SHUEY, EXECUTOR, v. UNITED STATES, U.S., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Attorney(S)

Mr. D.B. Meany and Mr. F. Carroll Brewster, for the appellant, cited 14 Pet. 448; 15 id. 337; 18 How. 92; 2 Curt. 617; 1 How. 290; 7 Wall. 666; 1 Nott H. 292; 4 S. R. 241; 14 id. 267; 4 Watts, 317; 7 Casey, 263; 4 Barr, 353; 3 P.F. Smith, 207; 15 id. 269; 2 id. 484. Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Edwin B. Smith, contra. The offer of a reward, general or special, is a promise conditional upon the rendition of the proposed service before the offer is revoked. Such an offer is revocable at any time before performance; and it is only by performance that it becomes a binding contract. Freeman v. Boston, 5 Met. 57; Loring v. Boston, 7 id. 409; Cummings v. Gann, 52 Penn. St. 590; Ryer v. Stockwell, 14 Cal. 137; Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio 285; Crocker v. N.L.R.R. Co., 24 Conn. 261; Janorin v. Exeter, 48 N.H. 83; Jones v. Phenix Bank, 4 Seld. 228; Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N.Y. 248. This offer was revoked Nov. 24, 1865. Ste. Marie had rendered no service to the United States: he, at least, had performed no condition of that promise before that date. The revocation was as public, and certainly as authentic, as the original promulgation of the proclamation. According to the terms of the original offer, Ste. Marie never did that which would have entitled him to $25,000, or any thing more than a "liberal reward," had there been no revocation. The terms of such an offer are rightly prescribed by the person offering it, and must be strictly complied with by him who claims the reward. Jones v. Phenix Bank, 4 Seld. 228; Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N.Y. 248; Clinton v. Young, 11 Rich. (S.C.) 546. His receipt of the $10,000 was in full of all equitable claim: legally, he had none. Marvin v. Treat, 37 Conn. 96; Sholes v. State, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 182; Calkins v. State, 13 Wis. 389.

Judges

William Strong

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case is an appeal from the Court of Claims. Henry B. Ste. Marie filed a petition in the Court of Claims seeking $15,000 as the balance of a $25,000 reward offered by the Secretary of War on April 20, 1865, for the apprehension of John H. Surratt, one of the alleged accomplices of John Wilkes Booth in the assassination of President Lincoln. The same proclamation also offered “liberal rewards” for information that would conduce to the arrest of the named criminals or their accomplices.

On November 24, 1865, the President published an order revoking the reward offered for Surratt’s arrest.

In April 1866, both Surratt and Ste. Marie were zouaves in the service of the Papal government. Ste. Marie informed the American minister at Rome (Mr. King) that he had identified Surratt, who had confessed his participation in the plot, and he provided further information and kept watch over Surratt at the minister’s request. Diplomatic efforts led to an order by the Papal government on Nov. 6, 1866, to arrest Surratt at Veroli. Surratt was arrested under that order but escaped during transfer, fled to Naples, and then to Alexandria, Egypt. The American minister took measures that led to Surratt’s rearrest in Alexandria. The minister arranged for Ste. Marie’s discharge from Papal service and sent him to Alexandria to identify Surratt.

At the time of the initial disclosure and through Surratt’s final capture, neither Ste. Marie nor the American minister knew that the reward had been revoked. The court found that the discovery and arrest of Surratt were entirely due to Ste. Marie’s disclosures, but the arrest itself was not made by Ste. Marie, either at Veroli or at Alexandria.

Under the Act of July 27, 1868 (15 Stat. 234, § 3), the United States paid Ste. Marie $10,000. The Court of Claims held that his services constituted providing information that conduced to the arrest—not an apprehension within the meaning of the proclamation—and that the statutory payment fully satisfied the government’s liability. The petition was dismissed. Ste. Marie died during the litigation, and his executor (Shuey) was substituted as appellant.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Ste. Marie’s actions constituted the “apprehension” of John H. Surratt, entitling him to the specific $25,000 reward, or merely the provision of information that conduced to the arrest, for which only a “liberal reward” was offered.
Whether the government’s public revocation of the reward before Ste. Marie’s actions barred any contractual right to the $25,000, notwithstanding Ste. Marie’s ignorance of the revocation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The opinion lists numerous authorities cited by appellant’s counsel, but it does not articulate the specific legal arguments advanced. The citations include: 14 Pet. 448; 15 id. 337; 18 How. 92; 2 Curt. 617; 1 How. 290; 7 Wall. 666; 1 Nott H. 292; 4 S. & R. 241; 14 id. 267; 4 Watts, 317; 7 Casey, 263; 4 Barr, 353; 3 P.F. Smith, 207; 15 id. 269; 2 id. 484.

United States (Appellee) Arguments

An offer of a reward is a conditional promise that is revocable at any time before performance; it becomes binding only by performance. The reward here was revoked on Nov. 24, 1865, before Ste. Marie rendered any qualifying service. The revocation was as public and authentic as the original proclamation.
Under the terms of the original offer, only apprehension (or apprehension by the claimant’s agents) would entitle a claimant to $25,000; providing information would warrant only a “liberal reward,” and strict compliance with the terms is required.
The $10,000 payment satisfied any equitable claim; legally, Ste. Marie had no further claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
14 Pet. 448	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
15 id. 337	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
18 How. 92	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
2 Curt. 617	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
1 How. 290	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
7 Wall. 666	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
1 Nott H. 292	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
4 S. & R. 241	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
14 id. 267	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
4 Watts 317	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
7 Casey 263	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
4 Barr 353	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
3 P.F. Smith 207	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
15 id. 269	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
2 id. 484	Cited by appellant; the specific principle is not described in the provided opinion.	Not discussed or applied by the Court.
Freeman v. Boston, 5 Met. 57	Offer of reward is revocable prior to performance; contract arises only upon performance.	The Court applied the general rule that the publicly offered reward was revocable and had been withdrawn before any qualifying performance; the opinion did not analyze this case specifically.
Loring v. Boston, 7 Met. 409	Offer of reward revocable until accepted by performance.	Same general application; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Cummings v. Gann, 52 Penn. St. 590	Reward offers are conditional and revocable before performance.	Same general application; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Ryer v. Stockwell, 14 Cal. 137	Contractual obligation on reward arises only upon performance.	Same general application; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio 285	Revocability of offers prior to performance.	Same general application; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Crocker v. N.L.R.R. Co., 24 Conn. 261	Reward/offer principles concerning revocation before performance.	Same general application; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Janorin v. Exeter, 48 N.H. 83	Revocability of reward offers before performance.	Same general application; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Jones v. Phenix Bank, 4 Seld. 228	Strict compliance with terms of reward offers is required.	The Court distinguished between apprehension and providing information, effectively requiring compliance with the offer’s terms; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N.Y. 248	Strict compliance/knowledge-performance rules regarding reward offers.	The Court required compliance with the distinct terms (apprehension vs. information); not discussed specifically by the Court.
Clinton v. Young, 11 Rich. (S.C.) 546	Claimant must meet the precise terms of the reward offer.	The Court’s analysis aligned with this principle; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Marvin v. Treat, 37 Conn. 96	Payment may satisfy equitable considerations where no legal claim exists.	The Court noted the $10,000 payment as full satisfaction for information; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Sholes v. State, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 182	Limits on legal entitlement to reward where conditions are unmet.	Aligned with the Court’s holding that no legal right to $25,000 accrued; not discussed specifically by the Court.
Calkins v. State, 13 Wis. 389	No legal claim to full reward absent performance of stated conditions.	Aligned with the Court’s conclusion; not discussed specifically by the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Distinct contractual promises: The proclamation offered (a) $25,000 for the “apprehension” of Surratt and (b) a “liberal reward” for information conducing to the arrest. The Court emphasized that apprehending a fugitive and providing information leading to arrest are “quite distinct things,” even if one leads to the other. The findings confirmed the distinction: the arrest was not made by the claimant, and those who made the arrest were not his agents.
Application to the facts: Because Ste. Marie did not apprehend Surratt or effect the arrest through his agents, he was at most entitled to the “liberal reward” for information. He in fact received $10,000 under the Act of July 27, 1868, which the Court treated as full satisfaction for such information.
Independent ground—revocation of the offer: Even if the foregoing were not dispositive, the Court held that the government’s offer of a reward for Surratt’s apprehension was revoked on Nov. 24, 1865, through publication. Offers made by public proclamation are revocable through the same public channel prior to acceptance by performance; no contract arises until the terms are complied with.
Ignorance of revocation immaterial: The findings showed that the claimant did not provide information until approximately five months after revocation. Although he was ignorant of the withdrawal, the Court deemed that fact immaterial for a publicly issued offer because the same publicity sufficed for revocation.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: Judgment affirmed.

Direct effect: The claimant (through his executor) is not entitled to the $25,000 reward for apprehension because he did not apprehend Surratt or cause the arrest through his agents. The $10,000 already paid under statute constitutes full satisfaction for providing information that conduced to the arrest.

Implications: The decision confirms two key principles: (1) when a reward offer distinguishes apprehension from information leading to arrest, only actual apprehension (or arrest by the claimant’s agents) earns the specific apprehension reward; information merits only the “liberal reward.” (2) A reward offer made by public proclamation may be withdrawn via the same public means before rights accrue, and no contract arises until the offer’s terms are performed; a claimant’s ignorance of the revocation is immaterial.

Show full summary ...

SHUEY, EXECUTOR, v. UNITED STATES.

1. Where a "liberal reward" was offered for information leading to the apprehension of a fugitive from justice, and a specific sum for his apprehension, — Held, that a party giving the information which led to the arrest was entitled to the "liberal reward," but not to the specific sum, unless he, in fact, apprehended the fugitive, or the arrest was made by his agents. 2. Where the offer of a reward is made by public proclamation, it may, before rights have accrued under it, be withdrawn through the same channel in which it was made. No contract arises under such offer until its terms are complied with. The fact that the claimant of such reward was ignorant of its withdrawal is immaterial.

APPEAL from the Court of Claims.

Henry B. Ste. Marie filed his petition in the Court of Claims to recover the sum of $15,000, being the balance alleged to be due him of the reward of $25,000 offered by the Secretary of War, on the 20th of April, 1865, for the apprehension of John H. Surratt, one of Booth's alleged accomplices in the murder of President Lincoln.

The court below found the facts as follows: —

1. On the 20th April, 1865, the Secretary of War issued, and caused to be published in the public newspapers and otherwise, a proclamation, whereby he announced that there would be paid by the War Department "for the apprehension of John H. Surratt, one of Booth's accomplices," $25,000 reward, and also that "liberal rewards will be paid for any information that shall conduce to the arrest of either of the above-named criminals or their accomplices;" and such proclamation was not limited in terms to any specific period, and it was signed "Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War." On the 24th November, 1865, the President caused to be published his order revoking the reward offered for the arrest of John H. Surratt. 13 Stat. 778.

2. In April, 1866, John H. Surratt was a zouave in the military service of the Papal government, and the claimant was also a zouave in the same service. During that month he communicated to Mr. King, the American minister at Rome, the fact that he had discovered and identified Surratt, who had confessed to him his participation in the plot against the life of President Lincoln. The claimant also subsequently communicated further information to the same effect, and kept watch, at the request of the American minister, over Surratt. Thereupon certain diplomatic correspondence passed between the government of the United States and the Papal government relative to the arrest and extradition of Surratt; and on the 6th November, 1866, the Papal government, at the request of the United States, ordered the arrest of Surratt, and that he be brought to Rome, he then being at Veroli. Under this order of the Papal government, Surratt was arrested; but, at the moment of leaving prison at Veroli, he escaped from the guard having him in custody, and, crossing the frontier of the Papal territory, embarked at Naples, and escaped to Alexandria in Egypt. Immediately after his escape, and both before and after his embarkation at Naples, the American minister at Rome, being informed of the escape by the Papal government, took measures to trace and rearrest him, which was done in Alexandria. From that place he was subsequently conveyed by the American government to the United States; but the American minister, having previously procured the discharge of the claimant from the Papal military service, sent him forward to Alexandria to identify Surratt. At the time of the first interview between the claimant and the American minister, and at all subsequent times until the final capture of Surratt, they were ignorant of the fact that the reward offered by the Secretary of War for his arrest had been revoked by the President. The discovery and arrest of Surratt were due entirely to the disclosures made by the claimant to the American minister at Rome; but the arrest was not made by the claimant, either at Veroli, or subsequently at Alexandria.

3. There has been paid to the claimant by the defendants, under the act of 27th July, 1868 ( 15 Stat. 234, sect. 3), the sum of $10,000. Such payment was made by a draft on the treasury payable to the order of the claimant, which draft was by him duly indorsed.

The court found as a matter of law that the claimant's service, as set forth in the foregoing findings, did not constitute an arrest of Surratt within the meaning of the proclamation, but was merely the giving of information which conduced to the arrest. For such information the remuneration allowed to him under the act of Congress was a full satisfaction, and discharges the defendants from all liability.

The petition was dismissed accordingly: whereupon an appeal was taken to this court.

Ste. Marie having died pendente lite, his executor was substituted in his stead.

MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.

We agree with the Court of Claims, that the service rendered by the plaintiff's testator was, not the apprehension of John H. Surratt, for which the War Department had offered a reward of $25,000, but giving information that conduced to the arrest. These are quite distinct things, though one may have been a consequence of the other. The proclamation of the Secretary of War treated them as different; and, while a reward of $25,000 was offered for the apprehension, the offer for information was only a "liberal reward." The findings of the Court of Claims also exhibit a clear distinction between making the arrest and giving the information that led to it. It is found as a fact, that the arrest was not made by the claimant, though the discovery and arrest were due entirely to the disclosures made by him. The plain meaning of this is, that Surratt's apprehension was a consequence of the disclosures made. But the consequence of a man's act are not his acts. Between the consequence and the disclosure that leads to it there may be, and in this case there were, intermediate agencies. Other persons than the claimant made the arrest, — persons who were not his agents, and who themselves were entitled to the proffered reward for his arrest, if any persons were. We think, therefore, that at most the claimant was entitled to the "liberal reward" promised for information conducing to the arrest; and that reward he has received.

But, if this were not so, the judgment given by the Court of Claims is correct.

The offer of a reward for the apprehension of Surratt was revoked on the twenty-fourth day of November, 1865; and notice of the revocation was published. It is not to be doubted that the offer was revocable at any time before it was accepted, and before any thing had been done in reliance upon it. There was no contract until its terms were complied with. Like any other offer of a contract, it might, therefore, be withdrawn before rights had accrued under it; and it was withdrawn through the same channel in which it was made. The same notoriety was given to the revocation that was given to the offer; and the findings of fact do not show that any information was given by the claimant, or that he did any thing to entitle him to the reward offered, until five months after the offer had been withdrawn. True, it is found that then, and at all times until the arrest was actually made, he was ignorant of the withdrawal; but that is an immaterial fact. The offer of the reward not having been made to him directly, but by means of a published proclamation, he should have known that it could be revoked in the manner in which it was made.

Judgment affirmed.

SHUEY, EXECUTOR, v. UNITED STATES