FOUR PACKAGES v. UNITED STATES, U.S., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Mr. S.G. Clarke for the claimants. The information is defective in not alleging a seizure on land within the Southern District of New York, and is not cured by the allegation that the collector "now has them within the district." Non constat, but that the seizure was in New Jersey, and the, goods then brought within the district. This is a jurisdictional fact, and necessary to be averred and proved. Act of 1789, sect. 9, 1 Stat. 77; Keene v. United States, 5 Cranch, 304; Act of March 2, 1799, sect. 89; The Washington, 4 Blatchf. 101; The Fideleter, 1 Abb. (U.S.) 577. Where the jurisdiction does not appear on the face of the record, it may be taken advantage of in arrest of judgment or on error. Donaldson v. Hogen, Hemp. 423; The Washington, supra. The evidence shows that, in point of fact, the seizure was made in the district of New Jersey. It was there that the customs officers took charge of the goods, and deprived the claimants of their possession. It is said, however, that having given a stipulation for the value of the goods proceeded against, we have admitted the jurisdiction of the court. But consent cannot give jurisdiction to the Federal courts. Bobyshall v. Oppenheimer, 4 Wn. 482; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393. Or to any court of limited jurisdiction, proceeding in rem. The Montague, 4 Blatchf. 461; United States v. Shares of Stock, 5 id. 231; United States v. Ninety-two Barrels, 8 id. 480. The proceedings being in rem, they are void, if it appears that the court is without jurisdiction. The taking of the stipulation was as much a void act as any thing else, unless the seizure was made in the district; the court had no jurisdiction to do any thing. As soon as the want of jurisdiction appeared, proceedings should have been stayed. Fisk v. Union Pacific Railroad, 6 Blatchf. 362; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657. The evidence offered and excluded was competent to show a sufficient permit for placing the packages upon the dock. United States v. Ninety-five Boxes, 19 Int. Rev. Rec. 101. The goods were not unladen and delivered from the steamship without a permit. United States v. Ninety-five Boxes, supra; Caldwell v. United States, 8 How. 366. If the placing of the packages on the dock with all the other baggage on board the steamship for examination did not forfeit them, then it is clear that they are not forfeited under the first count of the information. Six Hundred and Fifty-one Chests of Tea v. United States, 1 Paine, 499; Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch, 347. The fact that the goods were merchandise and not personal effects can have no bearing upon this question of landing without permit. The penalty of forfeiture is imposed upon goods as well as merchandise, and the personal effects are certainly goods; the fact that they might not be dutiable makes no difference. The Elizabeth, 2 Mason, 407. Therefore, if these packages were forfeited by being put over the side of the vessel, so were all the trunks which came over in the same manner, and likewise the vessel herself. Mr. Assistant-Attorney-General Smith, contra.

Judges

Nathan Clifford

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from an in rem forfeiture proceeding brought by the United States against four packages containing human hair and other dutiable articles imported by Hugo Seitz and Carl Breidbach, partners doing business as Hugo Seitz & Co. The United States alleged violations of sections 24, 46, and 50 of the Act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 627) and section 4 of the Act of July 18, 1866 (14 Stat. 178).

The steamship "Hansa" arrived at the port of New York from Bremen on April 23, 1873. The claimants, residents and businessmen in New York City, traveled as steerage passengers and brought with them the four packages at issue. After arrival within the port, the vessel proceeded to its dock or pier at Hoboken, New Jersey, owned by the Bremen line, and began landing passengers and their baggage on the dock.

Two customs inspectors, specially detailed for examination of steerage baggage, found the four packages on the Hoboken dock. The packages had been unladen and delivered there from the vessel by its officers or employees, without the inspectors' knowledge, and were claimed on the dock by the claimants as their property. Each package was in a wooden box similar to merchandise cases, containing some wearing apparel and personal effects, but also a substantial quantity of dutiable merchandise.

Evidence showed that the claimants had gone to Germany in March 1873 contemplating a partnership in hair-dressing and the manufacture and sale of switches, that the human hair in the packages was purchased there for that business, and that the other merchandise was fancy goods bought for and at the request of Breidbach’s father, a dealer in such goods in New York, to be delivered to him for sale. The packages had been produced to the officers of the "Hansa" when the claimants engaged passage and were treated by the ship’s officers as baggage.

Two packages were opened and examined on the Hoboken dock. When inspectors found dutiable goods not on the manifest, they marked all four packages so they would be identified later at Castle Garden, where steerage baggage containing dutiable articles was regularly sent for further inspection and collection of duties. It was proved that duties on such baggage were never collected at the Hoboken pier, and that no permit or document in the nature of a permit for unlading or delivery of these goods had been granted by the collector, apart from two documents later offered by the claimants.

The packages were then sent to Castle Garden in New York City, where they were seized and forwarded to the seizure-room at the custom-house. The claimants offered two official documents—a baggage inspection order (April 19, 1873) and a “General Order” (April 24, 1873)—as permits authorizing unlading and delivery of the goods. The district court excluded these documents, accepting the government’s position that they related only to the landing of passengers and baggage and were not the statutory permits required for the unlading and delivery of the dutiable merchandise in suit.

The information for condemnation and forfeiture was filed by the United States in the District Court for the Southern District of New York on May 8, 1873. The first count alleged that on April 25, 1873, the collector “seized on land” the four packages, “which he now has within said Southern District of New York, as forfeited,” on the ground that they had been “unladen and delivered from the steamship ‘Hansa’ within said port and collection district, without a permit.” The claimants appeared, pleaded the general issue (denying forfeiture), and the case went to a jury.

The district court directed a verdict condemning the goods as forfeited for having been unladen and delivered without a permit under section 50 of the Act of 1799. Judgment of forfeiture was entered. On writ of error, the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed. The claimants then brought the case to the Supreme Court of the United States on error.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, for jurisdictional purposes, the seizure of the four packages was made within the Southern District of New York (at Castle Garden) rather than at the Hoboken, New Jersey pier where the goods were first unladen and examined.
Whether the two documents offered by the claimants (a baggage inspection order of April 19, 1873, and a “General Order” of April 24, 1873) constituted statutory permits for the unlading and delivery of the goods, thereby precluding forfeiture under section 50 of the Act of March 2, 1799.
Whether, in light of the evidence, the district court erred in directing the jury to return a verdict condemning the goods for violation of section 50 of the Act of 1799 rather than submitting the case to the jury on factual questions, including whether the goods were unladen and delivered without a permit.

Arguments of the Parties

Claimants' Arguments

Defective information and lack of jurisdiction: The claimants argued that the information was defective because it did not allege that the seizure occurred on land within the Southern District of New York, and that the statement that the collector “now has them within the district” did not cure this omission. They contended that, for all that appeared, the seizure could have occurred in New Jersey and the goods then brought into the district. The place of seizure on land within the district was characterized as a jurisdictional fact that must be alleged and proved, relying on the Act of 1789, § 9 (1 Stat. 77), the Act of 1799, § 89, and authorities including Keene v. United States, The Washington, and The Fideleter.
Challenge to jurisdiction based on facts: They asserted that the evidence showed the seizure was in the District of New Jersey, because customs officers took charge of the goods and deprived the claimants of possession at Hoboken. They maintained that where jurisdiction does not appear on the face of the record, it may be challenged in arrest of judgment or on error, citing Donaldson v. Hogen and The Washington.
Consent cannot confer jurisdiction: Responding to the suggestion that by giving a stipulation for the value of the goods they had admitted jurisdiction, the claimants argued that consent cannot confer jurisdiction on federal courts or on any court of limited jurisdiction proceeding in rem. They cited Bobyshall v. Oppenheimer, Dred Scott v. Sandford, The Montague, United States v. Shares of Stock, and United States v. Ninety-two Barrels. They further contended that if the court lacked jurisdiction, the entire in rem proceeding, including the stipulation, was void and that proceedings should have been stayed as soon as the want of jurisdiction appeared, citing Fisk v. Union Pacific Railroad and Rhode Island v. Massachusetts.
Existence of a sufficient permit: The claimants argued that evidence they offered, including two customs documents, was competent to show a sufficient permit for placing the packages on the dock. They cited United States v. Ninety-five Boxes in support of their position that the goods were not unladen and delivered without a permit, and also relied on Caldwell v. United States.
No forfeiture under the first count if mere dock placement is not a violation: They maintained that if placing the packages on the dock with other baggage for inspection did not itself forfeit them, then they could not be forfeited under the first count of the information, citing Six Hundred and Fifty-one Chests of Tea v. United States and Peisch v. Ware.
Treatment of personal effects and “goods” for forfeiture purposes: They contended that the distinction between merchandise and personal effects was irrelevant to the question of landing without a permit because the forfeiture penalty is imposed on “goods” as well as merchandise, and personal effects are “goods,” regardless of dutiability. They cited The Elizabeth. They argued that if the claimants’ packages were forfeited merely by being put over the side of the vessel, the same would be true of all similarly landed trunks and even of the vessel itself.
Trial requests for instruction: At trial, the claimants requested jury instructions that: (a) no seizure within the court’s jurisdiction had been proved; (b) the government could not recover under section 50 of the 1799 Act; (c) no United States law forbids steerage passengers from bringing dutiable articles among their baggage or forfeits goods so brought; (d) the goods were not landed without a permit; (e) the landing occurred under customs officers’ direction and supervision, or under a baggage or general order permit, which precluded forfeiture under section 50; (f) the claimants themselves did not land the goods; and (g) in the absence of fraudulent intent in importation, the government could not recover.

United States' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Keene v. United States, 5 Cranch 304	Cited by claimants for the proposition that allegation and proof of a seizure on land within the district are jurisdictional requirements under the early customs statutes.	Relied on in the claimants’ jurisdictional attack; the Supreme Court did not expressly analyze or rely on this case in its opinion.
The Washington, 4 Blatchf. 101	Cited by claimants for (1) the need to allege a district-based seizure as a jurisdictional fact, and (2) the rule that lack of jurisdiction appearing on the record may be raised in arrest of judgment or on error.	Used by claimants to support their contention that the District Court lacked jurisdiction; not expressly discussed by the Supreme Court in resolving the case.
The Fideleter, 1 Abb. (U.S.) 577	Referenced by claimants as supporting the view that the place of seizure within the district is a necessary jurisdictional averment and proof in in rem customs proceedings.	Cited only in the claimants’ argument; the Supreme Court did not expressly apply this precedent.
Donaldson v. Hogen, Hemp. 423	Cited by claimants for the rule that where jurisdiction does not appear on the face of the record, the defect may be taken advantage of in arrest of judgment or on error.	Invoked by claimants to justify raising jurisdictional objections after trial; not analyzed by the Court.
Bobyshall v. Oppenheimer, 4 Wash. 482	Cited for the principle that consent cannot confer jurisdiction on federal courts.	Used by claimants to argue that their stipulation for value could not cure any jurisdictional defect; not directly discussed by the Court.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393	Cited by claimants for the broad constitutional principle that parties cannot, by consent, create jurisdiction in federal courts where it does not exist.	Relied upon in the claimants’ argument that jurisdictional defects cannot be waived; not expressly addressed by the Supreme Court in this opinion.
The Montague, 4 Blatchf. 461	Cited for the statement that consent cannot confer jurisdiction on any court of limited jurisdiction proceeding in rem.	Used by claimants to challenge the validity of the in rem proceeding if jurisdiction was lacking; not expressly applied in the Court’s reasoning.
United States v. Shares of Stock, 5 Blatchf. 231	Similarly cited to support the proposition that consent cannot create in rem jurisdiction in a court of limited jurisdiction.	Invoked by claimants; not discussed in the Supreme Court’s analysis.
United States v. Ninety-two Barrels, 8 Blatchf. 480	Cited with The Montague and Shares of Stock for the rule that parties cannot, by stipulation or consent, validate an in rem proceeding where the court lacks jurisdiction.	Relied on only in argument; not expressly considered in the Court’s opinion.
Fisk v. Union Pacific Railroad, 6 Blatchf. 362	Cited for the proposition that once want of jurisdiction appears, further proceedings must be stayed.	Used rhetorically by claimants; the Supreme Court did not base its decision on this authority.
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657	Also cited to support the principle that proceedings should cease once a lack of jurisdiction is apparent.	Referenced in claimants’ jurisdictional argument; not analyzed in the Court’s opinion.
United States v. Ninety-five Boxes, 19 Int. Rev. Rec. 101	Cited by claimants to show that their excluded evidence was competent to establish the existence of a sufficient permit for placing the packages on the dock, and that the goods were not unladen without a permit.	Relied upon by claimants to support their view of what constitutes a permit; the Supreme Court did not discuss this case and held the offered documents were not statutory permits.
Caldwell v. United States, 8 How. 366	Cited along with Ninety-five Boxes for the claim that the goods were not unladen and delivered without a permit.	Used solely in the claimants’ argument regarding permits; not mentioned in the Court’s substantive analysis.
Six Hundred and Fifty-one Chests of Tea v. United States, 1 Paine 499	Cited by claimants for the view that mere placement of goods on the dock for examination does not constitute a forfeiture-triggering unlading within the meaning of the statute.	Invoked to argue that the first count of the information could not be sustained; the Supreme Court did not rely on this precedent.
Peisch v. Ware, 4 Cranch 347	Cited with Six Hundred and Fifty-one Chests of Tea for the same proposition regarding the effect of landing goods on a dock for examination.	Relied upon in the claimants’ argument concerning the scope of forfeiture; not addressed by the Court.
The Elizabeth, 2 Mason 407	Cited by claimants to support the proposition that forfeiture penalties apply to “goods” as well as “merchandise,” and that personal effects can fall within “goods,” irrespective of whether they are dutiable.	Used to argue that, if putting the packages over the side forfeited them, it would equally forfeit all trunks and even the vessel; the Supreme Court did not engage this authority directly.
The Propeller Commerce, 1 Black 574	Cited by the Supreme Court in support of the proposition that the manner of sending goods to another place within the port for further examination and seizure can be proper and consistent with port usage in in rem customs cases.	Used to reinforce the Court’s conclusion that no seizure occurred on the Hoboken wharf and that sending the goods to Castle Garden, where they were seized, was correct and in accordance with the usage of the port.
The Slavers (Kate), 2 Wall. 350	Cited along with The Propeller Commerce and Greenleaf on Evidence as supporting authority for the Court’s treatment of seizure location and procedure in maritime in rem matters.	Relied upon to uphold the legality of the seizure at Castle Garden and the procedural steps leading to it.
Improvement Company v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442	Cited for the principle that where the evidence is uncontroverted and clearly establishes one result, the court may properly direct a verdict rather than submit the issue to the jury.	Used by the Supreme Court to justify the district court’s direction of a verdict condemning the goods, given the absence of opposing testimony.
Ryder v. Wombwell, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 39; Law Rep. 2 P.C. 235	English authorities cited for the same general proposition that, where evidence is one-sided on a material issue, a directed verdict is appropriate.	Invoked to support the Court’s conclusion that the instruction directing a verdict for the United States was proper in light of the undisputed evidence of unlawful unlading without a permit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court, through Mr. Justice Clifford, began by reciting the statutory framework. Under the Act of March 2, 1799, all goods imported from foreign ports must be landed in open day, and “none such shall be landed or delivered” from the importing vessel without a permit from the collector and naval officer, if any, for that unlading and delivery. Persons violating this regulation incur penalties, and all goods so unladen or delivered become forfeited and may be seized by customs officers.

The Court summarized the government’s evidence: four packages containing human hair and other dutiable merchandise were brought into the port of New York by the claimants as steerage passengers on the “Hansa.” Upon arrival, the vessel went to its Hoboken dock and began landing passengers and baggage. The four packages, presented to the ship’s officers as baggage, were landed on the dock along with other steerage baggage. Customs inspectors, assigned to examine such baggage, found the packages on the dock, opened two, and discovered dutiable goods not listed on the manifest. Each package was a wooden box typical of merchandise containers and contained both personal effects and significant quantities of dutiable merchandise. The packages were then marked for identification and sent to Castle Garden for further examination and collection of duties, consistent with the established practice that duties on steerage baggage are collected at Castle Garden, not at the Hoboken pier.

It was proven that no permit, nor any document amounting in law to a permit, had been issued authorizing the unlading or delivery of these goods, except for the two exhibits the claimants later offered. The District Court excluded those exhibits as not being the statutory permits required for unlading and delivery of dutiable goods and directed a verdict in favor of the United States.

The Supreme Court addressed three principal assignments of error.

1. Location and validity of the seizure (jurisdictional issue)

The first assignment contended that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the seizure purportedly was not made within its territorial jurisdiction. The Court rejected this argument, finding that “it is clear that the seizure of the four packages was made at Castle Garden, where the goods were sent by the inspectors present on the wharf, for final examination.” The Court noted that, as a matter of port practice, duties in such cases “are never collected on the wharf”; the examination there serves only to pass baggage without dutiable articles, while baggage containing dutiable goods is “uniformly sent to Castle Garden for the collection of the duties, or to be dealt with as the law directs.”

The Court emphasized that no seizure occurred on the Hoboken wharf where the goods were landed. The act of sending the goods from the wharf to Castle Garden, where the final examination and seizure took place, was characterized as “in all respects correct and in accordance with the usage of the port.” In support, the Court cited The Propeller Commerce, Greenleaf on Evidence, and The Slavers (Kate). On this basis, the Court held that there had been a “due seizure” at Castle Garden and overruled the jurisdictional assignment of error.

2. Exclusion of the claimed “permits”

The second assignment challenged the exclusion of two documents the claimants offered as statutory permits: an April 19, 1873 order directing the on-board inspector to examine passengers’ baggage and permit landing if only personal baggage was found (sending all other articles to public store), and an April 24, 1873 “General Order” instructing the inspector to send certain unpermitted packages to public store.

The Court held that “it is too clear for argument that neither of the exhibits offered in evidence was a permit for landing and delivering any package which contained dutiable merchandise.” The documents related to inspection and disposition of baggage and unpermitted packages generally, but the Court concluded they did not constitute the specific permit from the collector and naval officer contemplated by section 50 for the “unlading and delivery” of the particular dutiable goods at issue.

The Court also dismissed as immaterial the claim that inspectors were present on the wharf when the packages were unloaded and placed with other baggage. The decisive point was that, “as soon as the inspectors discovered that the packages contained dutiable merchandise, they ordered the same to be sent to the proper place for further inspection.” The presence or absence of inspectors at the moment of physical unloading did not convert the unlading into a permitted one within the meaning of the statute.

Accordingly, the Court sustained the trial court’s ruling that the offered documents were not statutory permits and that the evidence showed the packages had been unladen and delivered without the required permit.

3. Directed verdict and sufficiency of the evidence

The third principal issue concerned the propriety of the district court’s directed verdict. The Court found that, taken as a whole, “the evidence fully proved that the packages were unladen and delivered without the permit required by the act of Congress,” and that there was “no opposing testimony.” Given this uncontroverted proof of the statutory elements for forfeiture under section 50, the district court’s instruction directing the jury to find for the United States was “entirely correct.”

To support the propriety of a directed verdict in such circumstances, the Court cited Improvement Company v. Munson and Ryder v. Wombwell, including the related Privy Council report, as authorities establishing that where the evidence admits of only one reasonable conclusion, the court may withdraw the issue from the jury and direct a verdict.

The claimants had requested multiple instructions—asserting, among other things, that no seizure within the court’s jurisdiction was proved, that the government could not recover under section 50, that no law forbade steerage passengers from bringing dutiable goods as baggage, that the goods were landed under customs officers’ supervision or under a baggage/general order permit, that the claimants did not themselves land the goods, and that lack of fraudulent intent barred recovery. The district court refused all such requests and declined to submit to the jury the factual questions of whether the goods had been landed without a permit or imported contrary to law. The Supreme Court held it unnecessary to examine these additional assignments in detail because the instructions actually given—especially the directed verdict based on uncontroverted evidence of unlading without a statutory permit—“disposed of the case.”

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court’s final ruling was: JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

The Court held that the seizure of the four packages was validly made at Castle Garden within the Southern District of New York, consistent with established port usage, and that no seizure occurred on the Hoboken wharf. It further held that the two documents offered by the claimants did not constitute the statutory permits required for unlading and delivering dutiable goods under section 50 of the Act of 1799, and that the undisputed evidence established that the goods were unladen and delivered without such a permit. In light of the absence of contrary evidence, the district court properly directed a verdict condemning the goods as forfeited.

The immediate consequence of the decision is that the four packages are condemned and forfeited to the United States, and the judgments of both the District Court and the Circuit Court stand. The opinion applies existing statutory requirements regarding customs permits and in rem seizure practice to the specific facts of this case; it does not purport to announce a new legal rule or broader doctrine beyond that application.

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FOUR PACKAGES v. UNITED STATES.

1. On the arrival of the steamship "Hansa" at her pier or dock at Hoboken, N.J., certain packages were, without a permit or the knowledge of the customs inspectors, unladen by her officers as the baggage of steerage passengers. The customs officers having there examined the packages, and found them to contain articles subject to duty, so marked them for identification, and sent them to Castle Garden, New York City, for further examination. Upon such further examination at that place, and the failure to pay the duties, the packages were sent to the seizure-room at the custom-house. Held, that the seizure was made at Castle Garden, and not on the pier or dock at Hoboken. 2. It being fully proved that the packages were so unladen, the court below did not err in directing a verdict condemning them for a violation of the fiftieth section of the act of March 2, 1799 ( 1 Stat. 665).

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

This was an information filed by the United States in the District Court, May 8, 1873, for the condemnation and forfeiture of four packages, seized by the collector of customs for the port of New York as the property of Hugo Seitz and Carl Breidbach, composing the firm of Hugo Seitz Co., for a violation of sects. 24, 46, and 50 of the act of Congress approved March 2, 1799 ( 1 Stat. 627), entitled "An Act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage," and sect. 4 of the act of July 18, 1866 (14 id. 178), entitled "An Act further to prevent smuggling, and for other purposes." The first count of the information alleges that on April 25, 1873, the collector of the port of New York "seized on land the property described as four packages containing human hair and other articles, which he now has within said Southern District of New York, as forfeited to the United States," having been unladen and delivered from the steamship "Hansa," "within said port and collection district, without a permit from the collector and naval officer for such unlading or delivery," contrary to the fiftieth section of the act of March 2, 1799.

To maintain the issue on its part, the United States introduced evidence to show that the "Hansa" arrived at New York from Bremen, April 23, 1873, and that the claimants came in her as steerage passengers, and brought with them the said packages; that on her arrival she proceeded to her dock or pier at Hoboken, N.J., and commenced landing her passengers and their baggage on the dock; that two inspectors, specially detailed by the collector of customs for the port of New York for the examination of the baggage of steerage passengers, found said packages on the dock, they having been there unladen and delivered from said vessel, and claimed by the claimants as their property; that Seitz and Breidbach went to Germany in March, 1873, having in contemplation the establishment, on their return, of a partnership in the business of hair-dressing and the manufacture and sale of switches; that the human hair found in said packages was purchased in Germany for use in the manufacture of said switches, and that the other articles were fancy goods bought for and at the request of the father of Briedbach, who was a dealer therein in New York, and were intended to be delivered to him for sale. It was also proved that said packages were produced to the officers of the "Hansa" by the claimants, on engaging passage, as their baggage, and that they, with the baggage of other steerage passengers in said vessel, were put upon the dock at Hoboken by her officers, without any knowledge on their part of the contents thereof; that said packages having been subsequently examined on the pier by the inspectors, and found to contain dutiable articles, were so marked, in order to identify them at Castle Garden, where the proper officers were detailed for the purpose of collecting the duty, the baggage of steerage passengers being landed or delivered at that place, and the duties never being paid or collected on the pier at Hoboken; it was also proved that neither of said packages nor its contents was entered upon the manifest of the "Hansa," and that no permit or document in the nature of a permit, either in terms or legal effect, for the unlading or delivery of said packages or their contents had been granted by the collector of the port of New York; and that said packages having been sent to Castle Garden, were there seized and sent to the seizure-room at the custom-house in the city of New York. There was also evidence tending to show that the claimants imported said merchandise with the intent to secure its landing and delivery without paying the lawful duties thereon. The claimants thereupon offered in evidence the following papers as and for permits for the unlading and delivery of their goods: —

"CUSTOM HOUSE, "NEW YORK, April 19, 1873.

"The inspector on board the steamer `Hansa,' from Bremen, will examine the baggage of all the passengers, and if nothing be found but personal baggage, permit the same to be landed, and send all other articles not permitted, in due time, to the public store, 119 Greenwich Street and 24 Trinity Place.

THO'S G. BAKER, Dep. Collector.

"E. MANNING, Naval Officer."

" General Order.

"CUSTOM HOUSE, PORT OF NEW YORK, "COLLECTOR'S OFFICE, April 24, 1873.

"The inspector on board the German steamship `Hansa,' Brickenshime, master, from Bremen via Southampton, will send to the public store, No. Hoboken, all packages, when landed, and for which no permit or order shall have been received by him contrary to this direction, except perishable articles, gunpowder, new hides, explosive substances not permitted for consumption, which you will retain on board, and send notice of to this office. The usual weighing, gauging, and measuring to be done before sending goods under this order.

"R. WYNKOOP, Dep. Collector. "J.N.P., Hoboken."

The plaintiff admitted that said papers came from the official records of the office of the collector of the port of New York, but claiming that they were issued in connection with the landing of passengers and their baggage on the arrival of the "Hansa," and not as the permits required by law for unlading or delivering the goods, wares, and merchandise in suit, objected to their admission in evidence. The court sustained the objection and excluded the papers, whereupon the claimants excepted. The claimants also gave evidence tending to show their innocence of any intent to secure the unlading or delivery of the goods without paying the duties thereon. They thereupon requested the court to charge the jury to find for them on the ground that no seizure of the goods in question had been proved within the jurisdiction of the court; but the court declined so to charge, and the claimants excepted. The court thereupon directed the jury to return a verdict of condemnation of the goods, wares, and merchandise, in that the same were unladen and delivered from the "Hansa" without a permit, contrary to the fiftieth section of the act of March 2, 1799. The claimants requested the court to charge the jury that the plaintiff could not recover under the fiftieth section of the act of 1799; that no law of the United States forbids steerage passengers from bringing dutiable articles to this country with their personal effects as baggage, and that there is no law for forfeiting goods so brought; that the goods in question were not landed without a permit; that, having been landed under the direction and supervision of the officers of the customs, or under a baggage or general order permit, they were not forfeited under the fiftieth section of the act of 1799; that upon the facts in the case the claimants did not land the goods; and that in the absence of fraudulent intent on their part in the importation of the goods the government could not recover.

The court refused so to charge, and also to submit to the jury as questions of fact whether the goods had been landed without a permit in violation of said fiftieth section, or whether they were imported contrary to law.

The jury thereupon returned a verdict condemning the goods, and judgment of forfeiture was entered thereon; and that judgment having been affirmed by the Circuit Court, the claimants then brought the case here.

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

Goods imported in any ship or vessel from any foreign port or place are required by the act of Congress to be landed in open day, and the express provision is, that none such shall be landed or delivered from such ship or vessel without a permit from the collector and naval officer, if any, for such unlading and delivery. 1 Stat. 665; Gen. Reg. (1857), 145.

Persons violating that regulation are subjected to penalties; and the further provision is, that all goods, wares, and merchandise so unladen or delivered shall become forfeited, and may be seized by any of the officers of the customs.

Four imported packages containing human hair and other dutiable articles were seized on land by the collector; and the information alleges that the goods were brought into the port of New York in the steamer therein named, from a foreign port, and that the four packages were unladen and delivered from the steamer in which they were imported into the port without a permit from the collector and naval officer for such unlading and delivery. Seasonable appearance was entered by the claimants, and they pleaded the general issue, that the goods did not become forfeited as alleged, which was duly joined.

Pursuant to the issue between the parties, they went to trial before the district judge and a jury. Evidence to prove the allegations of the information was introduced by the district attorney, showing that the steamer arrived at the port from a foreign port at the time alleged, and that the claimants then and there came in the vessel as steerage passengers, and that they brought with them the said four packages containing the described goods; that on the arrival of the steamer within the port she proceeded to the dock or pier at Hoboken, N.J., owned by the Bremen line of steamships, to which she belonged, and commenced the landing of her passengers and their baggage on the dock; that two inspectors of customs, especially detailed by the collector of the port for the examination of the baggage of the steerage passengers, in the execution of their duty found the said four packages upon the said dock, the same having, without the knowledge of the inspectors, been there unladen and delivered on said dock from the vessel by the officers of the vessel or their employés, and having been then and there claimed by the claimants as their property; that the said four packages were each in a wooden box or case similar to boxes or cases used for the package of merchandise, with a cover connected therewith by hinges; that in each box were some articles of wearing-apparel and other personal effects not dutiable, but there was besides such articles a large quantity of dutiable merchandise.

Testimony was also introduced which showed that the claimants, being residents and in business in New York City, went together from there to Germany the month previous; that they then had in contemplation, on their return, the establishment of a partnership with each other to carry on the business of hair-dressing and the manufacturing of switches, and that the father of the junior partner is a dealer in fancy goods in New York City; that the human hair found in the packages was purchased in Germany to be used in the manufacture of switches for sale; and that the residue of the merchandise contained in the packages was fancy goods bought for and at the request of the father of the said junior partner, to be brought and delivered to him for sale in his said business.

Proof was also introduced by the district attorney showing that the packages were produced to the officers of the steamer by the claimants when they engaged their passage, as their baggage, and that the packages were unladen by the officers of the steamer and put upon the dock at the place of landing as such, without knowledge of their contents by the officers, with other baggage of the steerage passengers.

Two of the packages were opened and examined at the place where they were unladen; and it being found that each contained dutiable goods not on the manifest, the inspectors placed upon each of the four packages the usual marks to show that they had not been passed, but were to be sent to Castle Garden for further inspection and for the collection of the duties to which the same were subject; that no permit or document in the nature of a permit, either in terms or legal effect, for the unlading or delivery of the goods had been granted by the collector and naval officer of the port, otherwise than as set forth in the two exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants.

Those two exhibits were offered in evidence by the claimants as the permits required by law for the unlading and delivery of the four packages in question; but the district attorney objected to the admission of the same as not being the permits which the act of Congress requires in such a case; and the court sustained the objection and excluded the same, to which ruling the claimants excepted. Exceptions were also taken to the charge of the court. The verdict and judgment were for the plaintiffs; and the defendants sued out a writ of error and removed the cause into the Circuit Court, where the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. Though defeated in both of the subordinate courts, the respondents removed the cause into this court by the present writ of error.

Three principal errors were assigned, which will be separately considered: 1. That the seizure of the goods in question was not made at a port within the jurisdiction of the District Court. 2. That the court erred in refusing to admit in evidence the exhibits offered by the claimants as permits for the unlading and delivery of the goods. 3. That the court erred in directing the jury to find a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.

Much discussion of the first assignment of error is unnecessary, as it is clear that the seizure of the four packages was made at Castle Garden, where the goods were sent by the inspectors present on the wharf, for final examination. Sufficient appears to show that the duties in such cases are never collected on the wharf; that the examination made is only for the purpose of passing the baggage which does not contain any dutiable articles, and that the baggage which does contain dutiable goods is uniformly sent to Castle Garden for the collection of the duties, or to be dealt with as the law directs. Suffice it to say that no seizure was made on the wharf where the goods were landed, and that the proceeding in sending the goods to the place where the seizure was made was in all respects correct and in accordance with the usage of the port. The Propeller Commerce, 1 Black, 574; 3 Greenl. Evid. (8th ed.), sect. 395; The Slavers ( Kate), 2 Wall. 350.

Due seizure was made in this case at Castle Garden, and consequently the first assignment of errors must be overruled.

Nor does the second assignment of error require any considerable examination, as it is too clear for argument that neither of the exhibits offered in evidence was a permit for landing and delivering any package which contained dutiable merchandise. Opposed to that is the suggestion of the respondents, that two of the inspectors were present on the wharf when the officers of the steamer unloaded the packages and placed them with the other baggage for examination; but it is wholly immaterial whether the inspectors were present or absent at the moment the packages were landed from the steamer, as it clearly appears that as soon as the inspectors discovered that the packages contained dutiable merchandise, they ordered the same to be sent to the proper place for further inspection.

Taken as a whole, the evidence fully proved that the packages were unladen and delivered without the permit required by the act of Congress; and inasmuch as there was no opposing testimony, the direction of the court to the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiffs was entirely correct. Improvement Company v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442; Ryder v. Wombwell, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 39; Law Rep. 2 P.C. 235.

Repeated requests for instruction were presented by the respondents, all of which were refused. Some of the rulings of the court in refusing these requests are also assigned for error, but it is wholly unnecessary to examine those assignments, as the instructions given disposed of the case.

Judgment affirmed.

FOUR PACKAGES v. UNITED STATES