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Attorney(S)

No counsel appeared for the plaintiffs in this Court. B. F. Moore, for defendants.

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Joseph Knight and others v. John L. Knight and others (Supreme Court of North Carolina, June Term 1857)

Source document: Opinion (Pearson, J.). Cause removed from Court of Equity of Edgecombe County. Counsel: No counsel for plaintiffs in this Court; B. F. Moore for defendants.

Factual and Procedural Background

The testator, Lewis Barlow, executed a will containing a clause that gave certain named slaves to his son Billy Blount Barlow for life, and provided that if Billy had lawful heirs of his body then the slaves would go to those heirs and their heirs forever; but if Billy died without lawful heirs of his body, the slaves would be given to "the heirs lawfully begotten of the body of my daughter Louisa Knight, to them and their heirs forever." There is also a separate bequest to Louisa Knight elsewhere in the will.

Billy B. Barlow received the slaves with the executor's assent, held them for several years, and then died intestate without leaving any issue or descendants. At the death of the life tenant (Barlow), Louisa Knight had the following children then alive: John L. Knight, David B. Knight, Sarah L. Knight, Luther B. Knight, and Peter E. Knight. After that event, Peter E. Knight died and Joseph Knight administered his estate. The plaintiffs in this suit are also children of Louisa Knight but were born after the death of Billy B. Barlow (i.e., born since the termination of the life estate).

The bill filed by the plaintiffs seeks a share of the slaves as members of the described class (the heirs of Louisa's body) and a share of the part that belonged to the deceased Peter E. Knight (of whom Joseph Knight is administrator), claiming to be his next of kin along with the defendants. The defendants answered, asserting that only those children of Louisa who were born and in existence when B. B. Barlow died are entitled under the will.

The cause was set down for hearing on the bill, answer and exhibit, removed from the Court of Equity of Edgecombe County, and was submitted to this Court for trial and decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the phrase "heirs lawfully begotten of the body of my daughter Louisa Knight" (where the testator knew Louisa was alive when the will was made) should be construed to mean Louisa's children and descendants, and thus whether a class of takers is intended.
When a gift is made to a class (here, heirs or descendants of Louisa) but a prior life estate to another person (an intermediate estate) intervenes, whether the membership of the class is to be determined at the death of the testator or at the termination of the intermediate estate.
Whether children of Louisa born after the termination of the intermediate life estate (i.e., born after B. B. Barlow's death) are entitled to share in the remainder, or whether only those children in esse when the life estate ended take.
Whether next of kin of one of the class members who predeceased the termination of distribution (here, Peter E. Knight), are entitled to that deceased member's share even if those next of kin were born after the termination of the intermediate estate (subject to being living at the death of that class member).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

The defendants, by their answer, insist that under the rules of interpretation applicable to the will, only children of Louisa Knight who were born and in existence at the time B. B. Barlow (the life tenant) died can be included in the class entitled to the slaves.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any affirmative legal argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs in this Court; the bill's claim is stated but no developed legal argument by plaintiffs is reported.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from textual interpretation and established property-law principles as set out in the opinion:

Interpretation of "heirs of the body" where the testator knew the named person was alive: The Court holds that because the testator knew his daughter Louisa was alive when he made the will, the phrase "heirs of her body" must mean her children and descendants (so as to include a grandchild if the parent be dead). The Court cites the canonical axiom nemo est haeres viventis (no one is heir of a living person) to support this rule of construction.
Distinction between gifts to a class with and without an intervening estate: The Court explains two different rules depending on whether there is an intermediate particular estate (here, a life estate to B. B. Barlow).
If no intermediate estate is interposed (a direct gift to a class at the testator's death), the class is "enumerated" at the death of the testator; only those members in esse at that time can be called to take because personal property vests and ownership must be fixed so that property has an owner at all times.
Where a particular (intermediate) estate is interposed, the first taker (the life tenant) fills the ownership and possession during that period, and thus the call for the ultimate takers (the class) is deferred until the intermediate estate ends. The Court explains that, for personal property remainders, the class is to be ascertained at the termination of the preceding estate to effectuate the testator's intent to include as many members of the class as the law permits. Accordingly, only those who answer the description at the time the first estate falls in (i.e., at the life tenant's death) are entitled.
The Court distinguishes the rule for real property (where, in some circumstances, a descent may "open" to admit later-born heirs) from personal property, noting that the different rule for land does not apply to personal property remainders.
Application to facts: Because there was an intervening life estate to B. B. Barlow, the Court applies the rule that the class of Louisa's children is to be determined at the death of Barlow. Thus children of Louisa born after Barlow's death are excluded from taking as members of that class. Separately, the Court observes that Peter E. Knight, who was living at Barlow's death but who later died, left next of kin; any children of Louisa who were living at the death of Peter E. Knight (even if those children were born after Barlow's death) are entitled to Peter E.'s share as his next of kin if he left no children. The Court notes a reference may be necessary to ascertain the precise timing facts omitted in the pleadings (e.g., the date of Peter E.'s death) to implement this part of the decision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court decreed in accordance with the opinion's analysis. It held that the phrase "heirs ... begotten of the body of my daughter Louisa Knight" refers to Louisa's children and descendants, and because there was a life estate to Billy B. Barlow interposed, the class of takers is to be ascertained at the termination of that life estate. Therefore, only the children of Louisa who were living at the death of Billy B. Barlow are entitled as members of the class to the remainder; children born after Barlow's death are excluded from sharing as members of that class. Separately, any child of Louisa who was living at the death of a deceased class member (e.g., Peter E. Knight) is entitled to that deceased member's share as next of kin if the deceased left no children.

Implications: The direct effect is that the plaintiffs born after the death of the life tenant were excluded from the class share of the slaves, while the defendants (children in esse at the life tenant's death) take as class members. The Court further recognized that the next of kin of a deceased class member may take that member's share provided they were living at the deceased member's death; the opinion contemplates a factual reference to determine such details. The opinion applies established interpretive principles and property-law distinctions (including nemo est haeres viventis and the contrast between personal property and land rules) but does not announce or cite a new judicial precedent beyond these doctrines as stated in the text of the opinion.

Disposition: PER CURIAM — Decree accordingly.

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JOSEPH KNIGHT and others against JOHN L. KNIGHT and others.

A limitation by will, to the heirs or the heirs of the body of one known by the testator at the time of the making of the will to be alive, is construed to mean the children, and the descendants of deceased children, of such person.

Where a legacy is given to a class, if there be no intermediate estate, the class is enumerated at the death of the testator; but where there is an intermediate estate, the class is enumerated at the end of such intermediate estate.

The next of kin of one of the class, who is since dead, whether born before the termination of the intermediate estate, or after that event, are entitled to his share.

In the last will and testament of Lewis Barlow is contained the following clause:

"I leave to my son Billy Blount Barlow, during his natural life, the following negroes, namely: Paul, Frank, Maria, and Sam, and increase of any; and should my son aforesaid have a lawful heir or heirs begotten of his body, then the above-named negroes to them and their heirs forever; but in case my son aforesaid die without lawful heirs as aforesaid, the above-named negroes I give to the heirs lawfully begotten of the body of my daughter Louisa Knight, to them and their heirs forever." In another part of the will is a bequest to Louisa Knight.

The legatee for life, B. B. Barlow, received the said slaves, with the assent of the executor, and held them for several years, when he died intestate, without leaving any issue or the descendants of such. At the death of the tenant for life, Mrs. Louisa Knight had the following children, who were all then alive, to wit, John L. Knight, David B. Knight, Sarah L. Knight, Luther B. Knight and Peter E. Knight; but, after that event, the said Peter E. died, and Joseph Knight administered on his estate. These children of Mrs. Knight, and the administrator of the deceased, P. E. Knight, are made defendants.

The plaintiffs are the children of Mrs. Louisa Knight also, but born since the death of the holder of the life-estate, Billy B. Barlow.

The bill seeks for the plaintiffs, as constituting part of the class described, a share of the said slaves, and a share of the part of Peter E. Knight, deceased, of whom they, with the defendants, are the next of kin.

The defendants answered, insisting that only such children of Louisa Knight as were born when B. B. Barlow died, can, by the rules of interpretation applicable to this will, come within the description of the persons entitled.

The cause was set down for hearing upon the bill, answer and exhibit, and sent to this Court for trial.

PEARSON, J.

It appears by the will that the testator knew that his daughter Louisa was alive, hence the limitation to the heirs of her body must mean her children or descendants, (so as to take in a grand-child, if the parent be dead). This is a familiar rule of construction, as a consequence of the axiom nemo est haeres viventis.

We have then, a limitation of slaves to Billy B. Barlow for life, remainder to the children of Louisa Knight. Barlow is dead. The defendants are children of Mrs. Knight, who were born at the time of his death; the plaintiffs are children born since his death. The question is, do all the children take, or only those who were in esse at the time the particular estate terminated? Where a legacy is given to a class, e. g. to the children of A, and no particular estate is interposed, so that the question of ownership must be determined at the death of the testator, only such children of A who are in esse at the time and can answer to the call for an owner, are entitled to the property. This results from the fact that property, at all time, must have an owner, so as to belong to some one. After personal property once vests in possession, the ownership is fixed and cannot be divested without the act of the owner. A different rule has been applied to land, which is allowed, in the case of a descent cast upon a presumptive heir, to pass from his possession if a nearer heir be born, or to open and take in an heir of equal degree as a co-parcener. But this rule has no application to personal property.

Where, however, a particular estate is interposed, as in our case, the taker of the first estate answers the purpose of filling the ownership, and holding the possession; so, although the limitation over is vested, there is no absolute necessity of fixing the ownership in regard to it. With a view of taking in as many of the class as possible, so as to carry into effect the intention, as far as the rules of law will allow, the call for the owners of the ultimate estate is not made until the first estate falls in, and all who answer the description at that time, are entitled. This doctrine is stated in all of the text writers. By it the children of Mrs. Knight born after the death of Billy B. Barlow are excluded.

It is set out in the bill that Peter E. Knight, who is dead, and of whom Joseph Knight is the administrator, was a child of Mrs. Knight, and was living at the death of Barlow. It does not appear at what time this child died. Of course any of the children of Mrs. Knight, who were living at the death of Peter E. Knight, although born after the death of Barlow, are entitled to a share of his share as his next of kin, if he left no children. As to this there may be a reference to ascertain the facts, so as to supply the omission in the pleadings.

PER CURIAM, Decree accordingly.

KNIGHT v. KNIGHT