THIS was an action of slander; for pronouncing the words set forth by the declaration, in the following form, after the general introduction and averments, respecting the plaintiff's good fameand character: "That the defendant published, then and there, the following false, scandalous, lying, English words, of the plaintiff, in the hearing, c. to wit, You (him the said plaintiff, meaning) have taken a false oath, before squire Rush, (meaning that the said plaintiff had committed the crime of perjury, in a certain oath, by the said plaintiff, then lately taken, before William Rush, Esq. one of the Justices of the Peace, c. in and for the City and County of Philadelphia, in a cause before the said Justice, depending) and I (himself the said defendant meaning) can prove it: By reason whereof, c."
It appeared, on the trial of the cause, that the oath in question was voluntarily taken by the plaintiff, in order to satisfy the defendant upon a controverted fact, involved in the suit depending before the Justice, and in which the situation of the present parties was reversed: Mitchell, being then the plaintiff, and Rue, the defendant. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, with damages; but the cause was again brought before the Court, on a motion in arrest of judgment, which was founded on two grounds: 1st. That the words charged in the declaration, did not import perjury, in a legal acceptation of their meaning; and therefore did not, in themselves, independent of any injurious consequence to the plaintiff, render the speaker liable to an action at law. And, 2d. That the oath does not appear, in the declaration, to have been of a nature, that by taking it the party could commit the legal crime of perjury.
The President delivered the opinion of the Court, in the following terms.
SHIPPEN, President.
The sense in which words are received by the world, is the sense which Courts of Justice ought to ascribe to them, on the trial of actions for slander. Slander imports an injury; and the injury must arise from the manner in which the slanderous language is understood.
The words, in the present case, certainly import a crimes, and the inuendo (which the Jury have found to be true, and which, therefore, must govern our interpretation of the fact) shews that the reference was not to a matter of common conversation, but to an act committed before a Justice of the Peace, in relation to a cause actually depending.
Generally speaking, indeed, actions of slander, founded on triffling causes, to gratify a petulant and quarrelsome disposition, will not be encouraged by the Court: But, when the reputation, trade, or profession, of a citizen it really affected, for the sake of doing justice to the dearest interests of individuals, as well as for the sake of preserving public order and tranquillity, every appeal to the tribunals of our country ought to be liberally sustained.
Judgment for the Plaintiff.