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Opinion Summary: Marenna's Appeal from County Commissioners (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1913)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decision of the county commissioners of New Haven County authorizing the transfer (a removal permit) of a wholesale liquor license from one locality to another in the city of New Haven. A taxpayer (the remonstrant) contested the commissioners' action and brought the matter to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The Superior Court (Williams, J.) found facts and rendered judgment reversing the decision of the county commissioners. Joseph Quint, the applicant for the transfer (holder of a special license under § 2662), appealed the Superior Court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The applicant sought to move his licensed business to premises on Oak Street where he intended to sell intoxicating liquors in quantities from one gill upward, not to be drunk on the premises. It was found and conceded at trial that, at the time of the requested removal, the locality to which the removal was sought already contained a sufficient number of licensed places (i.e., too many licensed saloons).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application for a removal permit under General Statutes § 2669 should be treated as an application for a new license at the place to which the business is to be removed.
  2. Whether a locality that already contains a sufficient number of licensed places is a "suitable place" under General Statutes § 2643 for the granting of additional licenses, including licenses held by so-called wholesale liquor dealers.
  3. Whether a special license under § 2662 (for "respectable wholesale dealers" who do not allow liquors to be drunk on the premises) may be granted or removed to a locality that the county commissioners have determined already has sufficient licensed places.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant (Joseph Quint)

  • Argued that his special license under § 2662 (a so-called wholesaler's license, with a reduced fee because liquors are not to be drunk on the premises) could be granted in a locality where there were already sufficient licensed places, and therefore that he could properly be permitted to remove his licensed business to such a place.
  • Presented evidence that he had complied with federal special tax requirements authorizing the sale of intoxicating liquors at both wholesale and retail, and that he intended to sell in quantities from one gill upward but not for consumption on the licensed premises.

Remonstrant (Michele Marenna / demonstrating taxpayer)

  • Contended (and it was found and conceded at trial) that, at the time the removal permit was sought and granted, the locality to which the removal was proposed already contained a sufficient number of licensed places (i.e., too many licensed saloons), making it an unsuitable locality for additional licensing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bormann's Appeal, 81 Conn. 458, 461, 71 A. 502 The application for a removal permit by a licensed person under § 2669 is to be treated as an application for a new license at the place to which the business is to be removed. The court cited this case to establish that a removal permit must be judged under the same standards as an initial grant of a license at the new locality.
D'Amato's Appeal, 80 Conn. 357, 362, 68 A. 445 A locality where there already exists a sufficient number of licensed places is an unsuitable locality for the licensing of other places. The court relied on this precedent to support the proposition that the existence of sufficient licensed places in a locality renders that locality unsuitable for additional licenses, including the one sought here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by locating authority in General Statutes § 2643, which authorizes county commissioners to license suitable persons to sell spirituous and intoxicating liquors at suitable places. It then applied the principle from Bormann's Appeal that an application for a removal permit under § 2669 must be treated as if it were an application for a new license at the place to which the business is to be removed.

The court noted that it had been found that the county commissioners themselves had previously determined that sufficient licensed places existed in the locality to which the applicant sought to remove, and it was conceded at trial that there were too many licensed saloons there. Citing D'Amato's Appeal, the court held that a locality with a sufficient number of licensed places is unsuitable for licensing additional places. On that basis the court concluded the county commissioners could not lawfully grant a new license (or permit a removal that has the effect of granting one) in that locality.

The court then addressed the applicant's reliance on his special license under § 2662 (a license granted to "respectable wholesale dealers" who do not sell liquors to be drunk on the premises and which carries a reduced fee). The court rejected the notion that such a special license permits licensing in otherwise unsuitable localities. The court reasoned that:

  • The special license contemplates both wholesale and retail sales; the statutory prohibition on selling liquors "to be drunk on the premises" would be meaningless unless retail sales were contemplated.
  • Liquors sold in small quantities (from a gill upward) are presumed to be purchased for immediate consumption in the neighborhood, so the fact they are not to be drunk on the premises does not remove the locality-based objections that apply to ordinary saloons.
  • Section 2662's reduced fee reflects only the reduced objectionable feature of on-premises consumption; it does not authorize licensing in localities where other licenses are denied because the locality is unsuitable.

On these grounds the court concluded that the county commissioners lacked authority to grant the removal permit to the Oak Street locality where they had determined sufficient licensed places already existed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment reversing the county commissioners' grant of the removal permit — the county commissioners had no authority to permit the removal of the applicant's licensed business to a locality where they had found sufficient licensed places already existed.

Implications: The direct effect of this decision is that the transfer (removal) of the applicant's license to the Oak Street locality was unlawful and is reversed. The court applied existing statutory provisions and controlling precedents (Bormann's Appeal and D'Amato's Appeal) to reach this result. The opinion does not elaborate broader policy consequences beyond reaffirming that removal permits are governed by the same locality suitability rules that apply to original licenses and that the special wholesale-license fee provision (§ 2662) does not exempt such licensees from locality suitability limitations.

MICHELE MARENNA'S APPEAL FROM COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.

An application, by a person licensed to sell intoxicating liquors, for a removal permit under General Statutes, § 2669, is to be treated, in effect, as one for a new license at the place to which the business is to be removed. A locality in which there are already too many liquor saloons is not a "suitable place," within the meaning of that expression in General Statutes, § 2643, in which to grant additional licenses, whether to saloon keepers or to so-called wholesale liquor dealers; for the law makes no distinction, as respects the suitability of the locality, between places in which the liquor sold is, and those in which it is not, to be drunk on the premises, nor between the grant of an original license and the issue of a removal permit.

THAYER, J.

By § 2643 of the General Statutes, the county commissioners are authorized to license suitable persons to sell spirituous and intoxicating liquors at suitable places. The application for a removal permit by a licensed person under § 2669 of the statutes is to be treated as an application for a new license at the place to which the business is to be removed. Bormann's Appeal, 81 Conn. 458, 461, 71 A. 502. A locality where there already exists a sufficient number of licensed places is an unsuitable locality for the licensing of other places. D'Amato's Appeal, 80 Conn. 357, 362, 68 A. 445. It is found that, before granting the permission to remove asked for in the present case, the county commissioners had found that sufficient licensed places existed in the locality to which the removal was to be made and had refused to license other places in that locality, and it was conceded upon the trial that too many licensed saloons existed there at the time that the permission to remove there was sought and given. The county commissioners, therefore, could not lawfully grant a new license to sell spirituous and intoxicating liquors in that locality.

The applicant's license was a special one, granted under that provision of § 2662 of the statutes which makes exceptions in favor of reputable wholesale dealers who do not sell liquors to be drunk on the premises, and reputable hotels in places of less than four thousand inhabitants, in respect to the amount of the license fee to be paid. The applicant claims that such licenses may be granted to sell in a locality where there are already sufficient licensed places, and consequently that he might properly be permitted to remove his licensed business to such a place.

The applicant, as it is found, has complied with the laws of the United States with respect to the payment of special taxes authorizing the sale of intoxicating liquors at both wholesale and retail, and contemplates selling such liquors at the Oak Street place in quantities from one gill upward, but not to be drunk upon the premises. The county commissioners, in granting the removal permit, were controlled by their belief that, because the liquors to be sold by the applicant were not to be drunk upon the premises, the giving of permission to remove his place to the new locality was not inconsistent with their judgment that sufficient licensed places existed there. This assumes either that a special license of this kind may be granted to sell in unsuitable places, or that a place situated in a locality where there are already sufficient licensed places is not an unsuitable place for such a license. The first assumption is clearly untenable. The business permitted under such a license is retail as well as wholesale. It will not be claimed that such a business could be permitted adjoining a schoolhouse or church, or at the door of a manufactory, or in a residential neighborhood; and no good reason is apparent why the fact that the liquors sold under this special license are not to be drunk upon the premises should render eligible for such a license a locality which is ineligible for a general license.

It is not contemplated that liquors sold at wholesale will be drunk on the premises; but a wholesaler may, and frequently does, sell at retail, and his license contemplates that he will do such a retail business. This is apparent from the fact that one of the conditions of the so-called wholesaler's license is that the licensee shall not sell liquors to be drunk on the premises — a meaningless provision unless sales at retail were contemplated. The presumption is that liquors purchased in quantities as small as a gill at such a place are purchased for immediate consumption in the immediate neighborhood. The fact that the liquors sold under such a license are not to be drunk upon the premises where purchased, may remove from the place some of the objectionable features of the ordinary liquor saloon. It was doubtless for this reason that permission was given to grant such licenses to "respectable wholesale dealers" at a reduced license fee. All wholesale dealers may, under their general license, sell at retail liquors to be drunk upon their premises or elsewhere. The provision of the statute that licenses should only be granted to suitable persons to sell in suitable places has always applied to them. The law prescribes no different form of license, and no different license fee, for them than for the ordinary retail dealer. They could thus sell at retail the same as any other dealer under the general license. Section 2662, permitting the grant of the special licenses, does not expressly provide that the licensees under them may be permitted to sell in localities where, prior to the statute, they could not, and where now other wholesale dealers and retail dealers may not be permitted to sell. It allows a reduced license fee in consideration of the fact that liquors sold upon the licensed premises are not to be drunk there. This is all that it does provide for. We think that the county commissioners had no authority to grant the removal of a business thus licensed in one place to another where, in their opinion, sufficient licensed places already existed, and that the court's finding to this effect was correct.

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MARENNA'S APPEAL
(Jul 25, 1913)