WILLIAMS CO. v. NEWMAN HELLER

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

6 Div. 118.

Attorney(S)

Beddow Oberdorfer, of Birmingham, for appellant. The court erred in overruling the demurrers to plea 3. 31 Cyc. 1237, 1242, 1246, 1247, 1263; 59 N.E. 1123; 139 La. 781, 72 So. 248; 68 Ala. 167; 11 Ala. 531. Court erred in sustaining demurrers to plea 4. Authority supra. Court erred in overruling demurrers to plea 6. Authority supra. The fact that the appeal is on the record and that a trial was had on the merits does not render the errors innocuous. 67 So. 414; 200 Ala. 691, 77 So. 234. Ritter Wynn, of Birmingham, for appellee. There was no error in the ruling on the pleadings. 2 C. J. 467, 474; 1 Okl. 232, 32 P. 340; 80 Ind. 1; 18 Tex. 811.

Judges

SAYRE, J.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellees sued the appellant company on common counts, seeking payment for 12 coats shipped from New York to Birmingham. Upon receipt, the goods were returned by express to the plaintiffs, with some coats lost in transit. The dispute centered on the lost goods. Defendant's special pleas (3, 4, and 6) attempted to establish that the express company was the agent of the plaintiffs. The trial court sustained plaintiffs' demurrers to these pleas, and the defendant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant's special pleas (3, 4, and 6) sufficiently established that the express company was the agent of the plaintiffs for the lost goods.
Whether the defendant could rely on the doctrine of estoppel (including quasi estoppel) to avoid liability for the lost coats by asserting plaintiffs treated the carrier as their agent or by relying on plaintiffs' affidavits and claims against the carrier.
Whether the trial court erred in sustaining the plaintiffs' demurrers to the defendant's special pleas.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The court erred in overruling demurrers to plea 3, which attempted to show that the express company was the agent of plaintiffs either by original direction or by plaintiffs' subsequent acceptance of the returned goods.
The court erred in sustaining demurrers to pleas 4 and 6, which were pleas of confession and avoidance relying on plaintiffs' affidavits and agreements concerning the carrier's agency.
The errors in ruling on the demurrers were not rendered harmless by the fact that the appeal was on the record and a trial was had on the merits.

Appellee's Arguments

There was no error in the ruling on the pleadings sustaining the demurrers to the defendant's special pleas.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jones v. Peebles, 130 Ala. 269, 30 So. 564	Requirement that every plea in estoppel must be certain and allege all material facts supporting it.	Used to reject plea 3 for failing to allege sufficient facts to establish agency or estoppel.
16 Cyc. 785, 808	Principles of estoppel and quasi estoppel.	Applied to analyze the defendant's reliance on plaintiffs' claims and agreements, finding the pleas insufficient to establish estoppel.
31 Cyc. 1237, 1242, 1246, 1247, 1263	General authority on demurrers and pleading standards.	Cited by appellant to support arguments against sustaining demurrers; court implicitly considered but found pleas deficient.
59 N.E. 1123; 139 La. 781, 72 So. 248; 68 Ala. 167; 11 Ala. 531	Various principles related to pleading and agency.	Referenced by appellant; court did not find these authorities sufficient to uphold the pleas.
67 So. 414; 200 Ala. 691, 77 So. 234	Standards for harmless error and appellate review.	Argued by appellant that errors were not harmless; court upheld demurrers regardless.
2 C. J. 467, 474; 1 Okl. 232, 32 P. 340; 80 Ind. 1; 18 Tex. 811	Support for ruling on pleadings and demurrers.	Relied on by appellee to defend the trial court's ruling on demurrers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed each special plea in turn. Plea 3, which was in the alternative, failed because it was no better than its weakest alternative and did not allege facts sufficient to establish that the express company was plaintiffs' agent or that plaintiffs were estopped from denying agency. The court emphasized that estoppel pleas must be certain and allege all material facts, which plea 3 did not do.

Pleas 4 and 6, being pleas of confession and avoidance, admitted that defendant owed plaintiffs for the lost coats and that the carrier was defendant's agent in returning the goods. The defendant sought to avoid liability by alleging that plaintiffs prepared affidavits claiming the coats as their property and that there was an agreement treating the carrier as plaintiffs' agent. The court found these allegations insufficient to establish estoppel or a binding agreement supported by consideration. The pleas did not show how defendant was prejudiced or prevented from claiming against the carrier, nor did they demonstrate that plaintiffs' affidavits were used to defendant's detriment.

Overall, the court held that the pleas failed to meet the legal standards for estoppel and confession and avoidance, and thus the trial court's sustaining of the demurrers was proper.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the trial court's ruling sustaining the plaintiffs' demurrers to the defendant's special pleas 3, 4, and 6.

The direct effect of this decision is that the defendant remains liable to the plaintiffs for the lost coats, as the defendant's attempts to establish the express company as plaintiffs' agent or to invoke estoppel failed. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond the application of established pleading and estoppel principles to the facts of this case.

Show full summary ...

S. A. WILLIAMS CO. v. NEWMAN HELLER.

SAYRE, J.

Appellees sued appellant company, declaring on the common counts. Questions for review were reserved when the trial court sustained plaintiffs' demurrers to special pleas numbered 3, 4, and 6.

Plaintiffs' claim was for the price or value of 12 coats shipped by plaintiffs at New York to defendant at Birmingham; but, upon receipt of the goods, they had been returned by express to plaintiffs, and some of them had been lost in transit. The real controversy was about the goods that were lost, and defendant's effort in pleas 3 and 6 was to show that the express company was the agent of plaintiffs.

Plea 3 was in the alternative, and, on demurrer, was no better than its weakest alternative. It is alleged that defendant "with the consent or acquiescence of the plaintiffs returned (the coats) to the plaintiffs by delivering the same to a common carrier at Birmingham," etc., and "that said carrier was the agent of the plaintiffs by original direction by the plaintiffs to the defendant to make it such, or by subsequently accepting said package and treating said carrier as its agent." The effect of the plea, construed against the pleader, is to say that plaintiffs treated the express company as their agent as to the goods lost by the simple act of accepting from it the returned package containing that part of the goods which had not been lost (manifestly, a non sequitur), or it sought to estop plaintiffs to deny that the express company was their agent by defendant's mere conclusion that plaintiffs so treated it; but the rule is that every plea in estoppel must be certain in every particular and must allege the facts upon which the plea is predicated — must, if opportunity be afforded for pleading, allege every material fact which the pleader expects to prove. Jones v. Peebles, 130 Ala. 269, 30 So. 564; 16 Cyc. 808. This plea does not measure up to this rule.

Pleas 4 and 6, like plea 3, were pleas of confession and avoidance. They confessed therefore that defendant did owe plaintiffs for the four coats alleged to have been lost from the custody of the common carrier, thereby confessing that the property in the coats had passed to defendant and that the carrier in undertaking to return them to plaintiffs in New York had been the agent of defendant. Defendant sought to avoid the liability thus confessed by alleging (plea 4) that plaintiffs had "prepared and executed an affidavit to be presented to said carrier claiming said four coats as their property," and further that defendant had relied on plaintiffs' claim "that said twelve coats were plaintiffs' property after they were delivered to said carrier, and after plaintiffs had prepared said affidavit of claim against said carrier," and (plea 6), in effect, that the parties agreed that the carrier was the agent of plaintiffs, that plaintiffs prepared a claim against the carrier and in aid thereof caused defendant to make an affidavit to the effect that the package delivered to the carrier contained twelve coats — a fact about which there was no dispute between plaintiffs and defendant — and further that defendant "relied upon said agreement as to said four coats being the property of the plaintiffs and said carrier being plaintiffs' agent on said occasion and forbore and did not make a claim for said four coats of said carrier."

The species of estoppel here invoked — quasi estoppel, it is commonly called — rests upon the principle that where a person has, with knowledge of the facts, asserted a particular claim, title, or right, he cannot afterwards assume a position inconsistent with such claim, title, or right, to the prejudice of another. 16 Cyc. 785, where many cases are cited. For aught we can see, bearing in mind the confession of the plea, defendant, as against plaintiffs, had no right to rely upon plaintiffs' claim against the carrier, nor does the plea disclose for what, to what end, or with what effect prejudicial to defendant, the latter relied on plaintiffs' claim. As for plea 6, it does not appear that the alleged agreement was a contract supported by consideration; it must therefore be treated on demurrer as the mere mutual assent to the proposition that the carrier was the agent of plaintiffs, not true, as the plea confessed, and as to which the plea alleged nothing beyond its confession. As in the case of plea 4, it is not made to appear that plaintiffs' affidavit, though prepared, was used to any effect, or at all. Still bearing in mind the confession of the plea, we are unable to see that the mere preparation of the affidavit furnished any reason why defendant should not have claimed of the carrier compensation for the coats that were lost nor does the plea show how or in what manner defendant has been prejudiced by his forbearance to make a claim against the carrier for said coats. Non constat, defendant may yet assert its rightful claim against the carrier.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, C. J., and GARDNER and BROWN, JJ., concur.