RILEY v. HARRIS, Mass., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Attorney(S)

A.M. Lyman D.C. Stanwood, for the defendant. E.O. Achorn, for the plaintiff, was not called upon.

Judges

HOLMES, C.J.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an action of tort brought under Public Statutes chapter 102, section 93, seeking to recover double damages for injuries sustained from a bite by the defendant's dog while the plaintiff was on the defendant's land. The plaintiff, employed in the neighborhood, went at the invitation of a friend (who was also a friend of the defendant's servants) to call upon them. They approached the back door of the defendant's house by a back way when the dog rushed out and bit the plaintiff. There was conflicting evidence whether the plaintiff heard barking as she approached. At trial in the Superior Court, the defendant requested rulings that the plaintiff could not maintain the action if she was trespassing or if she did not prove the dog was vicious or the defendant acted willfully. The trial judge refused these rulings, instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not a trespasser as a matter of law, and that she could recover if she exercised due care. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant took exceptions to the rulings.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiff was a trespasser on the defendant’s land at the time of the injury.
Whether the plaintiff could recover under Pub. Sts. c. 102, § 93, without proving the dog was vicious or the defendant acted willfully, especially if the plaintiff was trespassing.
Whether the plaintiff’s exercise of due care affects her right to recover for injuries caused by the defendant’s dog.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lakin v. Ames, 10 Cush. 198, 220	Entry upon another’s land at usual hours and for common purposes implies a license and is not trespass.	Supported the conclusion that the plaintiff was not a trespasser as she approached the house for a social purpose by a customary route.
Hawks v. Locke, 139 Mass. 205, 207	Similar principle of implied license for entry onto land under common social usages.	Reinforced the court’s view that the plaintiff’s presence was licensed and not trespassing.
Chenery v. Fitchburg Railroad, 160 Mass. 211, 212-213	Principle relating to spring guns and liability for intentional or malicious harm on land.	Referenced as an analogy for when a landowner’s intent or use of force might bar recovery, not applicable here.
Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44	Even trespassers may recover for injuries caused by animals known to be dangerous under common law.	Noted as a precedent that trespass alone does not always bar recovery for dog bites.
Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. 496	Similar principle regarding trespassers’ rights to recover for injuries caused by dangerous animals.	Supported the possibility of recovery despite trespass in cases of known dangerous animals.
Sherfey v. Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58	Common law principles regarding liability for animal attacks on trespassers.	Referenced to illustrate the range of common law liability beyond strict trespass considerations.
Quigley v. Clough, 173 Mass. 429, 430	Cases limiting recovery by trespassers under certain conditions.	Compared to illustrate limits on trespassers’ recovery rights.
Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121, 132	Statutory interpretation supporting broader liability under statutes like Massachusetts’s.	Used to support the court’s interpretation that the statute imposes liability without requiring proof of viciousness or willfulness.
Kelly v. Tilton, 2 Abb. (N.Y. App.) 495	Landowner’s liability for allowing dangerous animals to roam freely where licensees may be present.	Supported the principle that landowners cannot allow ferocious dogs to roam unrestrained where licensees are lawfully present.
Raymond v. Hodgson, 161 Mass. 184, 185	Due care by plaintiff is a relevant issue for the jury in dog bite cases.	Justified submitting the question of plaintiff’s due care to the jury.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the plaintiff’s status on the defendant’s land, concluding she was not a trespasser because her entry was by implied license, consistent with community customs allowing social visits at reasonable times and in customary ways. The court relied on established precedents recognizing implied licenses and social customs to support this finding. It noted that even if the plaintiff had been a trespasser, common law and statutory principles could still allow recovery for injuries caused by a dangerous animal, especially absent malicious intent by the defendant. The statute in question (Pub. Sts. c. 102, § 93) imposes liability without requiring proof that the dog was vicious or that the owner acted willfully, extending protections to licensees such as the plaintiff. The court recognized that licensees must exercise due care but also that landowners cannot allow known dangerous animals to roam freely on their premises where licensees may be present. The conflicting evidence about whether the plaintiff heard barking was properly submitted to the jury as part of the due care inquiry. The court found no error in the trial judge’s refusal to instruct that the plaintiff was a trespasser or that she could not recover without proof of viciousness or willfulness.

Holding and Implications

The court overruled the defendant’s exceptions and affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff. The holding confirms that a plaintiff who is a licensee, entering land by implied social license, is not a trespasser under the statute and may recover for injuries caused by a dog bite without proving the dog was vicious or the owner acted willfully. The decision reinforces the broad protective scope of the statute and clarifies that due care by the plaintiff is a jury question. The ruling directly affects the parties by affirming the plaintiff’s right to recover and does not establish new precedent beyond interpreting existing statutes and common law principles.

Show full summary ...

JULIA A. RILEY vs. GEORGE R. HARRIS.

Bite of Dog — Trespasser — Due Care — Action. At the trial of an action of tort, under Pub. Sts. c. 102, § 93, to recover double the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff from a bite of the defendant's dog while the plaintiff was upon the defendant's land, it appeared that the plaintiff, who was in service in the neighborhood, at the invitation of a friend who was a friend of the defendant's servants, went with her to call upon them; that they were approaching the back door of the house by a back way when the dog rushed out and bit the plaintiff; and there was controverted evidence that the plaintiff heard barking as she approached the house. The judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not a trespasser, and could recover if she was in the exercise of due care. Held, that the defendant had no ground of exception.

HOLMES, C.J.

This is an action of tort brought under Pub. Sts. c. 102, § 93, to recover double the amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff from a bite by the defendant's dog. The injury was received upon the defendant's land, and the defence is that the plaintiff was there in her own wrong, or, at least, at her own risk. The plaintiff was in service, in the neighborhood, it may be inferred, of the defendant. At the invitation of a friend who was a friend of the defendant's servants the plaintiff went with her to call upon them. This may have been technically open to dispute but it was uncontradicted, and the defendant did not desire to dispute it. They were approaching the back door of the house by a back way when the dog rushed out and bit the plaintiff. There was controverted evidence that the plaintiff heard barking as she approached the house. Subject to exceptions the court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not a trespasser, and could recover if she was in the exercise of due care.

It does not seem to us to need argument that the plaintiff was not a trespasser. "There are cases . . . where the law will imply a license . . . from the usages of the community. Thus it has been held that the entry upon another's close, or into his house, at usual and reasonable hours, and in a customary manner, for any of the common purposes of life, cannot be regarded as a trespass." Lakin v. Ames, 10 Cush. 198, 220. Hawks v. Locke, 139 Mass. 205, 207. The private way upon which the plaintiff seems to have been travelling imported a license to approach the house for a social purpose familiar to every one according to a practice common in this part of the world. Therefore it is unnecessary to consider whether, if the plaintiff were a trespasser, she could recover. On the one hand, it may be assumed that a burglar bitten by a dog would have no standing in court, as the use of the dog probably would have been a legitimate defence not excluded by the statute. On the other hand, if the plaintiff manifestly was threatening no harm and the dog was set upon her, or if it was kept with intent that it should attack all comers, the case might fall within the principle of the spring gun cases as explained in Chenery v. Fitchburg Railroad, 160 Mass. 211, 212, 213.

In a case between the extremes just suggested, such as is presented by the facts before us fairly taken, where there was no malevolent intent on the defendant's part, it has been held that even there the fact that technically the plaintiff was trespassing would not prevent a recovery at common law for an injury by an animal known to be dangerous. Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44. Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. 496. Sherfey v. Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58. Compare Quigley v. Clough, 173 Mass. 429, 430; and, on stronger grounds, under a statute like ours, Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121, 132. However this may be, we are of opinion that in the case of a licensee, which the plaintiff was, the statute applies. While, no doubt, a licensee must take some active forces upon the defendant's premises as he finds them, and cannot demand or expect precautions to be taken on his account, for instance, in the case of railroad trains run in the usual way upon tracks which the plaintiff is permitted to cross, there are others which, even at common law, the landowner could not set loose in undefined courses without regard to the lawful presence of others upon his land. He might be liable for random shooting with a rifle in a pasture where he permitted the public to pick berries, and, on the same principle, for allowing a dog known by him to be ferocious to range there unrestrained. Kelly v. Tilton, 2 Abb. (N.Y. App.) 495. The statute makes it unnecessary to prove the owner's knowledge of the character of the dog, or of the danger, and imposes the double liability in any case where at common law an owner knowing the danger would be liable. Whether it goes further we need not consider. Its language is broad, and we do not mean to limit it to the cases just mentioned.

The plaintiff testified that she did not hear barking upon the defendant's land. The defendant was allowed to go to the jury upon the question of her due care. This was sufficiently favorable for him. Raymond v. Hodgson, 161 Mass. 184, 185.

Exceptions overruled.

RILEY v. HARRIS