CAMERON v. BURNHAM

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Docket Number

S.F. No. 3551.

Attorney(S)

H.A. Powell, and W.A. Dow, for Appellant. An estate for years under a lease of a mine, with the exclusive privilege of mining therein, is an estate or interest in the land. (Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, 150 Ill. 344; Watson v. O'Hern, 6 Watts, 368; Smith v. Cooley, 65 Cal. 46; Mack v. Shafer, 135 Cal. 113; Brown v. Beecher, 120 Pa. St. 590; Titusville etc. Works' Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 103; First Nat. Bank v. Dow, 41 Hun. 13; Hyatt v. Vincennes Nat. Bank, 113 U.S. 408; Duke v. Hague, 107 Pa. St. 57; Washburn on Real Property, 5th ed., 21; Blanchard Works on Mines, 32; Barringer Adams on Mines, 75; Snyder on Mines, sec. 1164.) Title in real property once vested cannot be divested by oral disclaimers. (Davis v. Perley, 30 Cal. 636. ) Forfeiture cannot be used as a mode of transferring property. (Wiseman v. McNulty, 25 Cal. 230.) The plaintiff was entitled to an accounting either as a tenant in common or a mining partner. (Smith v. Fagan, 17 Cal. 179; Coward v. Clanton, 122 Cal. 451; Shirley v. Goodnough, 15 Or. 642; Barringer Adams on Mines, p. 752; Lindley on Mines, sec. 700.) W.B. Kollmeyer, and William R. Davis, for Respondents. The plaintiff is not entitled to relief in equity, having willfully repudiated and broken his contract, in which time was made of the essence, and the value of the property having greatly changed through expenditures to which he refused to contribute. (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, secs. 357, 404; Rayfield v. Van Meter, 120 Cal. 416; Glock v. Howard etc. Co., 123 Cal. 9; Lindley on Mines, sec. 859; Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 593.) 69. Am. St. Rep. 17.

Judges

GRAY, C.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This action arises from a dispute over ownership and entitlement to profits from a subterranean gold-bearing gravel channel located on a tract of land in Sacramento County. The plaintiff, P.A. Cameron, along with six others, entered into a written agreement to lease mining rights from W.B. Plumb, the landowner. The parties agreed to subscribe funds to secure the lease and prospect the land, with ownership interests proportional to their contributions. The plaintiff subscribed but failed to pay his share after an initial installment was fixed. Despite repeated notifications, he refused to contribute further and disavowed participation in the mining venture. The other parties proceeded to develop the mine at their own expense and realized profits. The plaintiff sought a decree affirming his ownership interest and an accounting for the mining partnership's dealings. The Superior Court of Alameda County entered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiff, having repudiated the agreement and failed to perform his payment obligations, is entitled to an ownership interest in the mining lease and profits.
Whether equity will enforce the plaintiff's claim to an interest in the mining operation despite his nonperformance and abandonment of the enterprise.
The proper construction and effect of the contracts between the parties regarding the mining rights and subscription payments.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

An estate for years under a mine lease with exclusive mining privileges constitutes an interest in real property.
Title in real property once vested cannot be divested by oral disclaimers.
Forfeiture cannot be used as a mode of transferring property.
The plaintiff was entitled to an accounting either as a tenant in common or a mining partner.

Respondents' Arguments

The plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief because he willfully repudiated and breached the contract, which made time of the essence.
The value of the property changed due to expenditures made by the other parties, to which the plaintiff refused to contribute.
Equity principles require that a party seeking relief must have performed their contractual obligations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, 150 Ill. 344	Establishing that a lease of a mine with exclusive privileges is an interest in land.	Supported the characterization of the agreement as creating a real property interest.
Watson v. O'Hern, 6 Watts, 368	Same as above regarding mining lease as property interest.	Reinforced the legal nature of the leasehold interest.
Smith v. Cooley, 65 Cal. 46	Mining lease constitutes an estate or interest in land.	Used to affirm the nature of the plaintiff’s claimed interest.
Mack v. Shafer, 135 Cal. 113	Support for the leasehold interest and its characteristics.	Referenced for the estate-in-land principle.
Davis v. Perley, 30 Cal. 636	Title in real property once vested cannot be divested by oral disclaimers.	Addressed the plaintiff’s attempt to claim interest despite repudiation.
Wiseman v. McNulty, 25 Cal. 230	Forfeiture cannot be used as a mode of transferring property.	Considered but distinguished due to plaintiff’s failure to perform.
Smith v. Fagan, 17 Cal. 179	Right to an accounting as tenant in common or mining partner.	Argued by appellant but court found plaintiff forfeited rights.
Coward v. Clanton, 122 Cal. 451	Accounting rights in mining partnerships.	Referenced in appellant’s argument for entitlement to accounting.
Rayfield v. Van Meter, 120 Cal. 416	Equity relief denied where plaintiff repudiated contract.	Supported respondents’ position that repudiation bars relief.
Glock v. Howard etc. Co., 123 Cal. 9	Equity principles on contract enforcement and repudiation.	Used to show plaintiff’s nonperformance precludes equitable relief.
Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 593	Equity principles regarding contract performance and relief.	Supported respondents’ equitable defense.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the two contracts—the subscription agreement among the parties and the lease agreement with the landowner—as a single contract for the plaintiff’s purposes. The plaintiff’s failure to pay his subscription installment and his repeated repudiation and abandonment of the enterprise constituted a breach that forfeited his rights under the agreement. The court emphasized the equitable maxim that “he who asks equity must do equity,” requiring the plaintiff to have performed his contractual obligations to claim relief. Since the plaintiff neither contributed financially nor participated in the mining venture, he could not compel the defendants to share profits or grant him an ownership interest. The court rejected any argument that the statute of frauds or the form of the mining privilege affected this outcome. The decision rested on fundamental principles of contract and equity law, confirming that the trial court was justified in denying relief to the plaintiff.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County is affirmed.

The plaintiff’s appeal is denied because he failed to perform his contractual obligations and repudiated the mining agreement, forfeiting any right to an interest in the mining lease or profits. This decision directly affects the parties by upholding the defendants’ exclusive rights and denying the plaintiff any equitable relief. The opinion does not establish new precedent but applies well-established equitable principles to the facts presented.

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P.A. CAMERON, Appellant, v. J.R. BURNHAM et al., Respondents.

GRAY, C.

This action is brought to obtain a decree that plaintiff is the owner of a one-ninth interest in a subterranean gold-bearing gravel channel upon a certain tract of land in Sacramento County and for an accounting of all dealings in relation to said mine by and on behalf of an alleged mining partnership in which plaintiff claims to be a member.

The judgment was for defendants, and the plaintiff appeals therefrom.

The plaintiff and six others who are made defendants herein entered into a written agreement on May 17, 1901, wherein the tract of land in question is described, and it is recited that the parties to said agreement are desirous of leasing the mining rights and privileges on said land from W.B. Plumb, the owner thereof. Six of the parties, including the plaintiff, agreed to and did subscribe five hundred dollars each, and a seventh party to the contract, named J.R. Burnham, subscribed fifteen hundred, making an entire fund of forty-five hundred dollars, "for the purpose of securing said lease and prospecting said land." It was agreed that "each subscriber shall own and be entitled to an interest in said lease and mining privilege in proportion as the amount he subscribes is to the whole amount subscribed, when the whole amount of said subscription shall have been paid up." It was also agreed that "said sums so subscribed shall be paid into the hands of said A.T. Eastland in payments of equal proportion to the sum subscribed at such time or times and in such sums as shall be designated and fixed by said A.T. Eastland. And if any subscriber shall fail or refuse or neglect to make such payments at the time so designated by said A.T. Eastland and the same shall remain unpaid for the period of ten (10) days after the date set for such payment, and after the same should have been paid, then, and in that case, such delinquent subscriber or subscribers immediately forfeit all interest and rights in said lease and mining privileges and shall forfeit all moneys that he or they shall have paid under this agreement."

On the day following the execution of the above agreement, May 18, 1901, said W.B. Plumb, one of the defendants herein, entered into an agreement with the plaintiff and other defendants for the purpose of carrying out the purposes of the first agreement. It was agreed on the part of Plumb that he "hereby grants to said parties of the second part the exclusive right to enter upon the lands hereinafter described, and to prospect and mine the same for the term of six years from and after the 18th day of May, 1901." The right to use the land for agricultural and grazing purposes was reserved to the owner, Plumb. The second parties agreed to pay to the first party fifteen per cent "of the gross amount of all gold so extracted," or at their option in lieu of the above-named consideration they could within six months pay ten thousand dollars as the full consideration for said "exclusive right and privilege to mine as aforesaid."

It appears from the evidence and findings that soon after the execution of these instruments, and in that same month of May, the said Eastland designated and fixed the sum of one hundred dollars to be paid by plaintiff and each of the other parties interested with him on account of their several subscriptions. One of the subscribing parties, James Wing, it appears, had already paid the entire amount of his five-hundred-dollar subscription. The plaintiff and the other subscribing defendants, except Wing, were duly notified of the fixing of this hundred-dollar sum as due from each of them, and all of them paid up within the ten days given them, except the plaintiff. The plaintiff refused and neglected to pay anything, and "persistently and willfully declined and refused to participate in, or to have anything to do with the work, enterprise or undertaking referred to in said agreements." Time and again he declared that he was out of it and was glad of it; that defendants were "a bad lot"; that he had "not paid in," and was not going to pay anything or have anything at all to do with the matter. The court finds that "ever since the twenty-first day of May, 1901, the plaintiff has repudiated, disavowed, withdrawn from, deserted and abandoned said work, enterprise, undertaking, agreements and all the duties, obligations, options and benefits thereof." In the mean time the other parties to the agreement, recognizing that plaintiff was "out of it," proceeded to prospect the ground at an expense to them of much more than the original amounts subscribed, and finally, as appears, in about October, 1901, struck a rich mine, and have since worked the same with considerable profit. Plaintiff has done nothing at any time and contributed nothing toward the discovery, development, or working of this mine.

On the foregoing facts we are of opinion that plaintiff was not entitled to the relief prayed for. The plaintiff is or was a party to both the contracts above referred to, and as they were both intended for the accomplishment of one purpose, so far as plaintiff is concerned, they should be construed together as one contract. The plaintiff, after having neglected and refused to perform any part of his agreement, after standing by for five months watching the other parties spending their money in search of this gold that no one knew existed, all the time declaring that he was "out of it" and would have nothing to do with it, doing what he could to discourage the enterprise, now seeks in this equitable action to compel the defendants to share with him the profits of their industry and expenditure of moneys. This he cannot do in a court of equity. He who asks equity must do equity. He who seeks to enforce a contract must show that he has complied with the conditions and agreements of the contract on his part to be performed. (Civ. Code, sec. 1439) Plaintiff failed and refused to pay any part of the amounts he agreed to pay, and thereby by the very terms of the contract forfeited any right that he may ever have had in the property in dispute. It makes no difference whether we call the agreement executed by Plumb a lease or a mere "mining privilege," and the statute of frauds has nothing to do with the case. Plaintiff could have no rights in equity and no right to be heard in a court of equity until he did the equitable thing by his associates and performed his part of the agreement. To give him an interest in this mine and the proceeds thereof now would be the grossest injustice to his co-contractors. A court of equity will not countenance such an injustice. On the most familiar principles of equity it is clear that the trial court sitting as a court of equity was fully warranted in denying the plaintiff all relief.

We advise that the judgment be affirmed.

Chipman, C., concurred.

For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Shaw, J., Angellotti, J., Van Dyke, J.

Hearing in Bank denied.