1. DURESS. It is provided by Rev. Laws 1910, sec. 900, that duress consists in: (1) Unlawful confinement of the person of the party, or of the husband or wife of such party, or of an ancestor, descendant, or adopted child of such party, husband or wife; (2) unlawful detention of the property of any such person; or (3) confinement of such person, lawful in form, but fraudulently obtained, or fraudulently made, unjustly harassing or offensive.
2. APPEAL AND ERROR — Ground for Reversal — Instructions — Duress. Where the defense to a contract was that it was obtained by duress, and the court instructs the jury that the word "duress" means such a powerful influence and dominion over another as to take away free agency, and destroy the power of withholding assent in a person of ordinary firmness, held reversible error, especially where an instruction was requested in the words of the statute.
3. DURESS — Decisions from Other States. What constitutes duress in Oklahoma is provided by statute, and authorities from other states having no such statute have no application.
(Syllabus by Devereux, C.)
Opinion by DEVEREUX, C. (after stating the facts as above).
Assuming, but not deciding, that there was evidence in the record on the question of duress sufficient to go to the jury in any event, there was error in the charge as given, and in refusing to give the instruction requested on this subject. Our statute defines "duress" as follows (Rev. Laws 1910, sec. 900):
"First. Unlawful confinement of the person of the party, or of husband or wife of such party, or of an ancestor, descendant, or adopted child of such party, husband or wife.
"Second. Unlawful detention of the property of any such person; or,
"Third. Confinement of such person, lawful in form, but fraudulently obtained, or fraudulently made unjustly, harassing or oppressive."
In Snyder v. Stribling, 18 Okla. 168, on page 200, 89 P. 222 on page 232, it is said:
"Instructions numbered 7 and 9 relate to the questions of duress and undue influence in the execution of the contract of October 1st, and state the effect upon a contract made without consideration or under duress or undue influence. These questions are regulated by our statutory provisions, and the authorities cited have but little application, and are not controlling.
"The instruction defining duress and undue influence in the execution of contracts is copied from the provisions of the statute (Wilson's Stat. 1903, vol. 1, c, 15, art. 1), and, while such instruction embodies some propositions that have no application to the case, in our judgment, the inapplicable provisions were so palpably foreign that they could in no event have been misleading, and hence, not prejudicial."
In its charge the trial court abandoned the statutory rule by which duress is measured, although expressly asked to instruct the jury in the words of the statute, and laid down an entirely different rule.
We therefore recommend that the judgment be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
By the Court: It is so ordered.