Agency. In an action for the price of bricks used in building a greenhouse for the defendant ordered for her by her son-in-law, it appeared, that the evidence for the plaintiff was the same as that at a former trial which this court had decided was sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to go to the jury. The defendant asked for a ruling, that there was "no evidence that the defendant or her husband knew of the work until their return." The ruling was refused. Held, that the refusal was right; that if the request meant only that there was no evidence that the defendant knew before her return that the work had been begun, this, if true, was immaterial, in case she had authorized the work, and that, if it meant that there was no evidence that she knew the work was to be done, the contrary had already been decided in the same case as reported in 172 Mass. 84.
HOLMES, C.J.
This case has been before the court already on substantially the same evidence, and it has been decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to go to the jury. 172 Mass. 84. There was a little more evidence for the defence, but that, of course, the jury might disbelieve. We do not perceive upon what ground that question is raised here again. As to the second and third rulings asked, they were not literally correct, and were covered, so far as proper, by the instructions given. If the fourth request meant only that there was no evidence that the defendant's intestate knew before her return that the work had been begun, the proposition is questionable, and, in case she authorized it, immaterial. If it meant that there was no evidence that she knew that the work was to be done, that already has been decided against the defendant.
Exceptions overruled.