A school-teacher without paying rent or board lived in a boarding-house kept by her grandmother, whose lease had expired and been extended, assisted her grandmother in keeping the boarding-house, and received from her a bill of sale of the household goods and furniture in the house. It was found as a fact by a judge sitting without a jury, that what the granddaughter did in and about the house was only to assist her grandmother, and that she had never agreed to pay rent and was not a party to any plan to defraud the lessor. Held, that all requests for rulings as to the liability of the granddaughter for use and occupation of the premises jointly with her grandmother had been made immaterial by the findings of fact.
KNOWLTON, J.
The defendant Whittle occupied the plaintiffs' house under a lease for five years, which expired on September 1, 1897. This lease was extended for one year by an instrument under seal signed by the lessors and lessee, which was virtually a new lease for that term. This action is to recover for the use and occupation of the premises during this year. The judge who tried the case without a jury found against the defendant Whittle. The defendant Hoyt, who was her granddaughter, was a teacher in a kindergarten, and lived in the house without paying rent or board. In July, 1896, the grandmother gave her a bill of sale of the household goods, furniture and chattels in the house. The plaintiffs contended that the occupation of the house by the defendants and their use of it as a boarding-house was a joint enterprise to defraud the lessors, and that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for the use and occupation of the premises. The judge found in favor of the defendant Hoyt, and found further that "what she did in or about the house was only to assist her grandmother, that she did not ever agree to pay rent, and was not a party in or to any plan or enterprise to defraud the plaintiffs." These findings make the plaintiffs' requests for rulings immaterial to the question whether the defendant Hoyt was liable for use and occupation, and it is unnecessary to consider them in detail.
Exceptions overruled.