Mr. Wells H. Blodgett and Mr. George S. Grover for plaintiff in error:
The court has ample jurisdiction to hear and determine this controversy by reason of the constitutional question apparent upon the face of the record. Insurance Co. v. Needles, 113 U.S. 574; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87; Water Co. v. Green Bay, 142 U.S. 269; Gordon v. Bank, 144 U.S. 97; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U.S. 375; Powell v. Brunswick County, 150 U.S. 440; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U.S. 180; Railway v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226; Canal Co. v. Paper Co., 172 U.S. 58; Water Power Co. v. Railway Co., 172 U.S. 475.
The judgment of a sister State may become a Federal question: First. Where the existence or validity of such judgment is in dispute in a state court, and the decision impairs its integrity, or existence; Second. Where the effect of the judgment according to the law and usage of the State where rendered is in dispute in a state court, and the decision is adverse "to the claimed or contended effect of such judgment." The case at bar falls under the latter instance. Crapo v. Kelley, 88 U.S. 610; Dupasser v. Rochersar, 21 Wall. 130; Live Stock Company v. Butchers Union, 120 U.S. 141; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657; Railway v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710; Green v. Buskirk, 5 Wall. 310.
By denying the relief prayed for, the court below deprived the plaintiff in error of its property "without due process of law," in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Railway Co. v. Sturm, 194 U.S. 710.
Plaintiff in error was entitled to the relief prayed for and Flannigan was entitled to a hearing on the issue of priority.
A bill of interpleader may be properly filed in any cause, as well after the adverse claims to the fund have been reduced to judgment, as prior to that time. Cheever v. Hodgson, 9 Mo. App. 565; Dodds v. Gregory, 51 Miss. 351; Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65; Provident Savings Inst. v. White, 115 Mass. 112; 2 Story Eq. Jurisprudence (13th ed.), 137 note; Hamilton v. Marks, 5 DeGex Smale, 638; 13 Eng. Law Eq. 321; Johnson v. Maxey, 43 Ala. 521; Newhall v. Kastens, 70 Ill. 156; Mills v. Townsend, 109 Mass. 115; Robards v. Clayton, 49 Mo. App. 610; Building Association v. Joy, 56 Mo. App. 433.
The plaintiff has never been guilty of laches. Mr. John D. Johnson and Mr. Virgil Rule for defendant in error, Rule:
The decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals was upon the ground that all the parties to the bill of interpleader had had their day in court, and that the questions raised were res adjudicata. This is not a Federal question and this court is, therefore, without jurisdiction. Northern Pacific Railroad v. Ellis, 144 U.S. 464; Hammond v. Johnson, 142 U.S. 73; Hickman v. Fort Scott, 141 U.S. 415; Chaffin v. Taylor, 116 U.S. 367; Clark v. Keith, 106 U.S. 464; Peck v. Sanderson, 18 How. 42.
In order to give this court power to revise the judgment of a state court it must appear upon the transcript that the constitutional question was raised by the pleadings and decided against plaintiff in error. Oxley v. Butler Co., 166 U.S. 657, 658; Hoydt v. Sheldon, 1 Black, 518, 521; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How. 511.
This court will not review the judgment of a state court except upon the decree of the highest court in the State. Rev. Stat. U.S. sec. 709; Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U.S. 104; Desty's Fed. Proc. sec. 223.
The Supreme Court of Missouri is the highest court in that State having jurisdiction in constitutional questions. Constitution of Missouri, art. 6, sec. 12; State v. St. Louis Ct. of App., 97 Mo. 296, 299 State v. Caldwell, 57 Mo. App. 447; In re Essex, 44 Mo. App. 289.
The bill of interpleader does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants, for the following reasons:
It is essential to a bill of interpleader that the plaintiff shall make known his condition as a stakeholder by bringing a suit within a reasonable time after being advised of the double claims against him. Cheever v. Hodgson, 9 Mo. App. 565; Dodds v. Gregory, 61 Miss. 351; McDevitt v. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 592; Union Bank v. Kerr, 2 Md. Ch. 460; Ency. P. P. 462 Barnes v. Bamberger, 196 Pa. 123; Brackett v. Graves, 51 N.Y. St. Rep. 895.
It is an essential to a bill of interpleader that the right of either defendant to the fund should not have been previously determined by a judgment at law against the plaintiff. McKinney v. Kuhn, 59 Miss. 186; Risher v. Roush, 2 Mo. 95; French v. Robrchard, 5 Vt. 43; Holmes v. Clark, 46 Vt. 22; Mitchell v. N.W. Mfg. Co., 26 Ill. App. 295; Carroll v. Parks, 1 Baxt. 269; Yarborought v. Thompson, B.S. M. 291; Haseltine v. Brickley, 16 Gratt. 116; Cornish v. Tanner, 1 Young J. 333; Prov. Ins. Co. v. White, 115 Mass. 112.
A bill of interpleader must show that the plaintiff is ignorant of the rights of the parties who are called upon to interplead. Ency. P. P. 465, n. 2; Barker v. Barker, 42 N.H. 78; Shaw v. Coster, 8 Paige, 339; Morgan v. Fillmore, 18 Abb. Pr. 219; Mohawk, etc., R. Co. v. Chute, 4 Paige, 384; Pfister v. Wade, 56 Cal. 43; Illingworth v. Rowe, 52 N.J. Eq. 360; Trigg v. Hitz, 17 Abb. Pr. 436; Del., etc., R.R. Co. v. Corwith, 16 Civ. Pro. Rep. (N.Y.) 312; Heckmer v. Gilligan, 28 W. Va. 750.
A judgment debt of one jurisdiction is not subject to a bill of interpleader in another jurisdiction. Crane v. McDonald, 118 N.Y. 657; Snodgrass v. Butler, 54 Miss. 45; Fulton v. Chase, 6 N.Y.S. 126; Gibson v. Goldwaite, 7 Ala. 281; Stone v. Reed, 152 Mass. 179; Boston, etc., v. Skillings, 132 Mass. 418; Fairbanks v. Bilknap, 135 Mass. 179; Kyle v. Mary Lee Coal Co., 112 Ala. 606; Morristown v. Binnings, 26 N.J. Eq. 345; Bartlett v. Sutton, 23 F. 257.
The Circuit Court had no power to enforce its judgment against the person of defendant Flannigan, hence a temporary injunction as against him would have been wholly without effect, unless he chose to obey it. Rev. Stat. Mo. 1899, sec. 598 d; Sheedy v. Second Nat. Bank, 62 Mo. 17.
The Missouri court would have no power to decree that the judgment of the Illinois court was void or that it was not void. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 88.
A court of one jurisdiction cannot enjoin the collection of a judgment of another court of competent jurisdiction, in the absence of any allegation of fraud in obtaining such judgment. Scrutchfield v. Souter, 119 Mo. 621; Nelson v. Brown, 23 Mo. 13; Keith v. Plemmons, 28 Mo. 104; Pettus v. Elgin, 11 Mo. 411; Mellier v. Bartlett, 89 Mo. 137; Haehl v. Wabash R. Co., 119 Mo. 325; State ex rel. v. Eggers, 152 Mo. 487.
Where the Federal question asserted to be contained in the record is manifestly lacking all color of merit the writ of error will be dismissed. On petition of interpleader in a state court by a judgment debtor to engraft upon two judgments for the same debt, one in the State in which the action is brought and the other in a different State, a limitation to a single satisfaction out of a specific sum, there is no merit in the claim to protection under the due faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution where it does not appear that in the state courts any rights were set up specifically based upon the judgment obtained in the other State, an effect was claimed therefor which if denied to it would have impaired its force or effect, or any right to the relief demanded was predicated upon the effect to be given thereto.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The opinion of this court, upholding the correctness of the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Missouri in favor of Tourville, referred to in the preceding statement, was announced on December 3, 1900. Wabash R.R. Co. v. Tourville, 179 U.S. 322. The action now under review was begun seventeen days later. In the action which was under review in 179 U.S. the contention on behalf of the railroad company was that, despite the fact that on March 26, 1895, the Supreme Court of Missouri, on appeal by Tourville, had entered a judgment directing the St. Louis Court of Appeals to render judgment in favor of Tourville for the full amount of wages earned by him, the railroad company was yet entitled, after the filing in the St. Louis Court of Appeals of the mandate of the higher court, to offset against the amount of the judgment directed to be entered in favor of Tourville, the sum of the judgment recovered by Flannigan in the attachment suit which had been instituted in Illinois subsequently to the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Tourville's action. The claim of jurisdiction in this court to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri, just referred to, was based upon the contention that the refusal of the Missouri courts to give to the Illinois judgment in favor of Flannigan the effect claimed for it by the railroad company was a denial of the full faith and credit to which that judgment was entitled by virtue of section 1 of article IV of the Constitution of the United States. As already stated, the present action was begun after the opinion reported in 179 U.S. 322, affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri, was delivered.
The controversy in the present action relates to the same judgments which were under consideration in this court in the prior action, and the purpose of the railroad company in this, as in the previous case, was to limit the amount which might be collected by the holders of the respective judgments against it to a sum which in the aggregate would not be in excess of the indebtedness to Tourville upon his original claim. In substance, therefore, the present action is but an attempt by indirection to do that which the Supreme Court of Missouri and this court have held in the prior action could not be done.
The constitutional questions now urged on behalf of plaintiff in error are that the dismissal of its petition for interpleader was a denial of full faith and credit to the garnishment judgment rendered by the Illinois court, and that the denial of the relief prayed for also violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The objection last stated need not be further noticed, as it was asserted for the first time in the petition for the allowance of a writ of error from this court. We think it unavoidably results also that the claim of the protection of the due faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States here relied on is without merit. Nowhere in its petition for interpleader or in the proceedings had thereunder in the Missouri courts did the railroad company set up rights specifically based upon the Illinois judgment, claim for that judgment an effect which, if denied to it, would have impaired its force and effect, nor did the railroad company predicate any right to the relief demanded upon the effect due to the Illinois judgment. The relief asked by the railroad company in substance tended, on the contrary, to lessen the force and effect both of the Missouri and Illinois judgments. It was sought to change the status of the company from that of a general debtor for the amount due upon each judgment and to engraft upon the judgments a limitation to a single satisfaction out of a specific fund. In its petition the railroad company expressly alleged its inability to determine whether the Illinois or the Missouri judgment possessed a priority of right to payment out of the so-called fund. Clearly, also, even the owner and holder of the Illinois judgment could not, in reason, contend that the judgment of the Missouri court complained of had the effect of denying full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister State. As the settled rule in this court is that where the Federal question asserted to be contained in a record is manifestly lacking all color of merit, the writ of error must be dismissed, Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 493, and cases cited, it results that the writ or error in this case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Writ of error dismissed.
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