TAYLOR v. LEE, N.C., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Langston, Allen Taylor and R. D. Johnson for plaintiffs. Stevens, Beasley Stevens for defendant.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a civil action in which the plaintiffs sought to recover payment for supplies furnished to B. D. Parker during the year 1920. The defendant H. F. Lee, landlord to Parker, was alleged to have promised the plaintiffs to be responsible for Parker's debt for those supplies. The trial court rendered a judgment jointly and severally against Lee and Parker for $1,552.60 plus interest. Lee appealed from this judgment, contesting the denial of his motion for nonsuit.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant H. F. Lee's promise to answer for the debt of another (Parker) required a writing under the statute of frauds to be enforceable.
Whether the promise made by Lee was an original promise, thereby exempt from the statute of frauds.
Whether the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury and support a verdict against Lee.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Lee argued that his promise to pay Parker’s debt was a collateral promise to answer for the debt of another and thus void under the statute of frauds because it was not in writing.
He contended that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for nonsuit on this ground.

Respondent's Arguments

The plaintiffs maintained that Lee’s promise was an original undertaking, made at the time the credit was extended, and that Lee had a direct pecuniary interest in the transaction.
They argued that the promise was sufficient to bind Lee without a writing under the statute of frauds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Whitehurst v. Padgett, 157 N.C. 424	Held that a promise to answer for another’s debt is not within the statute of frauds if it is an original promise made at or before the debt's creation, supported by sufficient consideration, and the promissor has a direct pecuniary interest.	The court applied this precedent to find Lee’s promise was an original one and not barred by the statute of frauds, based on his promise to see Parker’s debts paid and his pecuniary interest as landlord.
Peele v. Powell, 156 N.C. 553	Supports the principle that an original promise based on new consideration or personal benefit to the promissor is not within the statute of frauds.	Used to reinforce that Lee’s promise was original and enforceable because it benefited him and involved a new consideration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined whether Lee’s promise to pay Parker’s debt fell within the statute of frauds requiring a writing. It found that Lee’s promise was made contemporaneously with the extension of credit and that Lee had a direct pecuniary interest as the landlord benefiting from the supplies furnished to his tenant. Citing established North Carolina precedents, the court held that such a promise is considered an original undertaking rather than a collateral one. Because the promise was original and supported by consideration, it was enforceable despite the absence of a written agreement. The court found the evidence sufficient to submit the case to the jury, whose verdict was supported by the facts. Therefore, the court found no error in denying the nonsuit motion and affirmed the judgment.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed.

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment holding H. F. Lee liable for the debt owed by his tenant Parker for supplies furnished. The decision confirms that a landlord’s promise to pay for supplies furnished to a tenant, where the landlord has a direct pecuniary interest and the promise is made contemporaneously with the credit, constitutes an original promise not barred by the statute of frauds. The ruling directly affects the parties by upholding the judgment against Lee and does not establish new precedent beyond the application of existing North Carolina law.

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L. TAYLOR ET AL. v. H. F. LEE ET AL.

Statute of Frauds — Promise to Answer for Debt of Another — Evidence — Motions — Nonsuit — Questions for Jury.

It does not require a writing within the statute of frauds to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another (C. S., 987), where the promissor directly assumes the debt or has a pecuniary interest therein; and where a landlord has obtained supplies to be furnished to his tenant within the coming crop year, upon his promise to see that the tenant pay for them, it is sufficient to deny the promissor's motion to nonsuit in an action against him by the furnisher of the supplies to recover for their payment.

Civil action tried upon the following issues:

"1. Did the defendant H. F. Lee promise and agree to become bound to the plaintiffs for supplies furnished to B. D. Parker during the year 1920, as alleged in the complaint? A. Yes.

"2. If so, in what amount is the defendant Lee indebted to the plaintiffs by reason of said contract? A. $1,552.60 and interest.

"3. In what amount is the defendant Parker indebted to the plaintiffs for supplies furnished him during the year 1920? A. $1,552.60 and interest."

From a judgment of $1,552.60, rendered jointly and severally against the two defendants, the defendant H. F. Lee appeals.

STACY, J.

Appellant's chief exception, as stressed on the argument and in his brief, is the one addressed to the refusal of the court to grant his motion for judgment as of nonsuit, made first at the close of plaintiffs' evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence, and based upon the ground that appellant's special promise to plaintiff, which was not in writing, was to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of his codefendant Parker, and was therefore void under the statute of frauds. C. S., 987.

It was in evidence that the defendants, Lee and Parker, landlord and tenant respectively, went to the plaintiffs' store and made arrangements with them whereby the plaintiffs were to furnish the defendant Parker with certain supplies during the year 1920. Plaintiffs understood that Lee was to be responsible for whatever Parker bought. He said to the plaintiffs: "Mr. Parker will be on our land this year and you sell him anything he wants and I will see it paid." Almost this identical language was held in Whitehurst v. Padgett, 157 N.C. 424, to be sufficient to warrant a finding that the promise was an original one and not within the statute of frauds, if made at the time or before the debt was created, upon sufficient consideration, and credit was given thereon solely to the promissor or to both promissors as principals, or if the promise were based upon a new consideration of benefit or harm passing between the promissor and the creditor, or if the promise were for the benefit of the promissor and he had a personal, immediate and pecuniary interest in the transaction in which a third party was the original obligor. See Peele v. Powell, 156 N.C. 553, and cases there cited.

In the instant case there was no exception to the charge, and we think the case was properly submitted to the jury. The verdict as rendered was warranted by the evidence.

No error.

TAYLOR v. LEE