Damages. Evidence. Boston Elevated Railway Company. At the trial of a petition for the assessment by a jury of damages to real estate the presiding judge in his discretion may admit evidence of the rents actually received from the property during the four years previous to the act which occasioned the damage as bearing upon the rental value of the real estate which is one of the things that enters into its market value.
At the trial of a petition for the assessment by a jury of damages to real estate the presiding judge in his discretion may admit evidence of the cost of a building standing on the land erected four years before the act which occasioned the damage, to assist the jury in arriving at the market value of the property at the date as of which the damages are to be assessed.
At the trial of a petition under St. 1894, c. 548, and St. 1897, c. 500, for damages to land and buildings of the petitioner by the construction, maintenance and operation of the elevated railway of the Boston Elevated Railway Company, it appeared that the construction of the elevated structure in front of the petitioner's premises began in October, 1899. The husband of the petitioner testified without objection that he bought the land for his wife in 1895 for $3,250, and that in the same year he erected a brick building on the land for his wife. He was asked to state the cost of this building. The respondent objected, and the judge admitted the question. He answered $12,300. The witness also was asked to state the rents received from the property, beginning in the latter part of 1895. The respondent objected on the grounds that the time named was immaterial and that actual rents were not competent to show rental values. The judge admitted the question as throwing light on the rental value, and the witness gave the rents in detail. Held, that the admission of the evidence in both instances was within the discretion of the presiding judge and that there was nothing to show that his discretion was exercised improperly.
MORTON, J.
These exceptions relate to two matters of evidence. The husband of the petitioner Levenson was called as a witness for her, and, subject to the respondent's exceptions, was allowed to testify to the cost of the brick building erected in 1895, and to the rents received from the property, beginning in the latter part of 1895. The judge allowed the rents to be introduced as bearing upon the rental value, — rental value being one of the things that enter into market value. Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 368, 380. There is nothing to show that the rents were not paid in the ordinary course of business under normal conditions and in good faith, or that they had been or were inflated for the purposes of the trial, or were higher than rents generally in that neighborhood. These things, as well as how far back the petitioner should be allowed to go, were all matters for the presiding judge to pass upon, and if taking all of the circumstances into account he was of opinion that the rents actually paid would or might assist the jury in arriving at the rental value, we think that, in the exercise of his discretion, he properly could admit them. We see nothing to show that his discretion was not exercised properly. And so with regard to the cost of the building. There is nothing to show that the sum paid was not paid in good faith and under normal conditions and it cannot be said, we think, as matter of law that the cost could not have assisted the jury in arriving at the market value of the petitioner's estate as of the date when the damages were to be assessed. We see nothing to show that the presiding judge was wrong in admitting it, or that his discretion was not exercised rightly.
Exceptions overruled.