Petitions for Review denied.
ass20 Cal. 3d at 429). "A bare allegation that the [product] had `a manufacturing defect' is an insufficient legal conclusion."
Id.
Here, the Court finds that the Scott and Riegel Breit complaints do not adequately assert claims for manufacturing defects under Twombly and Iqbal. For example, the Scott complaint alleges that the "ETCS systems and their various components were defectively designed and manufactured in that they were highly susceptible to malfunction caused by various electronic failures, including but not limited to short circuits and electromagnetic interference from electromagnetic sources outside the vehicle." (¶ 2 (italics added).) Plaintiff further alleges that "the Subject Prius, which was being used in a reasonably foreseeable manner, failed to perform as an ordinary consumer would have expected, failed to conform with its manufacturing specifications, failed to contain adequate warnings, and its design was a substantial factor in causing injuries." (¶ 130 (italics added).) Taken together, these two allegations seemingly allege a manufacturing defect. However, the Scott complaint does not offer any allegations of how the vehicle deviated from Toyota's intended design or other product models. See Lucas, 2010 WL 2867287 at *4. Instead, the Scott complaint offers bare allegations of a manufacturing defect, and thus dismissal is warranted.
Accordingly, Toyota's motion is granted as it pertains to Scott and Reigel Breit's allegations of manufacturing defects. The dismissal is without prejudice.
As noted previously, the Roberts and Akamike complaints do not allege manufacturing defect claims. Because the allegations in the Riegel Breit complaint are virtually identical to those inScott, the Court does not analyze them individually. The Court also recognizes that Toyota's Motion to Dismiss is cast in slightly different terms than those granted by the Court. However, because Twombly and Iqbal are at the forefront of Toyota's motion, and the manufacturing defect claims in the Scott and Riegel Breit complaints clearly fail to meet Twombly andIqbal, the Court grants Toyota's motion.
Leave to amend should be granted when amendment would not be futile. Lucas, 2010 WL 2867287 at *2 (citing Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002)). Because it is conceivable that Plaintiffs could allege facts sufficient to support a claim under a manufacturing defects theory of liability, the Court grants leave to amend.
* * *
With respect to Plaintiffs' design and warning defect claims, Toyota cannot credibly claim that it does not comprehend Plaintiffs' theory from the pleadings, nor that it is handicapped in responding to the Complaint.
B. Negligence
A negligence claim under California law requires plaintiff to allege that defendant "owed [plaintiff] a legal duty, breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of [plaintiff's] injury." Gonzalez v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 154 Cal. App. 4th 780, 793 (2007). "In the context of a products liability lawsuit, `[u]nder a negligence theory, a plaintiff must also prove . . . "that the defect in the product was due to negligence of the defendant."'" Id. (quoting Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 465, 479 (2001)).
Here, Toyota does not specifically challenge any particular element required for a negligence claim. Instead, Toyota broadly attacks the exemplar complaints on the same grounds that it challenged Plaintiffs' products liability claims, namely: Plaintiffs "fail to identify a defective cause of the alleged acceleration incidents," and as an issue of "fair notice" Plaintiffs must state "what is allegedly wrong with the vehicles other than conjecture that a brake override system could prevent an occurrence." (Defs.' Reply at 2.) The Court rejects Toyota's arguments for the reasons previously stated: Plaintiffs identify the alleged defect (i.e., Plaintiffs' cars suddenly and unexpectedly accelerate and do not stop upon proper application of the brake pedal), identify causes of the defect (e.g., an inadequate fault detection system and electronic failures), identify an alternative design that would have prevented the defect from injuring Plaintiffs (i.e., a brake override system), allege that the SUA risk was known by Toyota, and allege that Toyota did not disclose or eliminate the risk to Plaintiffs that culminated in Plaintiffs' injuries.
See Merril, 26 Cal. 4th at 480 (stating that "most of the evidentiary matters relevant to applying the risk/benefit test in strict liability cases are similar to the issues typically presented in a negligent design case," which is "not surprising, because to say that a product was negligently designed is to say it was defective, for purposes of establishing liability under a theory of negligence.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, Toyota's motion is denied as it pertains to Plaintiffs' negligence claims. Because the Court denies Toyota's motion, the Court similarly denies defendant The Hertz Corporation's motion to dismiss Count III of the Izenstark complaint for negligence. (Docket No. 372.)
The Hertz Corporation's ("Hertz") motion (Docket No. 372) expressly joined "Section III (A) and Section III (B)" of Toyota's motion, (Hertz Mem. at 5), and thereby limited itself to the issues raised by Toyota's motion: "The reasons for the dismissal of the Izenstark complaint by the Toyota defendants are the same reasons Hertz moves to dismiss the Izenstark complaint." (Hertz Mem. at 6.) Because Hertz does not offer additional grounds for dismissal in its moving papers, Hertz's motion is denied.
C. Conclusion for Products Liability and Negligence Claims
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Toyota's Motion to Dismiss the manufacturing defect claims in theScott and Riegel Breit complaints, but otherwise holds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged their products liability and negligence claims. The Plaintiffs in Scott and Riegel Breit are granted leave to amend.
IV. Breach of Express and Implied Warranties
The Court's previous rulings regarding the express and implied warranty claims, set forth in the Court's Economic Loss Order, are generally applicable to these same claims asserted by Plaintiffs in the personal injury/wrongful death cases.
In the Economic Loss Order, the Court dismissed with prejudice the express written warranty claims to the extent those claims were premised on defects in design rather than on defects in materials and workmanship. (Economic Loss Order at 57-59.) The remaining express written warranty claims, i.e., those premised on defects in materials and workmanship, are subject to the added requirement that a Plaintiff plead that he or she sought repairs, including in response to the recalls, during the relevant warranty period. (Id. at 52-55.) The claims of those Plaintiffs who cannot allege that they sought repairs during the relevant warranty period are dismissed with prejudice. (Id.)
Examining the four exemplar complaints, supra n. 1, two do not assert express warranty claims. (See generally Akamike FAC,Roberts FAC.) The two remaining exemplar complaints make only conclusory allegations regarding non-design defects that are insufficient to state an express warranty claim, and make no allegations regarding whether they sought repair during the relevant warranty period. (See Scott ¶ 130 (vehicle "failed to conform with its manufacturing specifications"); Riegel Breit ¶ 1 (referring to "electronic defects"), ¶ 127 (alleging that the vehicle was "defectively . . . manufactured"); cf. Roberts FAC ¶¶ 8-11 (making detailed factual allegations regarding "at least three design defects," including "inadequate fault detections systems," "components [that] are highly susceptible to malfunctions . . . such as short circuits, software glitches, and electromagnetic interference," and the "lack of a brake override system"); Akamike FAC ¶¶ 8-11 (same).)
Of course, the allegations regarding the design defects do not state a claim for breach of express warranty. The Court's reference to these factual allegations is merely illustrative of the type of factual allegations necessary to sufficiently plead a claim for breach of express warranty based on defects in material or workmanship.
The express warranty claims set forth in the exemplar complaints are therefore dismissed without prejudice.
In the Economic Loss Order, as to the implied warranty claim, the Court rejected a "dangerous instrumentality" argument substantially identical to that raised by Plaintiffs in response to the present Motions, which the Court rejects here as well. (Id. at 69-70.) Nevertheless, the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' implied warranty claims, notwithstanding the lack of vertical privity, because Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their third party beneficiary status. (Id. at 66-68.)
As they did in response to their Opposition to the Economic Loss Motion to Dismiss, in their Opposition to the present Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs indicate the intent to abandon the claim for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. (See Pltfs.' Opp'n at 3 n. 2.)
Here, none of the exemplar complaints set forth any factual allegations regarding the Plaintiffs' third party beneficiary status. As such, the implied warranty claims are dismissed without prejudice.
In opposition to the present Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs do not argue that third-party beneficiary status saves their implied warranty claims notwithstanding the lack of vertical privity. Nevertheless, the Court assumes Plaintiffs would request the opportunity to replead this issue, which appears to the Court, as pled in the MCC, to be equally applicable to Plaintiffs here.
V. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although at the time of the briefing of the Motions to Dismiss, the parties addressed the viability of a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing ("bad faith claim") under the present facts, upon a review of the current versions of the exemplar complaints to which Defendants' Motions to Dismiss refer, the Court finds no bad faith claim asserted. (Compare, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 92-98, Ross, et al. v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al., 10-5700 (Docket No. 1) (setting forth bad faith claim) with Ross FAC (Docket No. 10) (no bad faith claim asserted).)
Thus, the Court does not analyze the viability of a bad faith claim at this time.
VI. Fraudulent Concealment, Intentional Negligent Misrepresentation, and Rule 9(b)
A. Rule 9(b)
1. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), allegations of fraud "must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The Court recently summarized the case law applicable to Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement in its Economic Loss Order. (Docket No. 510 at 34-36, 77-78.) The Court adopts that discussion here.
2. Analysis
Toyota argues that Plaintiffs fail to identify "a single instance where Toyota directed a single material misrepresentation toward a single plaintiff, much less a material misrepresentation made with knowledge of its falsity." (Defs.' Mem. at 28.) However, Plaintiffs' fraud theory is based on fraudulent concealment, not active misrepresentation. None of the exemplar complaints contain claims for misrepresentation or negligent misrepresentation.
While not necessarily required to allege fraudulent concealment under Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs allege many instances where Toyota made partial representations and misrepresentations, giving rise to a duty to disclose, as explained below.
Plaintiffs no longer assert claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation in certain amended complaints. (See, e.g., Akamike FAC (Docket No. 8).)
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled fraud under Rule 9(b) to survive a motion to dismiss. In the exemplar complaints, Plaintiffs plead that Toyota concealed from Plaintiffs material facts regarding the SUA defect (e.g.,Roberts, ¶¶ 6-10, 75(b), 109-14, 125), going as far back as 2002 (e.g., Roberts, ¶ 50), for the purposes of avoiding escalating recall and public relations costs (e.g., Roberts, ¶¶ 100, 133, 135-36). Rather than disclosing the SUA defect to consumers, Toyota often blamed consumers for SUA-related problems. (Roberts, ¶¶ 70, 139.) These factual allegations state the "who, what, when, where, and how" of the fraudulent concealment. Thus, Rule 9(b) is satisfied.
Because the allegations in the exemplar complaints are nearly identical with respect to pleading particularity under Rule 9(b), the Court does not analyze them individually.
B. Fraudulent Concealment
1. Legal Standard
The Court recently summarized the case law applicable to fraudulent concealment and the duty to disclose under California law in its Economic Loss Order. (Docket No. 510 at 78-79, 81-86.) The Court adopts that discussion here.
2. Analysis
Toyota argues that Plaintiffs cannot allege that Toyota had an independent duty to disclose facts regarding the alleged ETCS defect because Toyota did not have exclusive knowledge of material facts that were not known or knowable to Plaintiffs, Toyota did not conceal any material facts where no Plaintiff alleges having made an investigation or having sought information from Toyota, and Toyota's opinions regarding the quality of its products are not actionable as representations of fact. (Defs.' Mem. at 21, 23, 24.)
Plaintiffs contend that Toyota had a duty to disclose the alleged defect because Toyota (a) occupied a superior position of knowledge regarding the condition of its vehicles; (b) made partial disclosures about the safety and quality of the subject vehicles without revealing their defective nature; and (c) fraudulently and affirmatively concealed the defective nature of the subject vehicles from Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., Roberts, ¶ 183.) Plaintiffs also contend that Toyota shared a relationship of "trust and confidence" with its consumers such that a duty to disclose arises. (Pltfs.' Opp'n at 14.) Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that a duty to disclose arises under California law regarding matters of public safety. (Id. at 20.)
a. Exclusive Knowledge
Toyota contends that the exemplar complaints do not include sufficient facts to support an exclusive knowledge claim. (Defs.' Mem. at 22.) Toyota also argues that Plaintiffs' exclusive knowledge claim is belied by the fact that the disputed facts were known and accessible to NHTSA, as well as part of the public record. (Id. at 23.)
Plaintiffs argue that if the facts were known to NHTSA and the public, Toyota would not have acquiesced to paying NHTSA a record $16.4 million fine for belatedly disclosing defects. (Pltfs.' Opp'n at 18.)
As an initial matter, the Court is mindful that remedial action such as repairing sticky accelerator pedals (even if not disclosed to NHTSA within five business days, resulting in a fine) does not support a permissible inference that Toyota fraudulently concealed a defect. See Tietsworth v. Sears, Roebuck Co., No. 5:09-CV-00288 JF (HRL), 2009 WL 3320486, at *5 (Oct. 13, 2009 N.D. Cal. 2009). Toyota's payment of a fine to NHTSA regarding sticky accelerator pedals is irrelevant to whether Toyota fraudulently concealed an underlying ETCS/SUA defect.
The Court finds that the exemplar complaints allege facts sufficient to demonstrate exclusive knowledge. While some facts surrounding SUA events were known to NHTSA and/or the public early on (e.g., Roberts, ¶¶ 52, 58), and others came to light more recently (e.g., Roberts, ¶¶ 73, 75(b), 81), Plaintiffs allege that Toyota had exclusive knowledge of the sheer magnitude and ongoing nature of the defect, as well as potential ways of identifying and correcting the defect. See, e.g., Roberts, ¶ 50 (internal recognition of SUA complaints, dating back to 2002; failure to uncover cause); ¶ 54 (internal Field Technical Report acknowledging that SUA was an "extremely serious problem for customers," expressing fear "of the frequency of this problem in near future"); ¶ 58 (knowledge of greater than 400% difference in SUA complaints in Camry models with ETCS not disclosed to consumers); ¶ 60 (receipt of a forensic report concluding presence of an ETCS defect); ¶ 90 (knowledge that recalls will not fix the problem and that software problems, faulty cruise control, and engine revs from using the air conditioning may be involved); ¶ 93 (no error codes shown, so SUA cannot be documented or replicated); ¶ 100 (convincing NHTSA to initially limit recall, saving Toyota over $100 million).
Taking Plaintiffs' allegations as true, Toyota had a duty to disclose the concealed facts because it had exclusive knowledge of those facts. See Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (sufficient allegations of exclusive knowledge where car manufacturer had exclusive access to aggregate dealership data, pre-release testing data, and numerous consumer complaints).
Toyota's reliance on Warner Constr. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 285, 294 (1970), does not diminish this duty to disclose. The Warner court stated that one circumstance in which non-disclosure is actionable is when "the facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff." Id.
While prospective customers could have been tipped off to the possibility of SUA by researching past complaints filed with NHTSA, many customers would not have performed such a search, nor would they be expected to. Moreover, searching publicly available information through NHTSA and/or the public record would have only revealed the tip of the iceberg, according to the factual allegations in Plaintiffs' complaints. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege facts that were known and accessible only to Toyota that were not known or reasonably discoverable by Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Roberts, ¶ 54 (internal Field Technical Report acknowledging that SUA was an "extremely serious problem for customers," expressing fear "of the frequency of this problem in near future"), ¶ 90 (internal knowledge that recalls will not fix the problem and that software problems, faulty cruise control, and engine revs from using the air conditioning may be involved), ¶ 106 (dealer Technical Service Bulletins acknowledging SUA), ¶¶ 109-14, 128, 134 (internal testing and knowledge of SUA), ¶ 122 (engineer with knowledge of SUA not presented to NHTSA), ¶ 125 (internal knowledge that aggregate number of complaints was approximately 37,900).
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a duty to disclose based on exclusive knowledge.
b. Concealment of Material Facts
Toyota argues that Plaintiffs cannot allege facts supporting the assertion that Toyota actively concealed information because Plaintiffs merely rely on conclusions regarding Toyota's interactions with NHTSA and others. (Defs.' Mem. at 23.)
The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient factual allegations to support a finding of active concealment at this stage based on alleged concealment of certain material facts.See, e.g., Roberts, ¶ 14 (concealed knowledge that brake override could prevent SUA), ¶¶ 16, 18 (concealing fact that recall was a safety measure meant to address design defect, not just a "confidence" booster); ¶¶ 17, 19(c) (recalls do not address design defect); ¶ 50 (concealing discovery of SUA defect in 2002 and the fact that "no known remedy exists . . . at this time"); ¶ 53 (internal recognition of "unwanted acceleration" in a Sienna); ¶ 70 (dealer acknowledging SUA is "normal for this model," yet not acknowledged by Toyota overall); ¶ 75(b) (ignoring 1,200 SUA complaints over eight-year period); ¶¶ 84, 87 (recalls do not address all SUA; Toyota hiding electronic defects); ¶ 92 (erroneously asserting that the ETCS software could not be faulted); ¶ 106 (dealer Technical Service Bulletins acknowledging SUA); ¶¶ 109-14 (concealment of internal testing and knowledge regarding SUA); ¶ 118 (concealment of relevant complaints from NHTSA); ¶ 121 (concealment of expert report regarding ETCS failure); ¶ 122 (concealing engineer who knew of electronic failures from NHTSA); ¶ 123 (removing reference to "vehicle speed control" problems); ¶ 125 (concealing actual number of complaints received reached 37,900); ¶ 128 (acknowledging it had a "less defensible product"); ¶ 130 (knowledge of SUA defect for at least three years); ¶ 134 (internal acknowledgment of SUA). Toyota cannot credibly claim that these facts, if true, are not material.
The foregoing allegations are sufficient to demonstrate active concealment at the pleadings stage. See Tietsworth v. Sears, Roebuck Co., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. 5:09-CV-00288 JF (HRL), 2010 WL 1268093, at *8 (Mar. 21, 2010 N.D. Cal. 2010) (active concealment sufficiently alleged where Plaintiffs contacted defendant for service of defective machines and were told there was no defect and/or denied free service or replacement parts).
While Toyota is correct that preventing a plaintiff from discovering an important fact is one way to demonstrate active concealment (Reply at 7, citing Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions ("CACI") No. 1901), it is not the only way. Active concealment standing alone is sufficient. See CACI No. 1901 (one method of proving concealment is for a plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant "actively concealed an important fact from [plaintiff]"). Whether Plaintiffs first sought to discover important facts before they were actively concealed is not controlling here. Plaintiffs plead fraudulent concealment, which by definition, means they could not be expected to seek facts which they had no way of knowing existed. See Baggett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (fraudulent concealment allegations are not expected to point out the specific moment when defendant failed to act).
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a duty to disclose based on concealment of material facts.
c. Partial Representations
Toyota argues that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that it made partial representations because the statements on which Plaintiffs rely are not representations of actionable facts, but rather general, vague, and unspecific assertions that a reasonable consumer would find to be promotional statements. (Defs.' Mem. at 25.)
Toyota makes similar arguments regarding allegedly false and/or misleading representations in their advertising materials with respect to claims falling under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500. The Court does not address these arguments because none of the exemplar complaints, as amended, raise this type of claim.
Plaintiffs argue that many of their allegations concern misrepresentations of material facts, and where the speaker has special knowledge of the subject, even opinion statements may be construed as actionable factual misstatements. (Pltfs.' Opp'n at 22 (citing Furla v. Jon Douglas Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1069, 1080-81 (Cal. App. 1998)).)
The Court agrees that some of Toyota's alleged statements may fairly be characterized as generalized opinions (e.g., Scott, ¶¶ 63, 121 ("high quality, reliable, and dependable", "outstanding quality, dependability, and peace of mind")). See Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 964, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Anunziato v. eMachines, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2005). These statements constitute "puffing" and are not analogous to the type of opinion that may be construed as actionable under limited circumstances. See 625 3rd St. Associates, L.P. v. Alliant Credit Union, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1051-52 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (construing CEO's opinion regarding the financial health and prospects of his company, when made in the context of a significant corporate transaction, as factual misstatements).
However, other statements cited by Plaintiffs have a factual basis and may be proven true or false during discovery. See, e.g., Roberts, ¶ 62 (stating to NHTSA there was "no evidence of a system or component failure" and "vehicles operated as designed"); ¶ 65 (representation that water damage caused SUA, no abnormality in ETCS); ¶ 66 (telling NHTSA the floor mat issue "is not a safety concern"); ¶ 75 (claiming vehicles were not defective and subsequently being rebuked by NHTSA for being "inaccurate" and "misleading"); ¶ 118 (stating to NHTSA that no defect trend had emerged and that ETCS could not fail in unknown ways); ¶ 126 (omitting reference to SUA in customer Q A document); ¶ 137 (falsely stating that "vehicle brakes would have restrained vehicle motion"); ¶ 138 (falsely stating that "there is no factor or trend indicating that a vehicle or component defect exists"); ¶ 139 (telling customer "[i]t is virtually impossible for this type of [SUA] incident to happen."). The foregoing allegations demonstrate Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged actionable statements.Anunziato, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 ("While some of eMachines' representations constitute puffery, others do not. . . . [A]t least some actionable statements have been pled.").
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a duty to disclose based on partial misrepresentations.
d. Trust and Confidence
Plaintiffs recognize that they have not explicitly pleaded a "fiduciary" or "confidential" relationship. (Pltfs.' Opp'n at 14.) However, Plaintiffs argue nonetheless that they formed a relationship of "trust and confidence" with Toyota, giving rise to a duty to disclose. (Id.) Plaintiffs support this argument by citing purposeful concealment of vehicle defects and partial representations regarding safety.
Plaintiffs conflate a duty to disclose under "concealment of material facts" and "partial misrepresentations," as discussed above, with the type of relationship contemplated by Ford v. Shearson Lehman Am. Express, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1020-22 (1986). In Shearson, the trust and confidence arose out of a fiduciary relationship between a client and his security broker and investment adviser where the individual ceded control over his stockholdings, which were subsequently liquidated in a scheme by the fiduciaries. This case is dissimilar because Plaintiffs allege no facts in support of finding a fiduciary or other confidential relationship based on Plaintiffs ceding control to Toyota, or a particular vulnerability on Plaintiffs' part.
Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not stated a duty to disclose under this factor.
e. Matters of Public Safety
Plaintiffs allege that the potential for SUA constitutes a safety hazard giving rise to a duty to disclose. (Pltfs.' Opp'n at 20.) Toyota contends that alleging a safety risk does not on its own give rise to a duty to disclose, it merely establishes that the alleged nondisclosure relates to a material fact. (Defs.' Mem. at 26.)
The Court finds that the risk of injury and/or death associated with the alleged SUA defect is the type of "unreasonable risk" that leads to a duty to disclose under California law. Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 836 (Cal. App. 2006). See also Falk, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1096 (citing as further strength of plaintiffs' defect allegations "the [alleged] risk of inadvertent speeding, driving at unsafe speeds, and accidents").
For the foregoing reasons, Toyota's motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment claims are denied.
C. Misrepresentation
Toyota argues that, for the same reasons Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate partial misrepresentations of fact, Plaintiffs fail to state intentional and negligent misrepresentation claims. (Defs.' Mem. at 25.)
Plaintiffs contend that Toyota's arguments are misplaced because none of the exemplar complaints allege misrepresentation claims. (Pltfs.' Opp'n at 20 n. 7.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. Because none of the exemplar complaints raise claims for misrepresentation and/or negligent misrepresentation, the Court declines to address Toyota's arguments at this time.
VII. Conclusion
As set forth herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part Toyota's Motions to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs are granted 45 days leave to replead; defendants have 60 days thereafter to respond.
IT IS SO ORDERED.