Morgan v. Morgan, Supreme Court of South Carolina, June 30, 1921 (Docket No. 10642)

Factual and Procedural Background

Adam Morgan (plaintiff/respondent), who cannot read or write, executed four deeds in 1913 — one to each of four of his children (W.L. Morgan, Edna Morgan Mungo, Bessie Morgan Faile, and Ora Morgan). The deeds were recorded on October 21, 1914. Plaintiff sued to set aside the recorded deeds as clouds on his title, alleging he never intended to deliver them and that they interfere with his management of his financial affairs and discriminate against other children. At trial before Judge McIver (Lancaster, October 1920), the plaintiff testified that he retained the deeds in his trunk, never authorized anyone to take them for record, and continued to exercise full ownership (including paying taxes, though in defendants' names). None of the three appellants (W.L., Edna, Bessie) had been in possession of the land or the deeds, and they had not asserted possession or collected rents prior to their answer in this case.

Defendants contended the deeds had been recorded as evidence of an intention to deliver them. Evidence for defendants included testimony from L.M. Mungo that plaintiff directed him to send the deeds to the county clerk for recording and have them returned with the bill; Bessie Faile testified the deeds were returned to plaintiff and that plaintiff instructed her to have a check sent for recording fees. Plaintiff denied these instructions, but admitted the deeds had at times been sent to the clerk and were later returned to him. The trial court (Judge McIver) concluded there was no delivery and canceled and ordered the mutilation of the recorded deeds. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, through Justice Watts, affirmed the judgment for the reasons assigned by Judge McIver.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the deeds executed by Adam Morgan were effectively delivered such that they passed title to the grantees, or whether they were not delivered and therefore should be set aside as clouds on the plaintiff's title.
2. Whether the recording of deeds, standing alone, creates a conclusive presumption of delivery, or whether that presumption is rebuttable by evidence of the grantor's lack of intent to deliver.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

• The recorded deeds raise a presumption of delivery and therefore transferred title.
• Evidence (testimony of L.M. Mungo and Bessie Faile) shows plaintiff instructed that the deeds be sent to the clerk for recording, which indicates intent to deliver or at least assent to recordation as evidence of delivery.
• Counsel cited a number of authorities they contend support what amounts to delivery or a presumption of delivery when deeds are recorded, and authorities on admissibility of statements by a grantor in other proceedings as evidence.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

• Plaintiff retained physical possession of the deeds in his trunk and never authorized anyone to deliver them to grantees; he continued to exercise dominion and all incidents of ownership over the land.
• The supposed act of recordation was done without plaintiff's intent to part with title; recordation is a rebuttable presumption of delivery and defendant's evidence fails to show actual delivery or intention to deliver.
• Counsel relied on authorities holding no intention to deliver defeats the presumption of delivery arising from recordation and on authorities concerning estoppel and delivery principles.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court, through Judge McIver's opinion (adopted by the Supreme Court), engaged in a fact-driven analysis focused on the element of delivery as a matter of intent. Key steps in the court's reasoning:

• Possession and conduct: The plaintiff continuously retained possession of the deeds (kept them in his trunk) and continuously exercised ownership of the land (paying taxes and exercising rights of proprietorship). The three appellants who were married and lived away did not demand possession or rents for years prior to this litigation.
• Statement of intent when deeds were executed: Testimony indicated plaintiff stated the deeds were being made so that, in view of his ill health and possibility of death, a plan for division of his land would exist — i.e., the plaintiff treated the deeds as a testamentary arrangement (in effect as a will), not an immediate transfer of title.
• Recordation and presumption: The court acknowledged that recordation of a deed creates a presumption of delivery, but emphasized that this presumption is rebuttable. If the party claiming delivery by recordation explains the circumstances of recordation in a way that shows the grantor did not intend delivery, the presumption should not prevail.
• Evidence of return and control: Testimony from Mungo and Bessie, even if credited, showed the deeds were sent to the clerk for recording but were returned to plaintiff — Mungo was, at most, plaintiff's agent for returning the deeds after recordation. The returning of the deeds to the plaintiff negated any effective delivery to the grantees.
• Intent governs delivery: Since delivery is an intentional act, absent intent to deliver (and absent any act constituting delivery aside from recordation), there was no delivery. The court found the evidence established lack of intent to transfer ownership inter vivos.
• Collateral pleadings/statements: The opinion notes an alleged contradictory pleading from another case was not properly a part of the record or, in any event, did not overcome the direct evidence of non-delivery presented at trial.
• Conclusion and remedy: Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded the deeds were not delivered, the recorded deeds constituted clouds on title, and the proper remedy was to cancel the recorded deeds and direct their mutilation in the record. The Supreme Court affirmed that judgment for the reasons assigned by Judge McIver.

Holding and Implications

Holding: It is the judgment of this Court that the judgment of the Circuit Court be AFFIRMED.

Implications:

• Direct effect on the parties: The trial court's decree, which the Supreme Court affirmed, canceled and set aside the recorded deeds from Adam Morgan to W.L. Morgan, Ora Morgan, Bessie Morgan Faile, and Edna Morgan Mungo (recorded October 21, 1914), adjudged them of no legal force and effect, and directed the clerk to mutilate the record entries and note that the deeds had been mutilated and were of no force.
• Precedential effect: The opinion affirms the principle applied by the trial court that recordation creates only a rebuttable presumption of delivery and that delivery of a deed requires the grantor's intent to part with title. The Court's action was to affirm the factual and legal conclusions of the trial court based on the specific evidence in this case. The opinion does not purport to announce a new doctrine beyond applying those principles to the facts; no broader change in law is articulated in this short appellate opinion.

Decision delivered June 30, 1921. Opinion of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Watts, affirming Judge McIver's judgment.