The admission of irrelevant testimony, which would be likely to prejudice the jury against one of the parties to a suit, and may have injuriously affected him in the trial of the cause, is a sufficient ground for granting a new trial. In an action brought by G. against C. to recover the expenses incurred by the former in the board, care and attendance, and funeral expenses of her daughter, the wife of the latter, where C. alleged in defence to the claim that his wife left his home without his consent, and refused his repeated requests to return to it, it was held, that evidence that C's wife said on her arrival at G.'s house in C.'s carriage and driven by his driver, that she should go back to him when he got moved, and that he was going to write her about it, was admissible for the purpose of showing that G. received C.'s wife as a visitor, and not as a deserter from her husband. Held further, that testimony that C., during the absence of his wife, went to balls and parties, and rode out with young ladies, and that he wrote a letter to another woman proposing matrimony, when he knew that his wife was fatally diseased, was inadmissible, as irrelevant to show that he had obliged his wife to leave, or to remain absent from, his home.
DURFEE, J.
We think the plaintiff was entitled to show that she received the defendant's wife simply as a guest or visitor, and not as a deserter from her husband. In this view, we think the statement made by the wife, on her arrival in the defendant's carriage, driven by his driver, was admissible.
We think the testimony that the defendant, during the absence of his wife, had attended balls, parties, and dinners, and ridden out with young ladies, was inadmissible for irrelevancy. It does not show that he had obliged her to leave, or to remain absent from his home, nor was it, in our opinion, evidence from which the jury could properly infer a contract on his part to pay for her support elsewhere. The admission of the letter proposing matrimony is open to the same objection. The writing of such a letter was doubtless heartless, and reprehensible in a high degree, but it did not necessarily imply a criminal purpose on the part of the defendant, his wife being, as was known to him, fatally diseased. There is nothing in the case to show that the letter, which was written previous to the separation, was the cause of the separation. In fact, it does not appear to have come to the knowledge of the wife. The testimony was, we think, irrelevant.
But though the testimony was irrelevant, it was of a kind which would be very likely to prejudice the jury against the defendant, and, considering the state of the testimony, may have injuriously affected him as a defendant in the cause. We therefore grant him a new trial.
New trial granted.