Case Summary: Edward L. Griffiths v. Dwight Powers, executor (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Nov. 25, 1913)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an action of contract brought against the executor of the will of an attorney-at-law (the testator). The attorney (the testator) died in 1911. Prior to his death, having collected money for a client named Mary E. Queenie, he "unreasonably refused after demand made in 1907 to pay over" a balance due of $50. The plaintiff in this action is the assignee of Mary E. Queenie. The controlling question presented to the court was the proper rate of interest recoverable under R.L.c. 165, § 49, which prescribes that an attorney who after demand unreasonably refuses to pay over money collected for a client "shall forfeit to such client five times the lawful interest of the money from the time of the demand." The Superior Court allowed interest at thirty per cent per annum from the date of demand to the date of its finding; the present opinion addresses the correctness of that ruling and whether such a claim survives against the attorney's estate.

Legal Issues Presented

Does R.L.c. 165, § 49, which states that an attorney who after demand unreasonably refuses to pay over money "shall forfeit to such client five times the lawful interest," create a separate cause of action for a penalty, or does it instead provide for an increased rate of interest incident to the underlying debt?
If the statute merely increases the rate of interest incident to the debt, does the claim for that increased interest survive the attorney's death and may it be collected against his estate (under R.L.c. 171, § 1)?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Corcoran v. Henshaw, 8 Gray, 267, 278.	That interest, even when allowed as damages for the detention of a debt due, is incident to the debt and is to be paid with it and as a part of it.	Used to support the conclusion that the additional amount prescribed by R.L.c. 165, § 49 is incident to the debt (an increased rate of interest) and therefore recoverable with the debt rather than requiring a separate tort action.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed R.L.c. 165, § 49 in context. It observed that the provision appears among statutes governing the duties and obligations of attorneys and reflects the Legislature's disapproval of an attorney's failure to account promptly for client collections. The provision was seen as a practical measure intended both to punish the delinquent attorney to some extent and to benefit the client; therefore the statute should be construed to afford reasonable relief.

The court reasoned that, despite the statute's use of the word "forfeit," the statutory language is more naturally read as substituting a higher rate of interest (five times the lawful rate) on the underlying debt rather than creating a separate penal cause of action in tort. The court relied on the principle (citing Corcoran v. Henshaw) that interest awarded for detention of a debt is incident to the debt itself. From this premise the court concluded that the increased rate becomes incident to the debt and is recoverable with the debt under contract rules.

Because the remedy relates to interest on a debt rather than a distinct tort remedy, the court held that contractual rules governing method of collection and survivorship apply. Therefore the claim for the enhanced interest survives the death of the attorney and may be pursued against his estate by the assignee of the client.

Applying these conclusions to the case at hand, the court affirmed the Superior Court's allowance of interest at thirty per cent per annum (i.e., five times the lawful rate then prevailing) from the date of demand (1907) to the date of the Superior Court's finding.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The statute R.L.c. 165, § 49 is to be construed as imposing an increased rate of interest (five times the lawful rate) on an attorney's debt to a client for money collected and unreasonably withheld after demand, rather than as creating a separate penal cause of action; accordingly, the increased interest is incident to the debt, survives the attorney's death under R.L.c. 171, § 1, and may be collected from the attorney's estate. The Superior Court's allowance of interest at thirty per cent per annum from the date of demand to the date of its finding was upheld and judgment was entered in accordance with that finding.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the plaintiff (assignee of the client) is entitled to recover the increased rate of interest (five times the lawful rate) as part of the debt from the attorney's estate. The opinion frames that remedy as contractual in nature and governed by rules of survivorship; the opinion does not set out broader policy pronouncements beyond this interpretation and application to the parties before the court.

Case metadata (from the opinion): Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol; Hearing date: October 27, 1913; Decision date: November 25, 1913. Panel: Rugg, C.J., Morton, Braley, Sheldon, De Courcy, JJ. Counsel: F.A. Pease for plaintiff; C.W. Cushing for defendant.

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EDWARD L. GRIFFITHS vs. DWIGHT POWERS, executor.

Attorney at Law. Survival of Actions. Interest. R.L.c. 165, § 49, which provides that an attorney at law who after demand unreasonably neglects to pay over money collected for a client "shall forfeit to such client five times the lawful interest of the money from the time of the demand," does not create a separate cause of action for a penalty, but merely provides for an increased rate of interest to be paid upon the debt to the client; and therefore a cause of action against an attorney at law for such interest as incidental to such a debt survives under R.L.c. 171, § 1, against the executor of the will of such attorney.

RUGG, C.J.

This is an action of contract against the executor of the will of an attorney at law. The testator died in 1911. Having collected money for a client named Mary E. Queenie, he unreasonably refused after demand made in 1907 to pay over to her a balance due of $50. The plaintiff is her assignee. The question is the rate of interest to which the plaintiff is entitled. This depends upon the meaning and effect of R.L.c. 165, § 49, which provides that an attorney at law who after demand unreasonably refuses to pay over money collected for a client "shall forfeit to such client five times the lawful interest of the money from the time of the demand."

This provision occurs in the part of the statute which governs the duties and obligations of attorneys at law. It expressed the public abhorrence for the breach of the obligation of an attorney at law promptly and fully to account to his clients for collections made in their behalf. It is a practical measure devised not only to be in a sense a punishment to the attorney, but also to benefit the client. It should be construed so as to afford reasonable relief. It hardly is likely that the Legislature intended that a separate action in tort was necessary in order to collect the additional amount due under the statute. It relates to the subject of interest. Interest, even when allowed as damages for the detention of a debt due, is incident to the debt, to be paid with it and as a part of it. Corcoran v. Henshaw, 8 Gray, 267, 278.

Although the statute is not phrased with clearness, we think it more consonant with the nature of the relief afforded against the delinquent attorney, and the terms in which it is expressed, to hold that, although the word forfeit is used, an increase in the legal rate of interest as applied to a debt of this character is intended rather than a technical forfeiture. The meaning is that the rate of interest upon such a debt shall be five times that which otherwise would be the lawful rate. It substitutes a five fold increase for the rate which would prevail if it were an ordinary debt. If follows from this that the increased rate substituted by way of penalty becomes incident to the debt and is to be recovered with it. Since it relates to the rate of interest, the rules of contract as to method of collection and survivorship govern, rather than those of tort. Hence it survives the death of the attorney and may be collected of his estate by the assignee of the client. The Superior Court rightly allowed interest at the rate of thirty per cent per annum from the date of demand to the date of its finding. Judgment in accordance with the finding.

The case was reported by Sanderson, J., for determination by this court.

The case was submitted on briefs.

GRIFFITHS v. POWERS