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Mr. Glenn, for the plaintiff. Mr. Holman, for the defendants.

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Case Summary: Laura Smith v. Samuel McDonald et als. — Supreme Court of North Carolina (October Term, 1886)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Laura Smith, brought a petition before a justice of the peace seeking allotment of a homestead and the personal property exemption from the estate of her deceased husband, Charles Smith. The parties agreed to a case stating the following facts: Charles Smith died intestate in 1886 owning a half-acre town lot in Danbury with a small storehouse (about $250) and personal property and solvent credits of about $500, with debts of about $300. No administrator had been appointed for his estate. No homestead nor personal property exemption had been allotted to him during his lifetime, nor had he applied for either. He left a surviving widow (the petitioner) and no children; his heirs at law were brothers and sisters. The creditors and heirs-at-law were made defendants and opposed the petition.

The justice of the peace granted the petition in favor of the widow. The defendants appealed to the Superior Court of Stokes County, where the justice's judgment was affirmed. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The Supreme Court considered the questions whether the widow was entitled to (1) the personal property exemption and (2) a homestead allotted out of her husband's lands where no allotment had been made during his lifetime.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the widow is entitled to the personal property exemption from the estate of her deceased husband where no personal property exemption had been allotted to the husband during his lifetime.
Whether the widow is entitled to have a homestead allotted to her out of the lands of her deceased husband when no homestead had been laid off or allotted to him in his lifetime.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff (Widow) — Position

The petition sought that the town lot and the personal property be assigned to the widow as a homestead and exemption for her benefit. (The opinion records the petition and relief sought; no detailed legal brief of the plaintiff's arguments is stated beyond the petition.)

Defendants (Creditors and Heirs-at-law) — Arguments

The defendants resisted the application on the ground that because the intestate had not applied for, nor had his homestead and exemption laid off and allotted to him during his lifetime, the widow could not now have them allotted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Johnson v. Cross, 66 N.C. 167	Holds that the personal property exemption provided by Art. X of the Constitution exists only during the life of the homesteader and, after his death, passes to his personal representatives to be administered.	The Court relied on this case to conclude the widow was not entitled to the personal property exemption after her husband's death.
Watts v. Leggett, 66 N.C. 197	Considered constitutionality of The Code, § 514 (act of 1868-9) and held the statute's purpose is to prevent prejudice to widow and children by omission of the homesteader to have the homestead laid off; the statute carries into effect Constitutional provisions and does not exceed them.	The Court cited Watts v. Leggett to support the proposition that the act of 1868-9 may be applied to enable a widow to obtain a homestead out of her husband's lands even though no allotment was made in his lifetime.
Branch, ex parte (Jemima Branch), 72 N.C. 106	Decision directly addressing a widow's petition after the husband's death, where no homestead had been allotted in his lifetime, holding the widow may have a homestead laid off and allotted to her.	The Court treated this case as directly in point and controlling on the question that the widow is entitled to a homestead despite no prior allotment to the husband.
Tucker v. Tucker, 103 N.C. 172	Cited in the opinion (no substantive principle from the case described in the provided text).	Cited; the opinion does not elaborate in the provided text how the case was applied.
Kirkwood v. Peden, 173 N.C. 462	Cited in the opinion (no substantive principle from the case described in the provided text).	Cited; the opinion does not elaborate in the provided text how the case was applied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded from the agreed facts and assumed the proceedings in the lower courts were regular. It addressed the personal property exemption and the homestead separately.

On the personal property exemption, the Court held that there was error in the lower courts' judgment to the extent that it awarded the exemption to the widow. Relying on Johnson v. Cross, the Court stated the constitutional personal property exemption exists only during the life of the homesteader and upon his death passes to his personal representatives for administration. There is no provision in the Constitution or statutory law giving the widow a right to have the personal property exemption allotted to her after the husband's death.

On the homestead question, the defendants argued that Art. 10, § 5 of the Constitution contemplates the widow's protection only when the owner of the homestead had been the "owner" (argued to mean one to whom the homestead had been laid off and allotted during his lifetime), and that The Code § 514 (act of 1868-9) could not enlarge constitutional benefits. The Court declined to re-litigate settled questions, citing prior decisions. It relied on Watts v. Leggett to uphold the constitutionality and purpose of The Code § 514, which the Court described as intending to prevent prejudice to widow and children by omission of the owner to have the homestead laid off in his lifetime and not to exceed the Constitution. The Court also cited Jemima Branch, ex parte (72 N.C. 106) as a directly controlling decision in which a widow obtained a homestead after the husband's death where no allotment had been made during his life. On that authority the Court concluded the widow in the present case was entitled to a homestead in her husband's land.

The Court therefore separated the two reliefs: it affirmed the widow's right to a homestead under controlling precedent and statutes construed in light of the Constitution, and it rejected her claim to the personal property exemption because that exemption terminates with the homesteader's life and passes to administrators.

The Court ordered the Superior Court's judgment reversed insofar as it granted the personal property exemption to the widow, and affirmed insofar as it granted the homestead. It remanded (certified) the case to the Superior Court of Stokes County to conform to this opinion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Superior Court's judgment insofar as it awarded the personal property exemption to the widow and affirmed the judgment insofar as it awarded a homestead to the widow out of her deceased husband's land.

Implications and direct effects:

The widow is not entitled to have the personal property exemption allotted to her after the death of the homesteader; that exemption exists only during the homesteader's life and the personal property passes to his personal representatives for administration.
The widow is entitled to have a homestead laid off and allotted to her from her deceased husband's land even though no homestead had been laid off or allotted to the husband during his lifetime, consistent with The Code § 514 as construed in Watts v. Leggett and the decision in Jemima Branch, ex parte.
The decision applies existing North Carolina precedents and statutory construction; the opinion does not purport to create a new rule beyond applying those authorities. The case was remanded for disposition consistent with this ruling.

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LAURA SMITH v. SAMUEL McDONALD et als.

Homestead and Personal Property Exemptions.

1. The personal property exemption exists only during the life of the homesteader, and after his death his widow has no right to have it allotted to her.

2. A widow who has no homestead of her own, is entitled to have one allotted to her out of the lands of her deceased husband, even although no homestead was allotted to him during his life.

( Johnson v. Cross, 66 N.C. 167; Watts v. Leggett, 66 N.C. 197; Branch, ex parte, 72 N.C. 106, cited and approved).

The petition was filed before a justice of the peace by the plaintiff, as widow of Charles Smith, to have her homestead and personal property exemption laid off and allotted to her, in the property of her deceased husband.

The following facts were admitted by counsel upon a case agreed, after the defendants, who were the creditors and heirs-at-law of Charles Smith, had made themselves parties defendant before the justice of the peace.

Charles Smith died intestate on the _____ day of __________, 1886, owning at the time of his death, one-half acre lot in the town of Danbury, on which is a small store house, as the only improvement, worth about two hundred and fifty dollars, and no other real estate. He also owned personal property, and solvent credits to the amount of about five hundred dollars, and at the time of his death was indebted to the amount of about three hundred dollars. There had been no administrator appointed to administer his estate. No homestead nor personal property exemption had been allotted to him previous to his death, nor had he ever applied for the same.

At the time of his death, he left him surviving the petitioner, his widow, and no children, but brothers and sisters as his only heirs-at-law.

The petition in this case is on the part of the widow, to have the above-mentioned town lot and personal property assigned to her as a homestead and exemption for the benefit of herself.

At the time of his death he was indebted to Samuel McDonald and others to the amount of about three hundred dollars.

From the above facts it is for the Court to say whether the said Laura Smith is entitled to a homestead and personal property (165) exemption in the above-mentioned house and lot and personal property.

The creditors and heirs-at-law resist the application, on the ground that inasmuch as the intestate had made no application for, nor had his homestead and exemption laid off and allotted to him during his lifetime, that she cannot now do it.

Upon this state of facts the justice of the peace gave judgment for the petitioner, granting the prayer of the petition, from which the defendants appealed.

In the Superior Court, the judgment of the justice was affirmed, and the defendants appealed to this Court.

ASHE, J. (after stating the facts).

We assume that the proceedings had in the Court below were regularly taken, as no objection was made in this Court upon that ground.

As to the personal property exemption, we think there was error in the judgment of the Court below. The widow was not entitled to that exemption. There is no provision in the Constitution, nor any act of the Legislature, which gives her such a right. In Johnson v. Cross, 66 N.C. 167, it is held, that the personal property exemption provided by Art. X of the Constitution, and laws passed pursuant thereto, exists only during the life of the homesteader, and after his death passes to his personal representatives, to be disposed of in a due course of administration.

But there was no error in the judgment so far as it gave to the widow her homestead in the land of her husband. The defendants contended that the widow was not entitled to a homestead in the land of her deceased husband, unless it had been laid off, and quantity and valuation fixed with some definite description, in the lifetime of the husband, for § 5, Art. 10, of the Constitution provides, "If the owner of a homestead die, leaving a widow, but no children, the same shall be exempt (166) from the debts of her husband, and the rents and profits thereof shall inure to her benefit, during her widowhood, unless she be the owner of one in her own right." That the meaning of this provision is, that the widow is not entitled to a homestead in the lands of her husband unless he himself was the owner of the homestead, which he cannot be unless it has been laid off and allotted to him in his lifetime, and that the act of 1868-'69 (The Code, § 514), cannot have the effect of enlarging the benefits given by the Constitution.

It is too late to raise these questions, for they have been too well settled by the decisions of this Court.

The constitutionality of the section of The Code referred to, was considered and decided in the case of Watts v. Leggett, 66 N.C. 197, when PEARSON, C. J., who delivered the opinion of the Court, held that, "the manifest purpose of the act of 1868-9, Chap. 137, (The Code, § 514), is to prevent the widow and children from being prejudiced by the omission of one entitled to a homestead to cause it to be laid off in his lifetime. It cannot be supposed that the effect of the statute is to go beyond the Constitution, when its professed object was to carry into effect its provisions."

And as to the other exception taken by the defendants, that the widow was not entitled to a homestead because it had not been allotted to her husband in his lifetime: Without going into a discussion of the question, and showing that the husband is the owner of the homestead, because he was the owner of the land, and the title to the homestead, thereon was vested in him by the Constitution, and not by virtue of any act of the Legislature, we need only refer to the case of Jemima Branch ex parte, 72 N.C. 106, which is a case directly in point, and a decision of the question under consideration. That was a case where the widow, after the death of her husband, no homestead having been allotted to him in his lifetime, filed her petition before a justice of the peace to have a homestead laid off and allotted to her in the land of her deceased husband. The creditors had themselves made parties defendant (167) before the justice, and from the judgment therein rendered in favor of the plaintiff, appealed to the Superior Court, where the judgment of the justice was sustained, and upon an appeal to this Court, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed.

The only difference in the facts of that case and this is, that there the husband had made a conveyance of his land to a trustee for the benefit of certain creditors, in which was the following claim: "Except so much thereof as may be laid off and assigned as a homestead under the act of Assembly, and which is expressly excepted from this conveyance." That claim in the deed in no way distinguished that case from this, for by the exception in the deed, the land remained liable to the homestead, just as if no deed had been made.

The judgment of the Superior Court must be reversed, so far as it relates to the exemption of the personal property, and affirmed as to the homestead. Let this be certified to the Superior Court of Stokes County, that the case may be disposed of in conformity to this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cited: Tucker v. Tucker, 103 N.C. 172; Kirkwood v. Peden, 173 N.C. 462.

SMITH v. McDONALD