Dog. License. Trespass. Negligence, Trespasser. Motor Car. Way, Public. Maine. A dog is property, for a wrongful injury to which an action will lie.
Under the statutes of the State of Maine, which require the registering and licensing of dogs over four months of age, provide a penalty for failure to meet the requirement and empower municipal authorities to issue warrants for the killing of dogs not properly licensed, an unlicensed dog upon a highway is not a trespasser nor an outlaw.
The owner of an unlicensed dog, which was killed by being run into by a motor car upon a highway in the State of Maine and which, under the laws of Maine, was not a trespasser nor an outlaw upon the highway, may maintain an action of tort against one, the negligence of whose servant while acting within the scope of his authority was the cause of the dog's death.
PIERCE, J.
By the common law a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie. Wright v. Ramscot, 1 Wms. Saund. 108. 2 Bl. Com. 393. Chapman v. Decrow, 93 Maine, 378. Uhlein v. Cromack, 109 Mass. 273. Cummings v. Perham, 1 Met. 555. State v. M'Duffie, 34 N.H. 523. St. Louis Southwestern Railway v. Stanfield, 63 Ark. 643. 4 Bl. Com. 235. "By the common law, as well as by the law of most, if not all, the States, dogs are so far recognized as property that an action will lie for their conversion or injury." Sentell v. New Orleans Carrollton Railroad, 166 U.S. 698.
The defendant concedes his negligence but claims that liability to respond in an action of tort for damages for injury to an unlicensed dog arises only when the acts complained of are intentional, wanton or reckless. This position is supported by the case of Jemison v. Southwestern Railroad, 75 Ga. 444, now somewhat weakened by Columbus Railroad v. Woolfolk, 128 Ga. 631, and by Dickerman v. Consolidated Railway, 79 Conn. 427. The basis of this last decision is that no person can have such property in an unregistered dog as will enable him to maintain an action for the negligent killing of the animal. The court refuses to decide whether or not one might under any circumstances have a right of action for a wilful killing of an unregistered dog, or for the negligent killing of a registered dog. The Dickerman case and the case at bar in their facts are alike only to the extent that an unlicensed dog may be killed by an officer of the law under the Maine statute, by virtue of a warrant — under the Connecticut statute without a warrant. The general rule supported by the weight of authority is that an owner of a dog, licensed or unlicensed, may maintain an action for damages against any person or corporation wilfully or negligently killing or injuring the animal. Louisville Nashville Railroad v. Fitzpatrick, 129 Ala. 322. St. Louis Southwestern Railway v. Stanfield, ubi supra. Smith v. St. Paul City Railway, 79 Minn. 254. Harper v. St. Paul City Railway, 99 Minn. 253. We are of opinion the general rule should be followed as one sound in principle. The unlicensed dog was not a trespasser and outlaw upon the public highway. The case in this respect is governed by Carrington v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway, 222 Mass. 119.
It follows that the case was submitted to the jury rightly and that the exceptions should be overruled.
So ordered.