IN RE HAWKINS, PETITIONER

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, John P. Hawkins, libelled the yacht Lurline and claimant in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to enforce a state law lien under a maritime contract for repairs. Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner. The claimant appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. After briefs were filed, the claimant contended that the value of the work and materials furnished by the libellant had not been proved. The libellant's counsel took depositions to support these points. The claimant moved to suppress these depositions, and the Circuit Court of Appeals granted the motion, suppressing the depositions on the grounds that the testimony was available at the District Court trial, the libellant was not prevented from presenting it, and was adequately informed of its materiality.

Following this suppression, an application was made for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Circuit Court of Appeals to receive and consider the depositions as part of the admiralty appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Supreme Court can, by mandamus, review the judicial action of a Circuit Court of Appeals in refusing to receive further proofs offered by an appellant in an admiralty cause pending on appeal.
Whether parties in admiralty appeals have an absolute right to offer new evidence on appeal, or whether such right is subject to the discretion of the Circuit Court of Appeals.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

The suppression of depositions by the Circuit Court of Appeals was unlawful.
Under prior Supreme Court decisions (The Lucille, The Charles Morgan, and The Hesper), an admiralty appeal constitutes a new trial, entitling the appellant to present new evidence.
Section 862 of the Revised Statutes and Admiralty Rules 49 and 50 secure the right to present new proofs on appeal, and these remain unrepealed and binding on the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Circuit Court of Appeals’ rules limiting new evidence to permission granted at the court’s discretion unlawfully restrict the statutory and established right to new evidence on admiralty appeals.
The petitioner sought mandamus relief to compel the Circuit Court of Appeals to receive and consider the depositions in accordance with the admiralty practice and statutory rights.

Opposing Counsel’s Position

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee’s legal arguments beyond noting opposition by Mr. John Murray Mitchell.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
The Lucille, 19 Wall. 73	An admiralty appeal is considered a new trial, entitling parties to present new evidence.	Referenced by petitioner to support the right to new evidence on admiralty appeal.
The Charles Morgan, 115 U.S. 70	Same principle as The Lucille: admiralty appeals allow new evidence as part of a new trial.	Used by petitioner to argue against suppression of depositions.
The Hesper, 122 U.S. 256	Affirmed that admiralty appeals constitute new trials with rights to new proofs.	Supported petitioner’s claim of statutory and rule-based rights to new evidence.
In re Morrison, ante 14	Mandamus cannot be used to review judicial actions of lower courts exercising legitimate jurisdiction.	Applied by the Supreme Court to deny mandamus relief.
Ex parte Morgan, 114 U.S. 174	Mandamus is not a proper remedy to control discretionary judicial decisions.	Supported denial of mandamus petition.
Ex parte Burtis, 103 U.S. 238	Mandamus does not lie to review judicial acts within jurisdiction.	Referenced to affirm the court’s refusal to intervene.
Ex parte Schwab, 98 U.S. 240	Mandamus cannot be used to control judicial discretion in a court’s proceedings.	Applied to support denial of mandamus relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court recognized that the Circuit Court of Appeals exercised legitimate judicial jurisdiction when it suppressed the depositions. The court noted that the testimony was available at the District Court trial and that the petitioner was not prevented from presenting it at that time. The petitioner was adequately informed of the materiality of the testimony at the close of the trial. The court further explained that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to review or control judicial decisions made within a court’s jurisdiction and discretion. Citing prior cases, the Court emphasized that it cannot compel the Circuit Court of Appeals to receive and consider evidence through mandamus. Therefore, the petition for leave to file a mandamus petition was denied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court denied leave to file a petition for mandamus to compel the Circuit Court of Appeals to receive and consider depositions offered as new evidence on appeal in an admiralty case.

Implications: This decision confirms that the Supreme Court will not use mandamus to control the discretionary judicial actions of a Circuit Court of Appeals in admiralty appeals. The ruling leaves intact the discretion of appellate courts to regulate the admission of new evidence on appeal and does not establish a new precedent expanding the right to new testimony beyond existing statutes and rules. The direct effect is a denial of the petitioner’s requested relief without altering established admiralty appellate procedures.

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In re HAWKINS, Petitioner.

Mr. George A. Black, for the petitioner, contended that the act of the Circuit Court of Appeals and of the Judges thereof in suppressing the depositions was unlawful in that, by the decisions of this court in The Lucille, 19 Wall. 73, The Charles Morgan, 115 U.S. 70, and The Hesper, 122 U.S. 256, an admiralty appeal is a new trial, and by Section 862 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and Admiralty Rules 49 and 50 of this court, the right on such new trial to give new proofs is secured to petitioner; and that said statute, rules and decisions remain unrepealed and in full force, and are binding upon said Circuit Judges and said Circuit Court of Appeals and had been disregarded by them.

With the petition the following paper was also presented, entitled "Brief of Amici Curiœ on petition for mandamus:"

"The undersigned, advocates in admiralty, practising as such in the Second Circuit, appear as Amici Curiœ in the above proceeding, and respectfully show to this court:

"That from the foundation of the judicial system of the United States until within a few years back, under the practice on appeal in admiralty cases from the District to the Circuit Courts, the appellant had the right to take new testimony to be used on his appeal, when he had in his petition of appeal stated that he desired to have his appeal heard on new evidence. That such right to take new testimony on appeal was according to the ancient practice of the admiralty, and was recognized by the Supreme Court, which made rules regulating the mode in which such new testimony should be taken, which rules have never been repealed by the Supreme Court. That the statute creating the new Circuit Court of Appeals merely provided for a review of decrees of the District Court by appeal, which, of course, in admiralty cases, must be an admiralty appeal, which has always been held to be a new trial.

"That the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit soon after its organization . . . adopted the following rules:

"`RULE 1. The appeal shall be heard on the pleadings and evidence in the District Court unless the appellate court on motion otherwise order.'

"`RULE 7. Upon sufficient cause shown, this court, or any judge thereof, may allow either appellant or appellee to make new allegations or pray different relief, or interpose a new defence or take new proofs. Application for such leave must be made within fifteen days after the filing of the apostles, and upon at least four days' notice to the adverse party.'

"`RULE 8. If leave be given to take new testimony, the same may be taken and filed within thirty days after the entry of the order granting such leave, and the adverse party may take and file counter testimony within twenty days after such filing.'

"That the effect of these rules is that the right to take new testimony on appeal, which the parties to an admiralty suit have always had, has been taken away, and for it has been substituted a right to apply to a judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals for permission to take new testimony, which he may grant or refuse, at his discretion.

"That, in the case of Hawkins v. The Yacht Lurline, the Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered certain depositions which had been taken to be used on the trial of the appeal to be suppressed.

"That the undersigned have read the brief of the advocate for the appellee in answer to the motion made to suppress such depositions, and that said brief seems to them to show that the right of the benefit of new testimony on the trial of an appeal in admiralty has been given by statute and the rules of the Supreme Court.

"That, if such statutory right existed, it does not seem to be within the proper scope of the power of the Circuit Court of Appeals to take it away by a rule governing its own practice.

"We therefore request that the Supreme Court will examine into the question, and will determine whether in admiralty appeals the parties have the right to offer upon the trial of the appeal such evidence (whether new evidence or evidence taken in the District Court) as they shall see fit, or whether the taking of new evidence is a mere privilege, to be granted, or not by the Judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals in his discretion.

"And that the Supreme Court, if it shall determine that the parties have such a right, may take such measures, by a mandamus or otherwise, as shall secure such right.

"Robert D. Benedict, of Benedict Benedict.

"Wilhelmus Mynderse, of the firm of Butler, Stillman Hubbard, 54 Wall St., New York.

"Geo. Bethune Adams, of Wilcox, Adams Green, 69 Wall St., New York.

"Wm. W. Goodrich, of Goodrich, Deady Goodrich.

"Joseph F. Mosher, of Carpenter Mosher, 62 Wall St., N.Y.

"Everett P. Wheeler, of Wheeler, Cortis Godkin.

"Harrington Putnam, of the firm of Wing, Shoudy Putnam.

"Sidney Chubb.

"Henry Galbraith Ward, of Robinson, Biddle Ward.

"William D. Guthrie, of Seward, Guthrie Morawetz.

"David Willcox, of Bristow, Peet Opdyke.

"Frank D. Sturges, of the firm of Owen, Gray Sturges.

"Wm. G. Choate, of the firm of Shipman, Larocque Choate.

"Wm. D. Shipman, of Shipman, Larocque Choate.

"Wm. G. Wilson, of Wilson Wallis.

"Henry T. Wing, of Wing, Shoudy Putnam.

"J. Langdon Ward, of North, Ward Wagstaff.

"Mark Ash, of Alexander Ash.

"James J. Macklin, of Stewart Macklin.

"F.R. Coudert, of Coudert Brothers.

"Treadwell Cleveland, of Evarts, Choate Beaman.

"Lorenzo Ullo, of Ullo, Ruebsamen Cochran.

"Lewis Cass Ledyard, of Carter Ledyard.

"Wm. Allen Butler, of Butler, Stillman Hubbard."

Mr. John Murray Mitchell opposing.

This court cannot, by mandamus, review the judicial action of a Circuit Court of Appeals in refusing to receive further proofs offered by an appellant, in an admiralty cause pending in that court on appeal.

THE petitioner libelled the yacht Lurline and claimant in the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of New York, to enforce a state law lien under a maritime contract for repairs. Judgment having been rendered in favor of the petitioner, the claimant appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Upon the filing of the briefs of counsel, it appeared that the claimant proposed to contend that the value of the work and materials furnished by the libellant under the contract had not been proved. Thereupon libellant's proctor gave notice to take testimony on these points and did take such testimony. The counsel for claimant moved to suppress these depositions, which motion was granted and the following opinion filed:

Per Curiam. Motion granted, for the reason that the testimony taken on deposition in this court was available to libellant on the trial in the District Court, witness and books being both present there; that it does not appear he was prevented from presenting such testimony except by his own choice; that he was as well informed as to its materiality under the issues when he closed his case as he is now, and was expressly notified by respondent's motion to dismiss, that the latter contended libellant's proof as to the amount of labor performed was insufficient.

Thereupon application was made here for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court of Appeals, directing the judges to receive the depositions, and to give them the consideration which in law they were entitled to receive, according to the practice of courts of admiralty.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE:

This is an application on behalf of John P. Hawkins for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and to the judges thereof, commanding them to receive and duly consider certain depositions or further proofs taken by petitioner on appeal in an action pending in that court wherein he is the libellant and appellee. The depositions in question were suppressed by the court on motion and for reasons given.

We cannot by mandamus review the judicial action thus had in the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction. In re Morrison, petitioner, ante, 14; Ex parte Morgan, 114 U.S. 174; Ex parte Burtis, 103 U.S. 238; Ex parte Schwab, 98 U.S. 240.

Leave to file the petition is

Denied.