Nellie Faulkner v. Boston and Maine Railroad — Summary of Opinion

Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Suffolk). Argued: November 16, 1904. Decided: January 6, 1905. Judge delivering opinion: Loring, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Nellie Faulkner, a girl ten years of age, sued the Boston and Maine Railroad for injuries to two of her fingers caused when a railroad car window fell on them as the train started from North Lawrence station on August 3, 1902. A writ was issued in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston dated August 5, 1902. On appeal to the Superior Court the case was tried before Schofield, J., who directed a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. Counsel of record were P.M. Keating for the plaintiff and A.R. Tisdale for the defendant.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the mere fact that an open railroad car window fell on a passenger's fingers when the train started constitutes evidence of negligence by the railroad company.
Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies under the circumstances described (i.e., an apparently properly functioning window falling when the train started).
Whether, in the absence of evidence of a defect in the window or its catch, the accident may be inferred to have been caused by negligence of a passenger who opened the window (specifically, in not raising it far enough for the bolt to catch).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The plaintiff argued that the testimony of a witness named Greim, who raised the window to release the plaintiff's fingers, warranted a finding that the window sash was loose in its jambs and moved side to side more than it should have, and that this condition caused the window to fall and injure the plaintiff.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the defendant's legal arguments beyond noting defendant's counsel's question which demonstrated the window jammed vertically until the plaintiff's fingers were released, and the court's observation that there was no evidence the window had been raised by the defendant's employees rather than by a passenger.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234	Supporting the proposition that the mere falling of a window when a train starts, absent evidence of defect, is not evidence of the railroad company's negligence (i.e., res ipsa loquitur does not automatically apply).	The court stated the case comes within this precedent and used it to justify directing a verdict for the defendant.
Wadsworth v. Boston Elevated Railway, 182 Mass. 572	Supporting the same line of authority as above regarding when an accident involving a window does not establish negligence by the carrier in the absence of defect or other evidence.	The court treated this case as controlling authority analogous to the facts at hand and relied on it in concluding that a verdict for the defendant was proper.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court affirmed the judge's direction of a verdict for the defendant. Taking the plaintiff's evidence as true, the only established fact was that the window fell when the train started with its "usual motion." There was no evidence of any defect in the catch or in the window itself.

The court described the window mechanism: the sash was held up by a bolt which rested on a metallic rest on the window jamb; the bolt was attached to the sash and drawn back by pressing a spring; when the spring was released the bolt flew out to its full length onto the rest.

The plaintiff's contention that Greim's testimony showed the sash was loose and moved laterally was rejected. The court explained that the testimony, especially when considered in light of the defendant's counsel's question and answer, indicated the window jammed vertically (not horizontally) until Greim raised it to free the plaintiff's fingers.

Given the absence of any evidence of defect, the court concluded the most reasonable inference was that when the window was previously put up and the bolt released to keep it up, the window had not been raised sufficiently for the bolt to engage fully over its rest. In short, the court found the likely cause to be negligence in the manner of raising the window (i.e., not raising it high enough), rather than negligence by the railroad or a malfunction of the window.

The court further noted that the testimony that an adjacent window appeared "equally high" did not refute this possibility because a window whose bolt merely contacted the rest without lying fully on it could appear as high as another entirely up.

Finally, the court observed there was nothing in the defendant's evidence that aided the plaintiff and there was no evidence that the window had been raised by the defendant's employees rather than by a passenger. On these bases, the case was held to fall within the cited precedents.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The trial judge was correct in directing a verdict for the defendant; the plaintiff's exceptions were overruled.

Implications: The direct effect is that judgment was entered for the defendant and the plaintiff's claim failed. The court treated the matter as governed by existing Massachusetts precedents and resolved the case on their authority; the opinion does not announce a new legal principle beyond applying those precedents to the facts of this case.

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NELLIE FAULKNER vs. BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD.

Negligence, Res ipsa loquitur. Railroad. The mere fact that an open window of a railroad car falls on the fingers of a passenger when the train starts is no evidence of negligence on the part of the operating company. If it appears that the bolt of the window worked by a spring and there is no evidence of a defect in the window or its catch, the inference is that the accident was caused by the negligence of the person who opened the window in not raising it far enough for the bolt to catch completely.

LORING, J.

We are of opinion that the judge was right in directing a verdict for the defendant.

Taking the plaintiff's evidence, all that appears is that the window fell when the train started with its "usual motion." There was no evidence of a defect in the catch or in the window. When put up, the window was kept up by a bolt which rested on a metallic rest on the window jamb; this bolt was attached to the sash and was drawn back by pressing a spring; when the spring was released, the bolt flew out to its full length on to the rest. The plaintiff has argued that the testimony of Greim, who raised the window to release the plaintiff's fingers, warranted a finding that the window sash was loose in the window jambs, so that it moved from side to side more than it should have; and that this warranted the further finding that this was the reason why the window fell and caused the injuries here complained of. But we do not think that Greim's testimony can bear that construction. The answer to the question put by the defendant's counsel makes it plain (if it was not plain before) that the window jammed vertically, not horizontally, until the plaintiff's fingers were released.

The case which the plaintiff proved therefore was the falling of a window in good order on the train's starting with the usual motion. The only inference is that when the window was put up and the bolt released to keep it up, the window was not raised high enough for the bolt to be shot clean over its rest; in other words, that the cause of the accident was negligence in raising the window when it was opened.

The testimony of Greim that his window was up as high as it would go and the window in question appeared to be equally high, does not cover this point. If a window is up so that the bolt holds the window by being more or less in contact with the rest without lying on it fully, the difference in height would not be apparent between the lower part of the sash of that window and that of a window next it which was entirely up.

There was nothing in the evidence introduced by the defendant which helped the plaintiff. There was no evidence in the case at bar that the window was raised by the defendant's employees and not by a passenger. The case comes within Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234; Wadsworth v. Boston Elevated Railway, 182 Mass. 572.

Exceptions overruled.

FAULKNER v. BOSTON MAINE RAILROAD