1. A witness who hath never seen a person write, nor received letters from him, and who hath no knowledge of his handwriting but that derived from having received bank notes in the course of business, which purported to be signed by the person as the president of the bank, and were reputed to be genuine, is incompetent to prove his handwriting, or to prove that a bank note, purporting to be signed by him, is counterfeit; at least, unless the ordinary occupation of the witness is such as to render it probable that he has received and passed large sums, so as to become a skillful judge, and unless it appear that he has actually passed them so long ago as to allow time for the return of them, if spurious.
2. The modes of proving handwriting are by the evidence of those: (1) who have seen the person write, which is most certain; (2) who, in the course of correspondence, have received pertinent answers or other letters of such a nature as renders it highly probable that they were written by the person; (3) who have inspected and become acquainted with ancient authentic documents which bear the signature of the person.
3. Adjudged cases have not yet laid down other rules, though new cases may arise that will come within the reason of these.
4. And hence it seems that a witness having no knowledge of the handwriting of a person but that derived from the signatures to the bank notes, who is a banker, and, in that character, has habitually, for several years, received and paid away large sums in such notes, which he believed to be genuine, and were so reputed, is competent to prove that a note, purporting to be a bank note and to be signed by the same person, was not signed by him, and is counterfeit.
5. Although sufficient legal evidence be before the jury to justify the verdict, yet if improper testimony be admitted, after objection, a new trial will be ordered, because it cannot be known on which the jury relied.
TAYLOR, C. J.
The only methods of proving the handwriting of a person sanctioned by law are:
1. By a witness who saw him sign the very paper in dispute.
2. By one who has seen him write and has thereby (8) fixed a standard in his own mind by which he ascertains the genuineness of any other writing imputed to him.
3. By a witness who has received letters from the supposed writer of such a nature as renders it probable that they were written by the person from whom they purport to come. Such evidence is only admissible where there is good reason to believe that the letters from which the witness has derived his knowledge were really written by the supposed writer of the paper in question.
4. When a witness has become acquainted with his manner of signing his name by inspecting other ancient writings bearing the same signature, and which have been regarded and preserved as authentic documents. This mode of proof is confined to ancient writings, and is admitted as being the best the nature of the case will allow.
Other modes of proving handwriting not yet sanctioned by adjudged cases may possibly come within the reason of the cases enumerated, but I think they ought to appear clearly to do so before they are admitted. The court ought to be well satisfied that the person who proves the signatures on a bank bill, without having seen the signers write or having been engaged in a correspondence with them, were from their situation and pursuits likely to acquire a correct knowledge on the subject; and, particularly, that they must have known of the return of those bills they believed to be genuine if they had been spurious. The first witnesses in this case only knew that they had received bills in the course of business which purported to be signed by the president and cashier of the Augusta bank; that they passed them away, and if they were genuine the note in question was counterfeit. What was the occupation of the witnesses, whether they were likely to receive many bills and to acquire an accurate knowledge of the signatures are facts to which no evidence is directed. They may have received counterfeit (9) bills which may yet return, for it is not said when they received and passed them away. Such evidence, I think, inadmissible, especially as it requires much experience and a more than ordinary skill to detect counterfeit signatures to bank-notes. The fraudulent ingenuity of men has brought this crime to such perfection that even the signers themselves have sometimes been imposed upon. Hence, before witnesses are allowed to give evidence to the jury, the court ought to be satisfied that they are skilled in the knowledge of bank-notes. The evidence of Erwin approaches very nearly to my conceptions of what is proper on such a question, and if I were certain that the verdict was founded on his evidence and not on that of the other witnesses I should hesitate in agreeing to a new trial; but, as some improper testimony has been admitted, a new trial must be awarded.
HENDERSON, J.
The law requires that he who deposes to a fact should have the means of knowing it. Grounds of conjecture and opinions are not sufficient. A knowledge, therefore, of the handwriting of a person should be founded on specimens of writing known to be his. Having seen him write is the most certain. But it is said to satisfy the rule if the specimens be obtained in the course of a correspondence in which pertinent answers have been received or if they be ancient authentic documents. I am not disposed to go further, for there is nothing more dangerous than a relaxation of the rules of evidence. Their object is more to prevent imposition by falsehood than even to get at the truth; my meaning is, that the law prefers that many truths should be omitted than that one falsehood should be imposed on the court. The rules, therefore, guard more against the introduction of falsehood than against the suppression of the truth. In this case it is more than probable that the bank-notes which the witnesses had seen and from which they had (10) drawn their knowledge of the handwriting of the president and cashier of the bank were genuine, and therefore that the note passed by the prisoner was counterfeit. But this rests on bare probabilities, for it might well have happened that most or all of the notes from which they derived their knowledge were spurious. We cautiously refrain from giving any opinion upon the doctrines laid down in U.S. v. Holtsclaw, 3 N.C. 379. It does not appear here what the ordinary business of the witnesses was, how or when they received the notes, at what time they had passed them, or whether they had passed them at all, so as, if spurious, they might be returned upon them. All that those witnesses said may therefore well be true and yet the note in question be genuine. It is certainly better that the prosecutor should be put to the trouble of procuring better testimony than that a man should be punished in a case where it is quite possible he may be innocent. Many of these observations do not apply to Mr. Erwin; certainly he had a better opportunity of forming a correct judgment than any of the other witnesses. But even if he was admissible a new trial should be granted, because we cannot say on whose testimony the jury relied. Let there be a
New trial.
HALL, J., concurred.
Cited: S. v. Harris, 27 N.C. 291; S. v. Vinson, 63 N.C. 338; S. v. Shields, 90 N.C. 695; Williams v. Telephone Co., 116 N.C. 562; Jarvis v. Vanderford, ib., 152.
(11)