Whether land belonging to a city or town seemingly prepared for a footway and used by the public as such, ever can become a highway or town way by dedication, notwitstanding Pub. Sts. c. 49, § 94, quære.
Permitting the use by the public of an ordinary entry or flight of stairs in a building belonging to a city or town is not a dedication, even if a public footway could be so created.
A flight of stairs in a building belonging to a city or town, leading from the outside of the building only to a room in it, is not a highway or town way within the meaning of Pub. Sts. c. 52, §§ 17, 18, giving remedies for death, injury or damage caused by defects therein, nor is it a way "entering on and uniting with an existing public highway" within Pub. Sts. c. 49, § 95, in regard to causing the entrances of such ways to be closed when the public safety demands it or cautioning the public against entering them when dangerous.
A city is not liable for injuries caused by a defect in a flight of steps leading to a basement room of a schoolhouse, used as a polling place, to a citizen who was going down the steps for the purpose of entering the room to vote.
HOLMES, C.J.
If for any reason land belonging to a city or town, seemingly prepared for a footway and used by the public as such, can become a highway or a town way simply by dedication, notwithstanding Pub. Sts. c. 49, § 94, which we are far from intimating, the elements of a dedication are wanting in the case of an ordinary entry or flight of stairs in a public building. In such a case it is evident to every one from the visible facts alone that the use of the entry or stairs, like the use of the rooms to which they lead, is merely permissive during such time as the public authorities continue to devote the building or rooms to the same purposes as at present, and that it may be stopped at any moment. Furthermore, a flight of stairs in a building leading only to a room in it is not a highway or a town way within the meaning of Pub. Sts. c. 52, §§ 17, 18, or a way "entering on and uniting with an existing public highway" within c. 49, § 95. Sullivan v. Boston, 126 Mass. 540. The argument to the contrary is merely an attempt by a perversion of language from its plain and common meaning to make out a liability of cities and towns which heretofore has been decided not to exist. Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344.
Judgment for defendant affirmed.