Summary of Opinion: Universal Optical Corporation v. Globe Optical Company (May 25, 1917)

Factual and Procedural Background

Four writs of scire facias issued in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston (dated June 17, 1915) named the Globe Optical Company as trustee in four original trustee-process actions brought by various plaintiffs against New England Wholesale Opticians, Incorporated (the principal defendant). In each case, judgment was entered against the Globe Optical Company for the amount claimed with interest and costs, and the Globe Optical Company appealed to the Superior Court.

The four cases were heard together in the Superior Court by Judge Dubuque, without a jury. At the outset of the trial the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction. The judge admitted evidence de bene which showed that in each original Municipal Court trustee-process action there had been a report to the Appellate Division at the request of the alleged trustee, that the Appellate Division ordered the trustee (Globe Optical Company) be charged, and that in none of the cases did the trustee appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court under the statutes cited in the record (St. 1912, c. 649, § 9, as amended by St. 1914, c. 35, § 4).

The Superior Court judge ordered that each appeal be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and that the papers be remanded to the Municipal Court of the City of Boston, and reported the cases to the Supreme Judicial Court for determination. If the Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the ruling, the orders were to stand; if not, there was to be a new trial.

The case was argued March 29–30, 1917, and decided May 25, 1917. Counsel of record: R. H. Montgomery for the plaintiffs and F. D. Fuller for the defendant.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a writ of scire facias issued under R. L. c. 189, §§ 45–49, to enforce a judgment charging a trustee in an action brought by trustee process is an independent civil action or part of the original action.
Whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to entertain appeals by a trustee from Municipal Court judgments on scire facias where the Appellate Division had ordered the trustee to be charged and the trustee did not appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court under St. 1912, c. 649, § 9, as amended by St. 1914, c. 35, § 4.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bickford v. Boston Lowell Railroad, 21 Pick. 109, 113	Supports the principle that original trustee-process actions and the scire facias are part of one continued and connected course of proceedings and that examination in scire facias is to be in the same manner and with the same effect as in the original action.	Used to demonstrate that the scire facias is not an independent action and to characterize the procedural effect of trustee examination and answers.
Fay v. Sears, 111 Mass. 154	Supports the same principle that trustee-process and scire facias proceedings form a connected course of proceedings.	Relied on as authority for treating scire facias as part of the original proceedings rather than a separate civil action.
Phillips v. Meagher, 166 Mass. 152	Supports the principle that scire facias proceedings are connected to the original trustee-process action.	Applied to reinforce the court's characterization of scire facias procedure and its consequences for issues of jurisdiction.
Koontz v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad, 220 Mass. 285	Another authority cited for the principle that the original action and the scire facias are part of the same continuing proceedings.	Included among authorities showing the scire facias is not an independent civil action.
M'Gee v. Barber, 14 Pick. 212, 215	Supports the proposition that scire facias, when used to enforce a judgment against a trustee, is a judicial writ to enforce a judgment rather than an independent civil action.	Applied to show the scire facias' character as a writ enforcing judgment against a trustee.
Gray v. Thrasher, 104 Mass. 373, 375	Used for the same rule that scire facias is a writ to enforce a judgment charging the trustee.	Relied upon for the conclusion that scire facias is not an independent action but a continuation of the original proceeding.
Perkins v. Bangs, 206 Mass. 408, 415	Supports the characterization of scire facias as a writ enforcing judgment; cited in connection with procedural consequences when the Appellate Division has ordered the trustee to be charged.	Employed to support the court's holding that, given the Appellate Division determination and absence of an appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the trustee's appeals.
Perkins v. Bangs, 206 Mass. 408, 416	Applied to the jurisdictional question arising from the trustee having taken the question to the Appellate Division and not appealing further to the Supreme Judicial Court under the cited statutes.	Directly cited to justify the ruling that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeals.
Dion v. Powers, 128 Mass. 192	Authority for the procedural remedy of dismissing appeals and transmitting the papers back to the lower court.	Used to support the order dismissing the appeals and directing that the papers be transmitted to the Municipal Court of the City of Boston.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with established authorities holding that a trustee-process action and the subsequent scire facias under R. L. c. 189, §§ 45–49, constitute "one continued and connected course of proceedings." The court observed that when scire facias is used to enforce a judgment charging a trustee (where the trustee, on demand, does not pay over goods, effects or credits sufficient to satisfy execution), the examination of the trustee in scire facias is conducted in the same manner and with the same effect as in the original action; there is no provision for a jury trial and the trustee's answers to interrogatories are to be treated as true and conclusive, subject to parties' ability to allege and prove material facts not stated or denied by the trustee.

From these principles the court concluded that scire facias in this context is not an independent civil action but a judicial writ to enforce a judgment. Applying that characterization to the procedural posture before it, the court noted that the original actions had not been removed from the Municipal Court to the Superior Court in accordance with the statutes governing removal (St. of 1912, c. 649, §§ 2, 3, as amended by St. 1914, c. 35, § 2, and St. 1914, c. 409). The court further observed that the trustee had taken the question whether he was chargeable to the Appellate Division, which ordered that the trustee be charged, and that no appeal from that order had been taken to the Supreme Judicial Court under St. of 1912, c. 649, § 9, as amended by St. 1914, c. 35, § 4.

Given (1) the nonindependent character of scire facias proceedings, (2) the Appellate Division's order charging the trustee, and (3) the absence of an appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court as provided by statute, the court held that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the trustee's appeals. The court therefore affirmed the Superior Court's order dismissing the appeals and directing remand of the papers to the Municipal Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Superior Court's dismissal of the appeals for want of jurisdiction and the order remanding the papers to the Municipal Court of the City of Boston is affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the four appeals brought by the Globe Optical Company to the Superior Court are dismissed and the case papers are to be transmitted back to the Municipal Court of the City of Boston. The opinion applies existing authorities to determine that scire facias proceedings enforcing trustee liability are part of the original action and that, where the Appellate Division has ordered the trustee charged and no statutory appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court has been pursued, the trustee has no right to appeal to the Superior Court. The opinion does not discuss broader legal consequences beyond the direct effect on these cases.

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UNIVERSAL OPTICAL CORPORATION vs. GLOBE OPTICAL COMPANY. COLUMBIA ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING COMPANY vs. SAME. BOSTON OPTICAL COMPANY vs. SAME. HARWOOD BROTHERS vs. SAME.

Scire Facias. Trustee Process. Municipal Court of the City of Boston.

A writ of scire facias issued under R. L. c. 189, §§ 45-49, to enforce a judgment charging the defendant as trustee in an action brought by trustee process, is not an independent civil action but is a judicial writ to enforce a judgment and is a part of the proceedings in the original action.

Where in an action brought by trustee process in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston a person summoned as trustee has been charged as such trustee, and on a report of the case at the request of such trustee to the Appellate Division the judgment is affirmed, and no appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth under St. 1912, c. 649, § 9, as amended by St. 1914, c. 35, § 4, is taken by the trustee, in a writ of scire facias brought by the original plaintiff against the trustee to enforce the judgment against him as such trustee, the trustee has no right of appeal to the Superior Court from a judgment against him upon the scire facias.

BRALEY, J.

It has been decided repeatedly that the original action by trustee process and the writ of scire facias provided by R. L. c. 189, §§ 45-49, where the trustee upon demand does not pay over to the officer goods, effects or credits sufficient to satisfy the execution which is to be sued out from the court where judgment was rendered, and the execution is not satisfied otherwise, "are part of one continued and connected course of proceedings," and that "the examination of the trustee" in the scire facias "is to be in the same manner and with the same effect" as in the original action. It is plain that no provision is made for a jury trial, as the answers of the trustee to interrogatories propounded to the trustee in scire facias are to be considered as true and conclusive, although either party may allege and prove facts not stated or denied by the trustee, which may be material in determining how far the trustee is chargeable. Bickford v. Boston Lowell Railroad, 21 Pick. 109, 113. Fay v. Sears, 111 Mass. 154. Phillips v. Meagher, 166 Mass. 152. Koontz v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad, 220 Mass. 285.

When thus used the scire facias is in no sense an independent civil action, but is a judicial writ to enforce a judgment charging the trustee either upon his answer admitting goods, effects or credits, or after he had been defaulted. M'Gee v. Barber, 14 Pick. 212, 215. Gray v. Thrasher, 104 Mass. 373, 375. Perkins v. Bangs, 206 Mass. 408, 415.

It follows that, the original actions not having been removed from the Municipal Court to the Superior Court in accordance with the St. of 1912, c. 649, §§ 2, 3, as amended by St. 1914, c. 35, § 2, and St. 1914, c. 409, and the question whether the trustee was chargeable having been taken by him to the Appellate Division, who ordered that the trustee be charged, and no appeal from this order having been taken to this court under St. of 1912, c. 649, § 9, as amended by St. 1914, c. 35, § 4, the ruling that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeals was correct. Perkins v. Bangs, 206 Mass. 408, 416.

The order dismissing the appeals and directing that the papers be transmitted to the Municipal Court of the City of Boston is to stand. Dion v. Powers, 128 Mass. 192.

So ordered.

UNIVERSAL OPTICAL CORP. v. GLOBE OPTICAL CO