PALMER v. TREASURER RECEIVER GENERAL, Mass., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

W.H. Hitchcock, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants. G.F. Piper, for the plaintiffs, was not called upon.

Judges

CROSBY, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a petition for instructions filed in the Probate Court by the executors of Edward H. Palmer's will. The executors sought to determine whether certain real estate owned by Emily M. Palmer, the widow of the testator, was subject to taxation under Massachusetts statutes governing legacies and successions (St. 1909, c. 490, Part IV, § 1, as amended by St. 1912, c. 678, § 1). The case was appealed and reserved for determination by the Supreme Judicial Court based on pleadings and an agreed statement of facts.

The agreed facts established that Emily M. Palmer and her husband Edward H. Palmer received a conveyance of real estate as tenants by the entirety on July 30, 1912, after which they held the property jointly until Edward's death on March 17, 1913. The real estate had been originally acquired by Emily through inheritance and purchase from her father’s heirs, and she had held title for many years prior.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether upon the death of Edward H. Palmer, an interest in the real estate held as tenants by the entirety passed to Emily M. Palmer by right of survivorship, thereby creating a taxable succession under Massachusetts statutes.
Whether the widow’s interest in the property after her husband’s death constitutes a new estate subject to succession tax under the relevant statutes.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney General's Arguments

Contended that upon Edward H. Palmer’s death, one half interest in the real estate passed to the widow by right of survivorship.
Argued that this interest is taxable under the statutory provision that taxes real estate passing "by the laws regulating intestate succession."
Did not contend the estate was taxable under any other provision of the statute.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

The opinion notes that counsel for the plaintiffs was not called upon to argue, and no specific arguments from the plaintiffs were detailed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219, 221	Defined tenancy by the entirety as a joint tenancy modified by the doctrine that husband and wife are one person.	Used to explain the nature of tenancy by the entirety and how it differs from joint tenancy, particularly regarding survivorship and severance.
Shaw v. Hearsey, 5 Mass. 521	Established that neither husband nor wife can sever a tenancy by the entirety or alienate a moiety to defeat survivorship.	Supported the principle that the estate is held as one entire interest, not divisible into moieties.
Wales v. Coffin, 13 Allen, 213	Reinforced the indivisibility of tenancy by the entirety and survivorship rights.	Further confirmed the nature of the estate as one held jointly and indivisibly by husband and wife.
Hoag v. Hoag, 213 Mass. 50	Considered the characteristics of tenancy by the entirety under Massachusetts law.	Used to affirm the court’s understanding of the estate’s nature and survivorship.
Enyeart v. Kepler, 118 Ind. 36	Held that no new estate by survivorship passes to the surviving spouse in tenancy by the entirety.	Supported the conclusion that the widow holds under the original deed, not by succession.
Attorney General v. Clark, post, 291	Discussed that survivorship in tenancy by entirety does not constitute intestate succession.	Reinforced that the surviving spouse’s title is not acquired by intestate succession but by the nature of the estate.
Matter of Klatzl, 216 N.Y. 83	Addressed survivorship interests and their tax implications under succession laws.	Used to illustrate that survivorship in tenancy by entirety is not a succession subject to tax.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature of tenancy by the entirety, emphasizing that it is a unique form of joint ownership restricted to husband and wife, where the couple holds one entire estate together rather than separate moieties. Unlike joint tenancy, neither spouse can sever the tenancy or alienate a portion to defeat survivorship rights.

The court reasoned that because the husband and wife take title as one person, upon the death of one spouse, no new estate or interest passes to the survivor by operation of law. Instead, the surviving spouse continues to hold the entire estate under the original deed. Therefore, the widow’s interest did not arise by succession or intestate laws, but by the inherent nature of the tenancy by entirety.

Since the widow did not acquire any new estate by survivorship but held the property continuously from the creation of the tenancy, the court concluded that no taxable succession occurred under the statutes governing legacies and successions.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the decree holding that the real estate held by Emily M. Palmer as tenant by the entirety is not subject to succession tax upon the death of her husband.

The direct effect of this decision is that the widow’s interest in the property is exempt from the succession tax imposed by the cited statutes, as no new estate passed to her by survivorship. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond affirming the established legal principles regarding tenancy by the entirety and its tax implications under Massachusetts law.

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EMILY M. PALMER others, executors, vs. TREASURER AND RECEIVER GENERAL another.

Tax, On legacies and successions. Tenants by Entirety. Husband and Wife. Upon the death of a husband, who with his wife had received a conveyance of real estate as tenants by the entirety, no new estate by survivorship passes to the widow, but she still holds under the deed by which she and her husband received the property by the entirety; and therefore she is not subject to a succession tax under Sts. 1909, c. 490, Part IV, § 1; 1912, c. 678, § 1.

CROSBY, J.

This is a petition for instructions brought in the Probate Court by the executors under the will of Edward H. Palmer to determine the question whether certain real estate owned by Emily M. Palmer, widow of the testator, is taxable under the statutes relating to the taxation of legacies and successions. St. 1909, c. 490, Part IV, § 1, as amended by St. 1912, c. 678, § 1.

Upon an appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court the case was reserved by Loring, J., upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts for determination by this court.

The agreed facts show that Emily M. Palmer, wife of Edward H. Palmer, on July 30, 1912, conveyed certain real estate owned by her and situated in this Commonwealth to one Kennedy, who, "at the same time, and as part of the same transaction, . . . conveyed the same to said Emily M. Palmer wife and said Edward H. Palmer husband, in fee as tenants by the entirety;" and they continued thereafter to hold the property so conveyed as tenants by the entirety until the death of Edward H. Palmer, which occurred on March 17, 1913. The title of Emily M. Palmer to the real estate was by inheritance from her father and by purchase from the other heirs of her father, and had been held by her for many years.

The Attorney General contends that upon the death of Edward H. Palmer one half interest in this real estate passed to the widow by right of survivorship, and that such interest is taxable under that clause of the statute which includes real estate which passes "by the laws regulating intestate succession." It is not contended that the estate is taxable under any other provision of the statute.

The peculiar nature of a tenancy by the entirety frequently has been considered by this court. It can arise only where the ownership is vested in husband and wife. As was said by Field, J., in Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219, 221: "This tenancy by entireties is essentially a joint tenancy, modified by the common law doctrine that husband and wife are one person." The difference between a joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety is that joint tenants take by moieties and are each seized of an undivided moiety of the whole, per my et per tout, which draws after it the incident of survivorship unless either party in his lifetime severs the jointure.

On the other hand neither husband nor wife can sever a tenancy by the entirety. They do not take by moieties but by entireties. Neither can alienate a moiety so as to defeat the title to the survivor in the whole. Shaw v. Hearsey, 5 Mass. 521. Wales v. Coffin, 13 Allen, 213. Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219. Hoag v. Hoag, 213 Mass. 50.

When a tenancy by the entirety is created, the husband and wife take the estate as one person, and they take but one estate. In view of the nature of such an estate, on the death of either husband or wife no beneficial interest accrues to the other by survivorship so as to create succession, and so no part of the estate was subject to the tax.

Upon the death of the testator no estate in the property in question passed to his widow. It belonged to her from the time when the tenancy by the entirety was created. In the event that she survived her husband, upon his death she took no new title by survivorship, but held under the deed by virtue of which she was originally seized of the whole. 21 Cyc. 1198, 1199. 1 Washb. Real Prop. (6th ed.) § 912. Enyeart v. Kepler, 118 Ind. 36.

Upon the testator's death the estate simply was freed from participation by him. The complete title of a surviving tenant by the entirety is not acquired by intestate succession, but by reason of the nature of the estate. See Attorney General v. Clark, post, 291; Matter of Klatzl, 216 N.Y. 83.

Decree affirmed with costs.

PALMER v. TREASURER RECEIVER GENERAL