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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Andrew Kehn, was employed as a fireman at the old capitol by Superintendent Hyde starting May 1, 1880, and served continuously until he filed a claim before the board of audit in late 1881. Kehn sought payment at the statutory rate of $3 per day under the general appropriation act of 1875, which fixed firemen's compensation at that amount. Initially, Kehn was paid $3 daily, but from May 24, 1880, the superintendent, acting under the comptroller's direction, reduced the pay to $1.50 per day during summer months without Kehn’s agreement. Kehn accepted the reduced pay for some periods but refused it from June 30 to September 30, 1881, receiving no pay during that time. Kehn claimed the difference to recover full pay. The board of audit denied his claim, and the Supreme Court's General Term affirmed on two grounds: that Kehn was employed at $1.50 per day and not as a fireman, and that the statutory pay rate could be modified by agreement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant was employed as a fireman and at what pay rate.
  2. Whether the statutory pay fixed by law for firemen could be reduced by agreement between the parties.
  3. Whether the 1875 statute fixing firemen's pay applied to firemen employed in the old capitol during 1880 and 1881.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Kehn was employed as a fireman at the statutory pay rate of $3 per day as fixed by the 1875 general appropriation act.
  • He did not consent to any reduction in pay and is entitled to recover the difference for the periods when the pay was reduced without his agreement.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appellant was hired at $1.50 per day and was not employed as a fireman.
  • The statutory rate for firemen's pay could be modified and reduced by agreement between the parties.
  • The 1875 statute fixing pay did not apply to the firemen employed in the old capitol in 1880 and 1881 (raised on appeal but not by the General Term).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
People, ex rel. Satterlee, v. Board of Police, 75 N.Y. 38 Board of police commissioners cannot reduce a salary fixed by law and hire persons at less than the statutory sum. The court analogized this case to Satterlee, holding that statutory pay could not be reduced by agreement.
Goldsborough v. U.S. (Taney's C.C. Decisions, 80) Salary fixed by law cannot be reduced by agreement, regardless of officer status. Supported the court’s conclusion that statutory salary protections apply whether or not the person is an officer.
Montague's Adm'r v. Massey, 13 Reporter, 701 Acceptance of reduced pay does not estop a person from claiming full pay if legally entitled. Used to reject the argument that partial acceptance of reduced pay barred recovery of the full amount.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court found the evidence uncontroverted that Kehn was employed as a fireman and not in any other capacity, rejecting the claim that he was hired at $1.50 or employed as a laborer. The superintendent’s unilateral reduction of pay without agreement was deemed invalid. The court relied on precedent establishing that statutory salaries cannot be reduced by agreement or administrative discretion, citing People, ex rel. Satterlee and Goldsborough. The court further held that the 1875 statute fixing firemen's pay at $3 per day applied to the old capitol firemen in 1880-1881, as the statute was prospective and had not been repealed or limited to the year of enactment. Although the appellant accepted reduced pay for some periods, this did not preclude recovery of the full statutory salary. Consequently, the claim should have been allowed.

Holding and Implications

The judgments of the General Term and the board of audit are reversed, and judgment is rendered in favor of the appellant for the amount of his claim, with costs.

The direct effect of this decision is that the appellant is entitled to recover the full statutory salary of $3 per day for his service as a fireman at the old capitol during the relevant periods. The ruling reinforces the principle that statutory salary rates fixed by law cannot be unilaterally reduced by administrative action or by agreement without consent. No new precedent beyond the application of established salary protections was created.

ANDREW KEHN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent.

RAPALLO, J.

The uncontroverted evidence shows that on the 1st of May, 1880, the appellant was employed by Mr. Hyde, superintendent of the old capitol, as fireman therein, and continued to serve in that capacity from the time of his employment until the filing of his claim before the board of audit, which was in November or December, 1881.

He claims pay at the rate of $3 per day during that period by virtue of a provision in the general appropriation act of 1875, which reads as follows: "And the compensation of the men employed as firemen in the capitol is hereby fixed at $3 per day to each of them. Said salaries shall be paid upon the certificate of the keeper of the capitol."

The appellant was paid at the rate thus prescribed by law from the time of his employment up to the 24th of May, 1880, when the superintendent, claiming to act under the direction of the comptroller, refused to allow him more than $1.50 per day during the summer months, and he made this reduction for the periods from May 24, 1880, to September 30, 1880, from May 21, 1881, to June 30, 1881. The appellant received the reduced pay during these periods, but there is no evidence that he ever agreed to the reduction. From June 30, 1881, to September 30, 1881, he declined to receive the reduced pay, and has been paid nothing. The present claim is for the sums necessary to make up his full pay of $3 per day up to September 30, 1881.

The board of audit rejected the claim, and on appeal to the Supreme Court, the General Term sustained the decision on two grounds. First, that the appellant was hired and agreed to work for $1.50 per day, and was not employed as fireman. Second, that, if otherwise, the rate fixed by statute for fireman's pay might be modified and reduced by the agreement of the parties.

The first ground is we think wholly untenable under the evidence. The testimony is positive and uncontroverted that the appellant was employed as fireman, and not in any other capacity. The superintendent himself testified that he employed the appellant as one of the firemen on the 1st of May, 1880; that he did not discharge him as fireman, and did not hire him over as laborer; that fires were made during the summer months for the purpose of drying out the dampness; that these men (appellant and another) made the fires; that it was their duty to make them, and that they were on duty ready to make them. He does not allege that they ever agreed to a reduction in their pay, but testified that he used his own discretion as to the time when their wages should be reduced.

As to the second ground upon which the General Term place their decision, we think it comes within the decision of this court in People, ex rel. Satterlee, v. Board of Police ( 75 N.Y. 38), where it was held that the board of police commissioners could not reduce the amount fixed by law as the salary of a police surgeon and procure persons to act at a less sum than the statute prescribed. To the same effect is Goldsborough v. U.S. (Taney's C.C. Decisions, 80). In that case it was further held that it was immaterial whether the person whose salary is fixed by law is or is not an officer, so long as he is specified in the law fixing his salary.

The present case, however, is stronger than either of those cited. At the time the appellant entered into the service his pay was fixed by law, and there is no evidence that he ever consented to a change. It was reduced by the superintendent, and for a portion of the time the appellant took the reduced pay, but that does not estop him from claiming his full pay if he was legally entitled to it. ( Montague's Adm'r v. Massey, 13 Reporter, 701.)

On the present appeal the attorney-general raises the point that the statute of 1875, fixing the rate of appellant's pay, did not apply to the firemen employed in the old capitol building in 1880 and 1881, a ground not taken by the General Term. At the time of the passage of the act of 1875, the old capitol building was the only one known as the capitol. This name was declared by law and was to continue. The trustees of the capitol have its care and custody (Laws of 1830, chap. 249), and are not to assume control of the new capitol until the first of January following the demolition of the old capitol. (Laws of 1881, chap. 325, § 4.) The provision fixing the salaries of the firemen employed in the capitol had reference to the old capitol, and had not in 1881 been repealed. It was clearly prospective and not confined to the firemen in the service in 1875.

We think the appellant was entitled to a salary of $3 per day so long as he was retained as fireman and that his claim should have been allowed.

The judgments of the General Term and of the board of audit should, therefore, be reversed and judgment rendered in favor of the appellant for the amount of his claim, with costs.

All concur, except EARL, J., not voting.

Judgment accordingly.

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KEHN v. STATE OF NEW YORK
(Oct 2, 1883)