MATTER OF CITY OF NEW YORK (JUNIPER AVE.), N.Y., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

John P. O'Brien, Corporation Counsel ( Joel J. Squier and William B.R. Faber of counsel), for appellant. Benjamin Trapnell for Thaddeus Firth et al., amici curiæ. Trabue Carswell and George D. Yeomans for respondents.

Judges

ANDREWS, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Several years prior to the decision, the Brooklyn City Railroad Company purchased a tract of land in Queens adjacent to its right of way, which it subsequently leased to the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company. This land, enclosed by a high fence and covered with railroad tracks, is used to store railroad cars and is essential for railroad operations. In 1905, the City of New York initiated proceedings to open Juniper Avenue, appointing commissioners to assess damages and benefits related to the improvement. The commissioners initially assessed the railroad-owned land as benefiting by $3,953, a finding confirmed by the Special Term. However, the Appellate Division reversed this confirmation on the legal ground that the property, being devoted to public railroad use, could not possibly benefit from the street opening. The case was remanded for reassessment excluding the disputed land. After a second report excluding the assessment on this land was confirmed and unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, the City appealed both the original reversal and the final affirmance to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals took up the question of whether the initial reversal was legally sound.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether land devoted to railroad use can be considered as benefiting from a local improvement such as the opening of a street.
Whether the Appellate Division correctly held as a matter of law that no benefit could accrue to railroad property used for public purposes from the opening of Juniper Avenue.
Whether the commissioners' factual finding regarding the benefit or lack thereof should be upheld or reviewed de novo by the Court of Appeals.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Owners of Ground, etc., v. Mayor, etc., of Albany, 15 Wend. 374	General principle that the question of benefit from a local improvement is factual and depends on enhancement of general value, regardless of ownership.	Supports the principle that ownership by a railroad or other public user does not preclude finding a benefit unless as a matter of law no benefit is possible.
Matter of Mayor, etc., of N.Y., 11 Johns. 77	Same as above, affirming the factual nature of benefit assessments.	Reinforces the factual inquiry into benefit rather than a categorical exclusion.
People ex rel. Howlett v. Mayor, etc., of Syracuse, 63 N.Y. 291	Assessment of benefits must consider all circumstances and the general value enhancement.	Used to clarify that use or ownership restrictions affect but do not eliminate possible benefit.
N.Y., N.H. H.R.R. Co. v. Vil. of Port Chester, 149 App. Div. 893; affd., 210 N.Y. 600	Rule that railroad right of way land is permanently devoted to public use and cannot benefit from street opening as a matter of law.	Distinguished by the Court as applying only to the right of way strip, not to land used for railroad yards subject to sale and market value increase.
Allegheny City v. W.P.R.R. Co., 138 Penn. St. 375	Recognition that railroad rights of way are highways devoted to public travel.	Supports the principle that permanent dedication to public use limits benefits from local improvements.
Troy Lansingburgh R.R. Co. v. Kane, 9 Hun 506; affd. 72 N.Y. 614	Assessment for sewers might properly be imposed on railroad right of way land.	Shows that some improvements may benefit railroad land, but the Court notes this is a different question than street opening.
Matter of City of New York, 226 N.Y. 128	Railroad property used for public purposes may not be condemned for other uses without legislative authority.	Referenced to explain the nature of railroad land use but not determinative of benefit assessment here.
Mt. Pleasant Borough v. B. O.R.R. Co., 138 Penn. St. 365	Supports the concept that railroad property not permanently devoted to right of way may benefit from local improvements.	Used to support the Court’s conclusion that the railroad yard land may receive benefit from the street opening.
L. N.R.R. Co. v. Barber A.P. Co., 197 U.S. 430	Federal precedent on railroad property and benefits from improvements.	Supports the Court’s reasoning that the land in question is not permanently dedicated and may benefit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by recognizing that the question of whether a parcel of land benefits from a local improvement is generally a question of fact, focusing on whether the general value of the property is enhanced rather than the current use or owner’s advantage. Ownership by a railroad or use for public purposes does not automatically preclude a finding of benefit unless it can be established as a matter of law that no possible benefit could arise. The Court acknowledged a narrow exception previously recognized where railroad right of way land, permanently devoted to public travel and incapable of severance or sale, cannot benefit from street openings. However, the land here is used as railroad yards, not as right of way, and is capable of being sold. Consequently, the Court concluded that the opening of Juniper Avenue could increase the market value of this land. The prior ruling by the Appellate Division, which held as a matter of law that no benefit could accrue, was therefore erroneous. The Court reversed the orders of the Appellate Division and Special Term and remitted the matter back to the commissioners for reconsideration consistent with this analysis.

Holding and Implications

The orders of the Appellate Division and the Special Term are reversed. The case is remitted to the commissioners to reconsider the assessment of benefits in light of the Court’s opinion that the railroad yard land in question may, as a matter of law, receive benefit from the opening of Juniper Avenue. The decision directly affects the parties by restoring the possibility that the land may be assessed for benefits, but it does not establish a new broad precedent beyond the specific distinction between railroad right of way land and other railroad-owned property used for railroad yards. Costs are awarded to the appellant in all courts.

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In the Matter of the Application of the CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, Relative to Acquiring Title to Lands for the Opening of Juniper Avenue in the Borough of Queens. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS RAILROAD COMPANY et al., Respondents.

ANDREWS, J.

A number of years ago the Brooklyn City Railroad Company acquired by purchase a tract of land in the borough of Queens abutting upon its right of way. This land it subsequently leased to the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company in whose possession it now is. No buildings have been erected but it is surrounded by a high fence and is covered by numerous railroad tracks. Upon these tracks the lessee stores its cars when not in use and it or some similar parcel is essential for the proper and convenient operation of the railroad.

In 1905 the city of New York instituted proceedings for the opening of a street called Juniper avenue. Commissioners were duly appointed to appraise the damages resulting and to assess the benefits. The commissioners later made a report assessing the land in question for $3,953. Their report constituted a finding of fact that this particular parcel was benefited to that extent. The report was confirmed by the Special Term but on appeal to the Appellate Division the resulting order was reversed as a matter of law upon the theory that this property being devoted by the railroad company to a public use no possible benefit could have accrued to it because of the opening of a street in the neighborhood. That court, therefore, returned the report to the commissioners, with instructions to strike out the assessment and redistribute the amount thereof upon other property within the area benefited. The commissioners again heard evidence, considered the matter and finally in obedience to these instructions made a new report in the form required of them. An order confirming this second report was made and unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division. Then an appeal was taken to this court from such final order and also from the intermediate order of the Appellate Division reversing the original report of the commissioners. As the action of the commissioners involved a finding of fact that no benefits were received and this finding has been unanimously approved, we might not review the last order appealed from were it not for the fact that we are also reviewing the first order. The question is, therefore, properly before us whether the reversal of the first order may be sustained.

Whether or not a particular parcel of land has been benefited by a particular improvement is ordinarily a question of fact. The test is not whether as now used by its present owner any advantage is received but whether its general value has been enhanced. It is immaterial whether land is owned by a railroad company or by a church or by an individual unless we can say as a matter of law that the improvement may not by any possibility increase the value of the property. If we cannot, the extent of the benefit is for the determination of the commissioners. They may consider all the circumstances. A certain parcel may be held under such a restricted title as to enjoyment or alienation that a local improvement is of less advantage to it than to another parcel of equal size owned in fee simple absolute. ( Owners of Ground, etc., v. Mayor, etc., of Albany, 15 Wend. 374; Matter of Mayor, etc., of N.Y., 11 Johns. 77; People ex rel. Howlett v. Mayor, etc., of Syracuse, 63 N.Y. 291.) But in one case, and one only we have said that the opening or widening of a street cannot as a matter of law be of benefit — where a railroad occupies a strip of land for its right of way. ( N.Y., N.H. H.R.R. Co. v. Vil. of Port Chester, 149 App. Div. 893; affd., 210 N.Y. 600.) Such land is used permanently by the railroad corporation in its operation. As a practical matter it may not be severed from other property and sold. It is a highway devoted to public travel. ( Allegheny City v. W.P.R.R. Co., 138 Penn. St, 375.) Not because the owner is a railroad corporation was the rule adopted; not because the land is devoted to a public use, but because the public use to which it is devoted is in all probability permanent and is inconsistent with the idea of any benefit from such an improvement as we are here considering. Even so used other improvements might be of advantage to the right of way. It has been said that an assessment for a sewer might properly be imposed upon it. ( Troy Lansingburgh R.R. Co. v. Kane, 9 Hun, 506; affd., on other grounds, 72 N.Y. 614.) However this may be, we are here dealing with a different question. The land in dispute is used to-day for railroad yards. This use it is true is a public one. The property doubtless might not be condemned for other purposes without express authority conferred by the legislature ( Matter of City of New York, 226 N.Y. 128), but the use is not of such a character that we can say as a matter of law no benefit could possibly be acquired by the opening of Juniper avenue. A mere glance at the map shows that as a result it may fairly be inferred that its market value will be increased. The land is not devoted as a permanency to railroad uses. To-morrow it may be sold and its present owners obtain the benefit of the advance. This being so we think that the result reached in the Appellate Division was erroneous. ( Mt. Pleasant Borough v. B. O.R.R. Co., 138 Penn. St. 365; L. N.R.R. Co. v. Barber A.P. Co., 197 U.S. 430.)

The orders of the Appellate Division and that of the Special Term must be reversed and the matter remitted to the commissioners for further consideration in accordance with this opinion, with costs in all courts.

HISCOCK, Ch. J., HOGAN, CARDOZO, POUND, MCLAUGHLIN and CRANE, JJ., concur.

Orders reversed, etc.

MATTER OF CITY OF NEW YORK (JUNIPER AVE.)