SPENCER v. McDOUGAL

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Docket Number

No. 245.

Attorney(S)

Mr. Louis D. Brandeis for plaintiff in error. Mr. Edwin H. Abbot, Mr. Howard Morris, and Mr. William H. Dunbar were on his brief. Mr. George G. Greene and Mr. A.B. Browne for defendant in error.

Judges

David Josiah Brewer

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from an action of ejectment filed by the plaintiff in error in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Wisconsin. The plaintiff sought to recover possession of specific parcels of land located within the city limits of Ashland, Wisconsin. The land's title was based on an agreement between two railroad companies, a patent issued by the State of Wisconsin to one of those companies, and a deed from that company to the plaintiff. The defendant challenged the plaintiff's title by asserting preëmption claims filed in 1858, contending these claims excluded the land from the railroad grant. The core dispute concerns the validity of a withdrawal order issued by the Commissioner of the General Land Office in 1856, which removed the land from preëmption or sale in connection with the railroad land grants. The case reached the Supreme Court on error from the Circuit Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the June 12, 1856, order by the Commissioner of the General Land Office withdrawing the land from preëmption or sale was valid despite covering more land than included in the congressional grant.
Whether the filing of preëmption declaratory statements in 1858 created valid claims that excluded the land from the operation of the railroad grant.
Whether the land department's withdrawal of land beyond the precise limits of the grant can be judicially reviewed or disregarded by the courts.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff in Error's Arguments

The plaintiff's title is based on a valid agreement between the railroad companies, a state patent, and a deed, establishing ownership of the contested land.
The land was within the place limits of the railroad grants and thus passed to the Omaha company or was transferred to it by agreement.

Defendant in Error's Arguments

The defendant contended that two preëmption declaratory statements filed in 1858 created valid claims that excluded the land from the railroad grant.
Argued that there had been no valid withdrawal of the land by the land department before those filings, so the preëmption claims attached to the land.
Maintained that the simple filing of these statements was sufficient to exclude the land from the operation of the grant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Walcott v. Des Moines Co., 5 Wall. 681	Validity of land withdrawal by the land department even if it exceeds the limits of a congressional grant.	The Court held that a withdrawal of lands beyond the terminus of a grant was valid and that such withdrawal excluded those lands from subsequent railroad grants. This precedent supported upholding the 1856 withdrawal order despite its broad scope.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the timeline and nature of the land withdrawal orders issued by the Commissioner of the General Land Office. It found that the initial telegraphic order to suspend sale and location of lands preceded the 1856 congressional act granting the land to the State of Wisconsin. The June 12, 1856 order formally withdrew the land from preëmption or sale to protect the grant, and subsequent communications reinforced this withdrawal without rescinding it.

The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the filing of preëmption declaratory statements in 1858 created valid claims, noting that no further steps were taken to perfect these claims and that the land was already withdrawn from sale. The Court emphasized that any objection to the extent of the withdrawal was a matter for the land department, not the judiciary.

Relying on the precedent set in Walcott v. Des Moines Co., the Court affirmed the validity of the withdrawal order even though it covered more land than the grant itself, reasoning that such administrative actions are binding and not subject to judicial revision in this context. Consequently, the Court concluded that the land was properly withdrawn from preëmption and sale, invalidating the defendant's claims.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and a new trial is ordered.

The Court’s decision directly affects the parties by invalidating the defendant’s preëmption claims and upholding the validity of the land withdrawal order protecting the railroad grant. No new legal precedent was established beyond affirming the principle that administrative land withdrawals by the land department, even if exceeding grant boundaries, are binding and not subject to judicial override.

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SPENCER v. McDOUGAL.

By the order of the Commissioner of the General Land Office of June 12, 1856, the land in controversy in this case was withdrawn from preëmption or sale; and the validity of that order was not affected by the fact that the order covered more land than was included in the grant by Congress which caused its issue.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Wisconsin, to recover possession of the east half of the southwest quarter and the east half of the northwest quarter of section number seven (7), in township number forty-seven (47) north, of range number four (4) west, in the county of Ashland and State of Wisconsin.

The land, found by the jury to be worth sixteen thousand dollars, is situated within the limits of the city of Ashland, more than six and less than ten miles from the Bayfield branch of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railroad Company, and also within ten miles of the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company. The title of the plaintiff rests upon an agreement between the two railroad companies settling all differences between themselves as to the lands within the place limits of each road, a patent from the State of Wisconsin to the Omaha company in pursuance of such agreement, and a deed from the latter to himself.

The same questions arise in this case as in that just decided, Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Forsythe, ante, p. 46, and it is unnecessary to enter into any detailed statement of the facts concerning the two land grants, or a discussion of the questions arising thereon. Obviously, as the land in controversy was within the place limits of each road, it either passed wholly to the Omaha company or in equal moieties to the two, and in the latter event the agreement referred to transferred all rights to the Omaha company.

As against this, the defendant offered evidence that on May 3, 1858, and June 16, 1858, respectively, two preëmption declaratory statements were filed in the local land office, one in respect to one-half of the tract and the other in respect to the remainder, and contends that up to those dates there had been no valid withdrawals of any lands by the land department, and, as a consequence, that these preëmption claims attached to the land and excluded it from the operation of the grant. It may be remarked, in passing, that it does not appear that any attempt was ever made to prove up or acquire title under and in accordance with these declaratory statements. But the contention is that, by the simple filing of the statements, the land was excluded from the operation of the grant made by either act.

We are unable to assent to this contention. On May 29, 1856, the Commissioner of the General Land Office telegraphed to the local land officers of the district in which the land is situated to suspend from sale and location all lands in the district. This was prior to the passage of the act of 1856. On June 12, nine days after its passage, the Commissioner wrote to the same officers, referring to his telegraphic despatch, and saying that the object of the withdrawal thus ordered was to protect from sale the lands granted to the State by a bill which had passed both houses of Congress, though not then approved by the President. But, it having been approved on June 3, he directs the continuance of the withdrawal. On October 26, 1856, he again wrote to the local land officers that upon the filing in their office of a duly certified map of the line of route as definitely fixed they "will, without waiting for further instructions from this office, cease to permit locations by entries or preemption, or for any purpose whatever of the lands within fifteen miles of said route," and on March 1, 1859, which was after the filing of these declaratory statements, he sent a letter, enclosing a diagram of the lands in their district with the line of route as definitely selected designated thereon, and again notified them to withhold from sale all lands within the indemnity limits. The only objection which can be made to the order of June 12, 1856, which was after the passage of the act, is that the Commissioner withdrew too much land, to wit, all land in the district, but that was a matter for the determination of the land department, and cannot be revised or disregarded by the courts.

Walcott v. Des Moines Co., 5 Wall. 681, is in point. In August, 1846, Congress granted to the Territory of Iowa five alternate sections of the public lands, on each side of the Des Moines River, to aid in improving its navigation. It was a disputed question whether the grant terminated at the mouth of the Raccoon Fork, or extended along the whole length of the river to the northern boundary of the State. The land department ordered that lands the whole length of the river within the State should be withdrawn from sale. In the course of subsequent litigation it was decided by this court that the grant terminated at the mouth of the Raccoon River. But in the case cited it was held that the withdrawal by the land department of lands above the mouth of the Raccoon River was valid, and that a subsequent railroad grant, with the ordinary reservation clause in it, did not operate upon lands so withdrawn. If a withdrawal of land beyond the terminus of a grant can be sustained, as it was in that case, equally so should be one made in anticipation of the locations of two lines of road, which locations were as yet undetermined, and might be such as to bring almost any portion of the lands withdrawn within the indemnity limits of the grant.

The order of June 12, 1856, was never set aside. The letter of October 26, 1856, simply gave authority for a reduction in the area of the withdrawn territory upon the filing of a map of definite location, and that of March 1, 1859, forwarded a diagram showing the line of definite location of a part of one of the roads aided, and directed the continued withdrawal of land within the indemnity limits as disclosed thereby, but neither of them set aside the withdrawal of June 12, 1856, or in any other way affected it. These declaratory statements were of no validity; the land was then withdrawn from preemption or other sale, and withdrawn for the purpose of satisfying the grant to the State of Wisconsin.

The judgment of the Circuit Court will, therefore, be reversed, and a new trial ordered.

The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.