Landlord and Tenant, Termination of lease. Attachment. Trespass. Officer. Where a lease provides in substance that, upon a breach of any of its covenants by the lessee, the lessor immediately and without demand or notice may enter upon the premises, dispossess the lessee and terminate the lease, a lessor has a right both to bring an action against the lessee for arrears of rent in which an attachment is made of personal property upon the leased premises, and also to enter upon the premises, dispossess the lessee and terminate the lease while the constable is upon the premises and in charge of personal property of the lessee under the writ of attachment; and the constable, if authorized so to do by the lessor, after the dispossession may prevent the lessee from entering the premises except for the removal of property exempt from attachment.
Under a writ of attachment in an action of contract against the proprietor of a tailoring business conducted in two rooms, each connected with a corridor, one room being used as a workroom by the employees of the establishment and the other for dealing with customers, a constable has no right against the wishes of the defendant to place a lock upon the door leading from the corridor into the workroom and to keep the defendant and his employees from using that door.
SHELDON, J.
There was no evidence to show what specific property of the plaintiff was attached by the defendant. Of the goods of the plaintiff in the rooms occupied by him as a place of business, some were and some were not exempt from attachment. There was nothing to indicate that the defendant interfered with any of the former goods, and it cannot be presumed that he did so.
Upon the testimony of both parties it appeared that the plaintiff voluntarily surrendered his keys to the defendant, and assented to the defendant's remaining through his keeper in possession of the attached property upon the plaintiff's premises. Certainly the plaintiff made no request for the removal of the keeper or of the property attached under R.L.c. 167, §§ 43, 44.
So far as appears the entry of Stone, the plaintiff's landlord, to take possession of the premises for non-payment of rent was lawful. Fifty Associates v. Howland, 5 Cush. 214. Hall v. Middleby, 197 Mass. 485, 489. Gunsenhiser v. Binder, 206 Mass. 434. There is nothing contrary to this in Desseau v. Holmes, 187 Mass. 486, or Fifty Associates v. Howland, 11 Met. 99, relied on by the plaintiff. The defendant did nothing unlawful or in violation of the plaintiff's rights in regard to this.
The action cannot be maintained on any of these grounds.
But there was evidence that the defendant put a lock on the rear door of the plaintiff's rooms and prevented the plaintiff and his servants from using that door. If, as might have been found, this was without the plaintiff's assent, it was a wrongful act and entitled the plaintiff to maintain his action. Walsh v. Brown, 194 Mass. 317. Morrin v. Manning, 205 Mass. 205. It follows that the verdict for the defendant ought not to have been directed, and for this reason alone the order must be
Exceptions sustained.