LEVIN v. RUSSELL, N.Y., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Samuel Hand ( Charles L. Spielthorn with him), for the appellant. Hooper C. Van Vorst, for the respondent.

Judges

Martin Grover

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a dispute over possession of certain goods. The respondent, Martin H. Levin, claimed ownership of goods that the appellant, Stephen P. Russell, had taken while acting as public administrator of the city of New York. Russell took possession believing the goods belonged to the intestate at the time of death. Levin brought an action against Russell personally for wrongful detention of the goods, alleging that they were his property and not the intestate's. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Levin, and Russell appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a public administrator acting in good faith can be held personally liable for taking property mistakenly believed to belong to the intestate.
Whether the complaint alleging unlawful detention can be maintained despite proof of an unlawful taking.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that the property taken was the same as that mortgaged by the intestate to the plaintiff.
Whether the mortgage was valid and given in good faith, thus protecting the plaintiff's interest against creditors.
Whether the plaintiff’s failure to file a statutory statement of interest affected his lien against creditors.
Whether the admission of the plaintiff's testimony regarding transactions with the intestate was erroneous.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The defendant, as public administrator, acted in good faith believing the property belonged to the intestate, thus no personal liability should attach.
The complaint alleging unlawful detention cannot be sustained on proof of an unlawful taking.
There was no sufficient evidence to prove the property taken was the same as that mortgaged by the intestate to the plaintiff.
The mortgage was fraudulent as against creditors of the mortgagor.
The plaintiff failed to file a statement of interest as required by statute, thus losing lien priority.
The plaintiff’s testimony about the transactions was incompetent and should have been excluded.

Respondent's Arguments

The public administrator is authorized only to take goods of the intestate, and has no power to seize goods belonging to others.
The action for wrongful detention was properly brought against the defendant personally.
There was proof of a demand and refusal to deliver the property after taking, supporting the claim for unlawful detention.
The mortgage was given in good faith to secure a debt owed by the intestate, thus valid against creditors.
The plaintiff took possession of the mortgaged property during the intestate’s lifetime and before any creditor liens attached, obviating the need for filing a statement.
The plaintiff’s testimony was admitted without proper objection, and the defendant waived any right to exclude it by failing to assign grounds for objection.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory powers of the public administrator, emphasizing that the administrator is authorized only to take goods of the intestate and has no authority to seize property belonging to others. Accordingly, personal liability may attach for wrongful detention of such property.

The court found the complaint sufficiently alleged wrongful detention and that evidence showed a demand and refusal to return the property, supporting the claim.

The court rejected the appellant’s argument that unlawful taking evidence could not support an unlawful detention claim, noting that the question was not raised in the case.

Regarding the identity of the property, the court held the plaintiff’s testimony, corroborated by others, was sufficient to establish that the property taken was the same as that mortgaged by the intestate to the plaintiff.

The defendant’s claim that the mortgage was fraudulent was addressed by the referee’s finding that the mortgage was given in good faith to secure a debt, which the court accepted as true.

The plaintiff’s failure to file a statutory statement was excused because the plaintiff had possession of the property before any creditor’s lien attached.

On evidentiary issues, the court explained that objections to testimony without assigned grounds are generally disregarded, especially when the opposing party has the opportunity to cross-examine and later seeks to strike the testimony without proper basis. Therefore, the denial of the motion to strike was not error.

Other exceptions to evidentiary rulings were examined and found without merit.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the respondent, Martin H. Levin.

The decision confirms that a public administrator cannot lawfully seize property not belonging to the intestate and may be held personally liable for wrongful detention. The ruling enforces the principle that possession under a good faith mortgage, supported by evidence, protects the plaintiff’s interest against claims of creditors and procedural defects like failure to file a statement. No new precedent was established beyond the direct effect of affirming the trial court’s judgment and costs in favor of the plaintiff.

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MARTIN H. LEVIN, Respondent, v. STEPHEN P. RUSSELL, Appellant.

GROVER, J.

The counsel for the appellant insists that the defendant having taken the property as public administrator of the city of New York in good faith, believing that it was the property of the intestate at the time of his death, no action will lie personally against him therefor, although the property was the plaintiff's, and not that of the intestate. In this the counsel is mistaken. Section 3 of the act (2d Statutes at large, 123) prescribing the powers and duties of the public administrator, in this respect only authorizes him to take the goods of the intestate. Section 42, page 131, making the corporation of the city liable for the application of all moneys received by the public administrator, according to law, and for the due and faithful execution of all the duties of office, confers no power upon him to seize and detain the goods of others in which the deceased had no interest. It follows that, if the goods in question were, as claimed, the property of the plaintiff, the action for detaining them from him was well brought against the defendant personally. The complaint contains all the allegations necessary to maintain the action. It alleges that the defendant had become possessed of and wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff the following goods, c., describing them, and concludes with a demand of judgment for their delivery to the plaintiff, and for damages for their detention. The judgment rendered is in accordance with the complaint. It is further insisted by the counsel for the appellant that the complaint charging an unlawful detention only, the action cannot be maintained upon proof of an unlawful taking. However this may be, the question does not arise in the present case. There was proof given tending to show a demand of the property by the plaintiff of the defendant after the taking and before the commencement of the action and a refusal to deliver the same. The referee has found that such demand and refusal was made. The counsel for the appellant also insists that there was no evidence showing that the property recovered was the same as that mortgaged by the intestate to the plaintiff. In this the counsel is mistaken. The testimony of the plaintiff, corroborated by other witnesses, was sufficient to warrant the finding of the identity of the property in suit with that mortgaged by the intestate to the plaintiff. The defendant having shown that he acted as public administrator in taking the property, and that subsequently he was appointed administrator of the mortgagor, had the right to show that the mortgage was fraudulent as against the creditors of the mortgagor (chap. 314, sec. 122, Laws of 1858). The evidence tended to show, and the referee has found that the mortgage was given in good faith for the purpose of securing the payment of a debt owing by the intestate to the plaintiff. There was evidence given in support of this finding. These facts must, therefore, be assumed as true by this court. This is an answer to this branch of the defence. The omission of the plaintiff to file a statement of his interest in the property, the mortgage, as required by statute, to preserve his lien against the creditors of the mortgagor, was obviated by the proof showing that the plaintiff took possession of the property by virtue of his mortgage in the lifetime of the intestate and before any lien of any creditor had attached, and that he retained such possession until the property was taken from him by the defendant. The testimony of the plaintiff as to the transactions between him and the intestate was not competent evidence against the defendant, and had such testimony been properly objected and excepted to, its admission would have been erroneous; but there was no ground assigned for the objection. It is the well settled law that objections to testimony without assigning any ground therefor will be disregarded, unless it clearly appears that the objection, if properly made, would have been decisive of the case, and could not have been obviated. It does not so appear in the present case. After the plaintiff had been examined and cross-examined by the appellant in regard to such transactions, the counsel for the appellant moved to strike out the testimony. This motion was denied by the referee, to which an exception was taken. It is entirely clear that a party who has sat by during the reception of incompetent evidence without properly objecting thereto, and thus taken his chance of advantage to be derived by him therefrom, has not, when he finds such evidence prejudicial to him, a legal right to require the same to be stricken out. The denial of the motion was not, therefore, any ground of exception. I have examined the other exceptions to the rulings of the referee upon the competency of evidence and think none of them well taken. The judgment appealed from must be affirmed with costs.

SMITH, J., also read an opinion for affirmance.

All concur except SUTHERLAND, J., who did not vote.

Judgment affirmed.

LEVIN v. RUSSELL