Case Summary: STATE v. ADDISON McADDEN AND ANOTHER (Supreme Court of North Carolina, June Term 1874)

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendants were indicted for forcible trespass and tried before Judge Watts at the Spring Term, 1874, of Granville Superior Court. The prosecutor (complaining witness) was a colored man who had possession of and claimed title to a certain cow. Two defendants came to the prosecutor's house; one defendant, McAdden, asserted the cow was his and announced his purpose to take possession. The prosecutor protested, stating that he had obtained the cow from one West and could prove his title by bringing West as a witness. While the prosecutor went to fetch West (who lived nearby), the defendants drove the cow out of a field (on land of one Wilkerson, who had permitted the prosecutor to place the cow there) and into the road a few yards outside the field. The prosecutor pursued, overtook them 100 to 150 yards beyond the draw bars, and in their presence twice demanded that they desist from driving away the cow. The defendants refused and drove the cow away. The jury below found the facts substantially as recited. The trial judge ruled the defendants not guilty. The Solicitor Cox appealed for the State to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendants' actions in taking and driving away the cow, after the prosecutor had asserted possession and, upon returning, forbade them from taking it, constituted a forcible trespass.
Whether the prosecutor's lack of physical resistance (combined with the fact that he was a colored man and there were two defendants) could be taken as evidence that he was put in fear and therefore that the defendants used force in taking the cow.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Fisher, 12 N.C. 504	Cited in the opinion; the text does not state the specific rule from the case.	Referenced at the point the Court directed certification so the lower court might pronounce judgment as upon a verdict of guilty.
S. v. Batchelor, 72 N.C. 468	The opinion does not specify the rule or principle from this precedent.	Listed in the opinion's citations without exposition or application in the body of the opinion.
S. v. Gray, 109 N.C. 793	The opinion does not specify the rule or principle from this precedent.	Listed in the opinion's citations without exposition or application in the body of the opinion.
S. v. Woodward, 119 N.C. 838	The opinion does not specify the rule or principle from this precedent.	Listed in the opinion's citations without exposition or application in the body of the opinion.
S. v. Robbins, 123 N.C. 738	The opinion does not specify the rule or principle from this precedent.	Listed in the opinion's citations without exposition or application in the body of the opinion.
S. v. Lawson, 123 N.C. 744	The opinion does not specify the rule or principle from this precedent.	Listed in the opinion's citations without exposition or application in the body of the opinion.
S. v. Jones, 170 N.C. 755	The opinion does not specify the rule or principle from this precedent.	Listed in the opinion's citations without exposition or application in the body of the opinion.
S. v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 663	The opinion does not specify the rule or principle from this precedent.	Listed in the opinion's citations without exposition or application in the body of the opinion.
S. v. Stinnett, 203 N.C. 832	The opinion does not specify the rule or principle from this precedent.	Listed in the opinion's citations without exposition or application in the body of the opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice Reade analyzed the trial facts and concluded that the defendants' conduct constituted the use of force sufficient for forcible trespass. He emphasized that there were two defendants and, so far as the record indicated, the prosecutor was alone. The Court noted that, beyond mere numerical superiority, the prosecutor's status as a colored man (while the defendants' race was not stated and thus assumed by the Court to be white) increased the effective force of the defendants' presence because "the feeling of subjection of the colored to the white race was calculated to add to the force of numbers."

The Court observed that the prosecutor, although he did not physically resist, had repeatedly and strenuously asserted his right to the cow, pursued the defendants, and in their presence forbade them from taking the cow. The prosecutor's lack of physical resistance, combined with his protests and pursuit, were taken as evidence that he was put in fear by the defendants' actions. The Court rejected any suggestion that the defendants' obtaining "actual possession" of the cow while the prosecutor was absent absolved them; because the prosecutor returned and forbade the taking in the defendants' presence, they nonetheless took the cow "out of the possession of the prosecutor, in his presence with a strong hand."

Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that the trial judge erred in holding the defendants not guilty. The opinion directs certification so the lower court may pronounce judgment as upon a verdict of guilty and cites State v. Fisher, 12 N.C. 504, in connection with that directive.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court held that there was error in the trial court's judgment and directed that the lower court pronounce the judgment of the law as upon a verdict of guilty.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the trial court's not-guilty judgment was set aside and the case was remitted so the lower court may enter judgment consistent with a guilty verdict for forcible trespass. The opinion applies existing authority (including a citation to State v. Fisher) but does not articulate broader doctrinal changes or announce a new rule beyond the Court's application of those authorities to the facts of this case.

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STATE v. ADDISON McADDEN AND ANOTHER.

Where the defendants, two white men, go to the house of the prosecutor, a colored man, and one of them claims a cow, (asserting his purpose to carry the cow away,) then in possession of and claimed by the prosecutor who protests against the defendant's taking the cow; and while the latter has gone to a neighbor's to procure evidence to prove his title, the defendants drive the cow off; they are guilty of a forcible trespass.

On the trial below the jury found substantially the following facts:

The prosecutor had in his possession and claimed a certain cow, when the defendants came to his house and McAdden claimed the cow to be his property, asserting his purpose to take possession. Prosecutor insisted that the cow was his, saying that he had obtained her of one West, and could prove by West that the cow was his property, and if the defendants would wait awhile he would go over to West's, who lived near by, and bring him over to where the parties (208) were, and prove that the cow was his. At this time the cow was in a field belonging to one Wilkerson, who had permitted the prosecutor to place her there. While the prosecutor was gone after West the defendants drove the cow out of Wilkerson's field, and when the prosecutor returned they had driven her into the road a few yards outside of the field. Prosecutor pursued defendants and overtook them about 100 or 150 yards beyond the draw bars through which they had driven the cow. The defendants did not have the cow tied or confined in any way; they were simply driving her before them. When the prosecutor got in sight he called to defendants and asked them to desist from driving his cow away, and when he got up to them he again demanded that they should desist from driving off his cow. Defendants refused and drove the cow away.

His Honor, upon the foregoing facts, being of opinion that the defendants were not guilty, gave judgment accordingly, from which judgment Solicitor Cox appealed for the State.

READE, J.

There were two of the defendants, and so far as appears, the prosecutor was alone. The force was therefore overpowering, supposing there was nothing to render it so but numbers; but it is stated that the prosecutor was a colored man, and as it is not stated that the defendants are colored, we assume that they are white, and we know that the feeling of subjection of the colored to the white race was calculated to add to the force of numbers. And the fact that the prosecutor did not offer resistance, although he strenuously insisted upon his right to the cow, and followed the defendants, forbidding them to take the cow, shows that he was put in fear.

It is not stated why his Honor held the defendants not guilty; and it may be that he was influenced by the fact that the defendants (209) got the actual possession of the cow while the prosecutor had stepped off to get a witness to prove his title. But that makes no difference, because the prosecutor returned and in their presence forbid them to drive off the cow. So that they did take the cow out of the possession of the prosecutor, in his presence with a strong hand.

There is error. This will be certified to the end that the Court below may pronounce the judgment of the law as upon a verdict of guilty. State v. Fisher, 12 N.C. 504.

PER CURIAM. Judgment accordingly.

Cited: S. v. Batchelor, 72 N.C. 468; S. v. Gray, 109 N.C. 793; S. v. Woodward, 119 N.C. 838; S. v. Robbins, 123 N.C. 738; S. v. Lawson, 123 N.C. 744; S. v. Jones, 170 N.C. 755; S. v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 663; S. v. Stinnett, 203 N.C. 832.

STATE v. McADDEN