Practice, Criminal, Verdict, Arrest of judgment. Pleading, Criminal, Indictment.
A verdict of not guilty on a count in an indictment charging the defendant with a violation of R.L.c. 208, § 98, in that he "did wilfully and maliciously administer" poison to "certain cattle belonging to" a certain person, is not inconsistent with a verdict of guilty on a second count in the same indictment charging the defendant with a violation of the same statute in that he "did wilfully and maliciously expose" poison "with intent that it should be taken or swallowed by cattle belonging to" the same person.
An objection that, in an indictment for a violation of R.L.c. 208, § 98, in exposing poison with intent that it should be swallowed by "cattle belonging to" a certain person, the word "cattle" is not sufficiently definite, even if it were a valid objection to the indictment, would not be a ground for arresting judgment after verdict, since it would be a cause existing before verdict which did not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
In an indictment charging that the defendant "did wilfully and maliciously expose certain poison . . . with intent that it should be taken or swallowed by cattle belonging to" a certain person, the word "cattle" is sufficiently definite to show a violation of R.L.c. 208, § 98, which in substance provides a penalty for administering or exposing poison with intent that it shall be taken or swallowed by "any horse, cattle or other beast of another person."
LORING, J.
If the defendant exposed poison with intent that it should be swallowed but it was not swallowed by the cattle in question, the jury had to find a verdict of guilty on the second count and a verdict of not guilty on the first. There is no inconsistency between the two.
The other reason for arresting judgment was that "cattle" is not sufficiently definite. This was a cause existing before verdict not affecting the jurisdiction of the court and so not ground for arresting judgment. R.L.c. 219, § 38. Commonwealth v. Monahan, 170 Mass. 460.
It is not improper to add, however, that there is nothing in the objection. For while the word "cattle" may have been too indefinite under the black act, St. 9 Geo. I.c. 22, § 3, (Rex v. Chalkley, Russ. Ry. 258) and at common law (State v. Brookhouse, 10 Wn. 87), it is not too indefinite under our criminal practice act. That act provides that a detailed description is not necessary (R.L.c. 218, § 17) and gives the defendant a right to a bill of particulars if the charge would not be otherwise fully, plainly, substantially and formally set out. R.L.c. 218, § 39. Commonwealth v. Dill, 160 Mass. 536. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259. Under that statute it is sufficient to charge this act in the words of the statute creating the crime. R.L.c. 208, § 98.
Judgment affirmed.