BROYLES STOVE FURNITURE CO. v. HINES

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Docket Number

6 Div. 120.

Attorney(S)

Weatherly, Deedmeyer Birch, of Birmingham, for appellant. Tortious conduct of defendant's agent and Mrs. Peck, in bringing about the delivery of the goods without the payment of the draft, was such a conversion as entitled the plaintiff immediately to rescind the contract with Mrs. Peck and resume possession of the property, or sue the carrier or Mrs. Peck for the conversion. 172 Ala. 645, 55 So. 206; 141 Ala. 671, 37 So. 659; 77 Ala. 236; 84 Ala. 173, 4 So. 356; 6 Ala. App. 478, 60 So. 598; 6 A. E. Ency. 462, 466, and note; 55 N.J. Law, 320, 26 A. 907, 22 L.R.A. 415, 22 L.R.A. 415, and note; 10 C. J. 347. This doctrine applies in all cases where possession and control is wrongfully obtained from the true owner. Authority supra. In a case of this kind, the consignor may recover the whole damage. 10 C. J. 348, 350, 354. The recovery is always the value of the goods. 20 Ala. 694; 27 Ala. 468; 20 Ala. 587. Plea 4 is not allowable in actions of this sort. 202 Ala. 263, 80 So. 101; 57 Ala. 521; 57 Ala. 588. Stokely, Scrivner Dominick, of Birmingham, for appellee. In this action, plaintiff can recover no more than the value of his special interest in the property converted. 110 Ala. 438, 18 So. 312; 109 Ala. 154, 19 So. 505; 130 Ala. 430, 30 So. 504; 147 Ala. 660, 41 So. 954; 198 Ala. 162, 73 So. 451.

Judges

ANDERSON, C. J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, involving a dispute over the delivery of goods by the defendant's agent to the consignee, Mrs. Peck, without payment of a draft covering shipping charges. The plaintiff contended that this act constituted a conversion of property, entitling it to rescind the contract or recover damages. The defendant raised a special plea asserting that the draft amount had been tendered. The circuit court entered a judgment of nonsuit, which the plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a party holding only a special interest or lien in property can recover the full value of the property in an action for conversion.
Whether the defendant's special plea of tender was sufficient to bar the plaintiff’s claim.
Whether delivery of goods to the consignee prior to payment of the draft constituted conversion actionable by the plaintiff.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The defendant's agent and Mrs. Peck engaged in tortious conduct by causing delivery of goods without payment of the draft, constituting conversion.
Such conversion entitled the plaintiff to rescind the contract or sue for conversion, recovering the full value of the goods.
The doctrine applies broadly where possession and control are wrongfully obtained from the true owner.
The plaintiff should recover the full damage, i.e., the value of the goods, and the defendant's special plea 4 is not allowable in this type of action.

Appellee's Arguments

The plaintiff can recover only the value of its special interest in the property converted, not the full value.
The plaintiff’s interest is limited to the amount of the draft or lien related to shipping charges.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
McGowen v. Young, 2 Stew. P. 160	One with special and general interest can maintain trover for conversion.	Supports limitation of recovery to value of special interest.
Zimmerman v. Dunn, 151 Ala. 438, 44 So. 533	Recovery for special interest only in conversion cases.	Confirms plaintiff’s recovery limited to special interest value.
Seibold v. Rodgers, 110 Ala. 438, 18 So. 312	Rule applies to lienholders or mortgagees suing for conversion.	Analogizes plaintiff’s interest to lienholder, limiting recovery.
Ryan v. Young, 147 Ala. 660, 41 So. 954	Measure of recovery for special interest holders.	Supports limitation of recovery to lien value.
172 Ala. 645; 55 So. 206; 141 Ala. 671; 37 So. 659; 77 Ala. 236; 84 Ala. 173; 4 So. 356; 6 Ala. App. 478; 60 So. 598	Doctrine of conversion and rescission when possession is wrongfully obtained.	Referenced by appellant to argue full recovery of value of goods.
202 Ala. 263; 80 So. 101	Non-allowance of certain pleas in conversion actions.	Appellant cited to contest defendant’s special plea 4.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged the settled principle that a party with a special interest or lien in personal property may maintain an action for conversion but may only recover the value of that special interest, not the full value of the property. The defendant’s special plea 4 negated any general ownership by the plaintiff and established that the wrong alleged was delivery of goods before payment of a $54 draft for shipping charges. The court held that the plaintiff’s interest was analogous to a lienholder’s, limiting recovery to the draft amount plus interest.

Further, the court found the defendant’s plea of tender insufficient because it did not aver that the $54 was tendered immediately after delivery or include interest from the time of conversion to the tender. The timing of the tender was critical to determine whether it fully satisfied the plaintiff’s claim. Because the plea failed in this respect, the court ruled that the trial court erred in overruling the plaintiff’s demurrer to the plea.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the circuit court is REVERSED AND REMANDED. The court set aside the nonsuit and reinstated the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This decision limits the plaintiff’s recovery to the amount of its special interest (the $54 draft) plus interest, rather than the full value of the goods. The ruling clarifies the application of conversion law to parties holding only a lien or special interest in property and emphasizes the requirements for a valid tender defense. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing principles.

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W. O. BROYLES STOVE FURNITURE CO. v. HINES, Director General.

ANDERSON, C. J.

While it is a well-settled legal principle that one who has a special as well as a general interest or title to personal property can maintain trover for the conversion of same, it is also settled that one who has a special interest can only recover the value of his special interest in the property. McGowen v. Young, 2 Stew. P. 160; Zimmerman v. Dunn, 151 Ala. 438, 44 So. 533. Especially does this rule apply to those plaintiffs in trover who sue for a general conversion and who merely hold a mortgage or lien upon the property converted. Seibold v. Rodgers, 110 Ala. 438, 18 So. 312; Ryan v. Young, 147 Ala. 660, 41 So. 954. The defendant's special plea 4 negatives any general interest or title of the plaintiff in or to the property, and sets up a state of facts showing that the gravamen of its action was the delivery to the consignee of certain goods before the payment of a draft for $54 covering certain shipping charges, freight, etc. In other words, the wrong complained of was not in the conversion of plaintiff's property, but in delivering certain property to the rightful consignee prior to the payment of said draft covering the shipping charges. Had the $54 been paid before the delivery of the goods to E. Peck, the plaintiff, under the facts disclosed by the pleading, would have no right of action against this defendant. Therefore the plaintiff's special interest in the property claimed to have been converted is analogous to that of a lienee or mortgagee, and the measure of recovery should be confined to the $54 with interest from the time of the alleged conversion.

The defendant's plea 4, however, purporting to be one of tender, should have averred that the $54 offered the plaintiff was tendered immediately after the delivery of the goods, or else should have included interest in said sum from the time of the alleged conversion up to the time of the offer. The plea does aver that the full amount due "to wit, $54," was tendered the plaintiff before the suit was brought, but it may have been tendered the day before the suit was brought; and, unless it was tendered contemporaneous with or immediately after the conversion, it could not be and was not the full amount due as confessed to be due in the former part of the plea. The trial court, therefore, erred in not sustaining the plaintiff's first ground of demurrer to defendant's special plea 4.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, the judgment of nonsuit is set aside, the cause is reinstated and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

SAYRE, GARDNER, and BROWN, JJ., concur.