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Attorney(S)

James A. Williams, for plaintiff. John A. Tillinghast, for defendant.

Judges

DUBOIS, J.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Joseph L. Peacock v. Hugh Linton

Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Providence — January 4, 1901. Panel: Stiness, C.J., Dubois and Blodgett, JJ. Opinion by Dubois, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff brought an action in assumpsit to recover $25 for services rendered as a tutor to the defendant's minor son during the summer vacation of 1898. The tutoring was performed after the plaintiff made arrangements directly with the minor and at the written request of the minor's regular teacher, Charles A. Cole. The defendant neither entered into any contract with the plaintiff nor was informed, in writing or otherwise, about the arrangement before the services were completed. The parties resided and conducted business in Pawtucket, and the minor lived with and was supported and educated at the father's (defendant's) expense.

At trial a motion for a nonsuit was granted. The defendant petitioned for a new trial; the petition for a new trial was heard by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and was denied.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether tutoring arranged by a minor and requested in writing by the minor's teacher, but undertaken without the parent's knowledge or consent, may be treated as a "necessary" such that the parent becomes liable on a quasi-contractual theory.
Whether a minor living with and supported by his father may bind the father, by procuring services for himself, for items or services that are not strictly for relief from absolute want (i.e., what scope of "necessaries" will the father's liability cover when the infant is under his control).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The plaintiff argued that education is one of the necessaries of life and that his tutoring services were necessary for the minor.
The plaintiff further contended that a minor is presumed to be the agent of his father in procuring necessaries suitable to the minor's condition, implying parental liability for such services obtained by the child.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Parsons on Contracts, 8th ed., vol. 1, p. 305	When an infant lives with his father or under his control, the infant's judgment as to what are necessaries is respected only to the extent that the father will be liable for things furnished to relieve the infant from absolute want.	The court relied on this statement to underscore the limited nature of parental liability for necessaries obtained by an infant living with the parent, supporting the conclusion that the plaintiff could not recover for tutoring arranged without the father's consent because the services were not shown to be required to relieve absolute want and the father was not given the opportunity to decide.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by acknowledging the generally accepted importance of education and that, within statutory limits, a common-school education is indisputably a necessary. The court noted, however, that it is more doubtful whether vacation tutoring constitutes a "necessary" in the same sense.

Relying on the principle set out in Parsons on Contracts, the court emphasized that where a minor lives with his father, the father's judgment regarding what is necessary for the child controls to a significant degree; the father's liability is effectively limited to those things furnished to relieve the child from absolute want. The court did not need definitively to resolve whether summer tutoring is a necessary in all circumstances, but it found that under the facts of this case the plaintiff failed to protect the father's right to exercise his judgment.

Concretely, the court observed that before undertaking the intimate and ongoing relationship of tutor and pupil the plaintiff should have ascertained whether the defendant (the father) was willing to employ him. Because the plaintiff neither communicated with nor obtained the consent of the defendant before performing the services, the father was not given the opportunity to make the choice that the law reserves to him when the child resides with and is supported by him.

On the basis of these considerations — the limited scope of paternal liability for necessaries, the uncertainty whether vacation tutoring is a necessary, and the plaintiff's failure to notify or obtain the father's consent — the court concluded the nonsuit at trial was proper.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The motion for a nonsuit was properly granted at trial, and the defendant's petition for a new trial was denied.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the plaintiff's action to recover $25 for the tutoring services was unsuccessful; the plaintiff may not recover on the quasi-contract/necessaries theory under the facts presented. The opinion focuses on application of existing principles concerning parental liability for necessaries when the child lives with and is supported by the parent and does not announce any broader new rule beyond applying those principles to these facts.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal points beyond those expressly stated therein.

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JOSEPH L. PEACOCK vs. HUGH LINTON.

(1) Parent and Child. Necessaries. Private Tuition. Quasi-contracts. Plaintiff sued to recover for services as tutor of defendant's minor son during the summer vacation. The services were performed at the written request of the minor's teacher and after the plaintiff had made arrangements with the minor. The defendant had no knowledge of the proceedings until after the services were performed. The minor was supported by and lived with the defendant. Upon the above facts a motion for a nonsuit was granted. Upon petition for new trial: —

Held, that the motion was properly granted.

DUBOIS, J.

The plaintiff sues to recover twenty-five dollars for services as tutor of defendant's minor son in 1898, during the summer vacation of the school of Charles A. Cole, in which the minor was a pupil.

The services were performed by the plaintiff at the written request of said Cole and after making arrangements with the minor. No contract was entered into by the plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff did not see the defendant or inform him by letter or otherwise, respecting the services rendered, at any time prior to the completion thereof.

The parties were both living in and doing business in Pawtucket, and the minor lived with and was supported and educated at the expense of his father, the defendant.

The plaintiff contends that education is one of the necessaries, that his services were also necessary, and that a minor is presumed to be the agent of his father in procuring necessaries suitable to his condition.

There can be no question, at this time and place, of the necessity of education. Our statutes make it compulsory within well-defined limits. A common-school education is undoubtedly necessary, and, under favorable circumstances, a collegiate education may also be. Whether tutoring in vacation can be said to be one of the necessaries is more doubtful. Continuous application without rest or recreation is not generally recommended. It is not necessary to determine that question in this case.

In Parsons on Contracts, 8 ed. vol. 1. p. 305, the law is stated to be as follows: "When an infant lives with the father or under his control, his judgment as to what are necessaries will be so far respected that he will be liable only for those things furnished to the infant to relieve him from absolute want."

However this may be, in the present case it is clear that before tutoring the minor the plaintiff should have ascertained whether the defendant was willing to employ him for that purpose. The intimate relation of tutor and pupil should not have been established without allowing the father to exercise his choice and judgment in the matter.

Under the circumstances, the motion for a nonsuit was properly granted, and the petition for new trial is denied.

PEACOCK v. HUGH LINTON