Assignment of wages to be earned — Trustee process.
A, being at work in the employment of B, desired to borrow money of C, and it was verbally agreed between the three that A should thereafter work for C (still in the employment and business of B as before), and B should pay over his wages to be earned to C. In an action by a creditor of A, wherein B was summoned as his trustee — Held, that the transaction must be regarded as an assignment by A to C of wages to be earned in the future, and so must be in writing, accepted by B, and filed with the town-clerk, according to Laws of 1873, ch. 9.
A coffin and grave-clothes, purchased by the defendant for his mother-in-law who died a member of his family, are necessaries so as to charge the trustee for the full amount in his hands.
FROM MERRIMACK CIRCUIT COURT.
LADD, J.
"No assignment of or order for wages to be earned in the future shall be valid against any creditor of the person making such assignment or order, until a copy of such order or assignment, duly accepted in writing on the back thereof, has been filed with the clerk of the town or city where the party making such order or assignment lives." Laws of 1873, ch. 9.
It seems to me very clear that the substance of the transaction between Smith, Leavens, and Sargent was a verbal assignment of his wages, to be earned in the future by Smith, to Leavens, and an acceptance of that verbal order by Sargent on behalf of the Granite Company. To give the arrangement then entered into the effect contended for on behalf of the trustee, — that is, of an employment of Smith by Leavens, and then a letting of him by Leavens to the company, — would be no less than putting form in the place of substance, and countenancing a clear evasion of the statute. I am of opinion that the trustee should be charged.
SMITH J.
The question before the circuit court, it is expressly stated, was as to the liability of the trustee, and that, it appears, was one mainly of fact. No question of discretion was reserved, nor does it even appear that the judge who tried the cause was called upon to exercise any discretion. I do not understand that it is disputed, that, if the arrangement between Leavens, Smith, and Sargent was in effect merely a verbal order from Smith to pay his future wages to Leavens, the arrangement would be illegal, because in conflict with chapter 9 of the Laws of 1873.
The circuit court must have found, as matter of fact, that such was the effect of the arrangement entered into; and unless the finding of that court was intended to be transferred, there does not seem to be any question before this court.
It would undoubtedly have been lawful for Sargent, as the agent of the Granite Company, to contract with Leavens to do the work which Smith was doing; and he might contract to do it personally, or procure it to be done, by Smith or any other third party. It is claimed here, on the part of Leavens, that it was agreed that Smith should work for Leavens, that Leavens should have credit with the company for his work, and that Sargent assented to this arrangement.
But I do not think the facts reported support this position. There is no satisfactory evidence that Leavens, in fact, entered into a contract to labor for the Granite Company, or to furnish the labor of Smith or any other person to the company. The terms of the arrangement are not what we should have expected, if the transaction had been what it is claimed it was. The substance of it seems to me very clearly to be merely a verbal assignment by Smith of wages to be earned, and as such was a clear evasion of the statute.
If the question whether the casket and grave-clothes were necessaries so as to charge the trustee for the full amount in his hands is before us, I am of opinion that they were — at least, to a reasonable amount.
CUSHING, C. J., concurred.
Trustee charged.