Certificate dismissed on the authority of Chicago, Burlington Quincy Railway Company v. Williams, 205 U.S. 444.
The headnote in that case is as follows: Under § 6 of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of March 3, 1891, 26 493 Stat. 826, the certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals as to questions or propositions of law concerning which it desires instruction must present a distinct point of law, clearly stated, which can be decided without passing upon the weight or effect of the advice on which the question arises, and if not so presented this court is without jurisdiction; and where the question certified practically brings up the entire case, and this court is asked to pass upon the validity of a contract and indicate what the final judgment should be, the certificate will be dismissed and the questions not answered.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, dissenting.
When this case was here before I felt doubts, but deferred to the judgment of the majority, as I think one should, when it does not seem that an important principle is involved or that there is some public advantage to be gained from a statement of the other side. But it seems to me that the present order is a mistake upon an important matter, and I am unwilling that it should seem to be made by unanimous consent. I think that such questions are to be encouraged as a mode of disposing of cases in the least cumbersome and most expeditious way. The former certificate was thought to invite a consideration of mixed questions of law and fact. However that may have been, the present one puts definite questions of pure law, and I think that those questions should be answered. Even if the third should be objected to, the other two are complete in themselves. It is no objection to a question of law that the case turns upon it. That is the best of reasons for propounding it. The only objection is not to deciding the case here but to putting questions that turn upon conclusions from evidence, or that present a general statement and ask a judgment with regard to unspecified questions of law.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE MOODY concur in this dissent.