Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof, Of foreign law. Equity Pleading and Practice, Master. Equity Jurisdictions, To rescind sale procured by fraud. Fraud.
In a suit in equity to rescind for fraud a sale and conveyance to the plaintiff of all of the defendant's right, title and interest in certain real estate in another State and to restore to the plaintiff what he paid therefor, the plaintiff introduced before a master, to whom the suit was referred, evidence tending to show that the defendant had purchased the land at a tax sale in the State where it was situated, but that shortly afterwards the defendant had been told by various persons in official positions that in their opinions his title so procured was of no value, and had been shown evidences that others were claiming the land, that thereafter he represented to the plaintiff that his title was unquestionable and that he knew nothing questionable about it, and by various means induced him to purchase the land without investigating the title. Held, that the question, whether the defendant's title was of value, was one of fact for the master to pass upon, and that its determination in no way depended upon whether the defendant's tax deed had or had not been avoided by a court of the State where the land was situated.
A void tax deed is not prima facie evidence of title.
One, who had purchased at a tax sale in another State land, which was described in the deed given to him only as "1577 acres in F. grant," and who thereafter was informed by various persons in official positions that the title which he had procured was of no value, thereafter represented to a prospective purchaser that the title to the land was unquestionable and that he knew nothing questionable about it, and, with the aid of an agent, who knowingly made like false representations, induced the prospective purchaser to buy the land without investigating the title, and to give to the holder of the tax deed $1,201 and to the agent, as a part of the same transaction, a note for $1,299, secured by a mortgage, to cover the amount of $1,300 which he supposed the agent was lending to him and which he supposed was paid to the seller. The agent paid the seller only $600. The tax title was worthless. Held, that the purchaser might maintain a suit in equity to rescind the transaction and to have the seller and the agent place him in statu quo.
A court of equity will not concern itself with the respective rights among themselves of wrongdoers who are defendants in a suit in equity to set aside a sale procured by their fraud.
SHELDON, J.
Both of the defendants Scott and Murdock filed numerous exceptions to the master's report, but only Murdock has appealed from the interlocutory decree overruling these exceptions and from the final decree which was entered in favor of the plaintiff.
The sixth of these exceptions has become immaterial in consequence of the addition made by the master to his report when the matter was called to his attention by the defendants' objection. As to the twelfth and thirteenth exceptions, it is enough to say that the other facts found by the master fully warranted the inference that "the deed from the State of Maine to Scott had no value, as it conveyed no ascertainable interest in land located in the Fryeburg Academy Grant." The validity and value of the title created by the deed depended upon the statute law of Maine, and it was purely a question of fact what that law was. Callender, McAuslan Troup Co. v. Flint, 187 Mass. 104, 107. Cherry v. Sprague, 187 Mass. 113, 117. Electric Welding Co. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386. But when such a question of fact is presented to our courts, they must pass upon it; and their right to find that under the laws of Maine a deed conveys no title, or no title that is of any value, does not depend upon the question whether the deed has or has not been avoided in a Maine court. The fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and twentieth exceptions relate to findings of fact which were well warranted by the subsidiary findings made. The master was not bound to find that the sum of $700 obtained by Murdock as a secret profit from the plaintiff was really a fair commission honestly paid to him by Scott. And a void tax deed is not prima facie evidence of title. All the other exceptions are to mere findings of fact, as to which the evidence is not reported, and which for that reason we cannot disturb. Lipsky v. Heller, 199 Mass. 310, 313. The decree overruling the exceptions and confirming the master's report must be affirmed.
From the master's report it is plain that a fraud was perpetrated upon the plaintiff by which he was induced to pay $1,201 in money and $1,299 in his note secured by a mortgage for what was of no value, and that both Scott and Murdock participated in this fraud. The decree entered in the Superior Court was right. Holst v. Stewart, 161 Mass. 516. Burns v. Dockray, 156 Mass. 135.
We need not consider whether Murdock has any remedy for contribution or otherwise against Scott. The court does not concern itself with the respective rights of wrongdoers among themselves. Light v. Jacobs, 183 Mass. 206. Rowley v. Towsley, 53 Mich. 329.
The final decree appealed from is to be modified so as to charge Murdock with the costs of this appeal, and so modified is
Affirmed.