Case Summary: Raymond W. Dobson v. Providence Tribune Co. (Sup. Ct. R.I., Dec. 12, 1924)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an action on the case for libel brought by Raymond W. Dobson against The Evening Tribune (Providence Tribune Co.). The declaration alleged that Dobson was engaged in managing boxers and conducting boxing and athletic exhibitions, that he had conducted himself with skill, care, judgment and integrity, and that he had deservedly obtained the good opinion and credit of those who knew him. The declaration further alleged that on January 29, 1924, the defendant published a newspaper item stating (in part) that Dobson "makes a practice of featuring his own boxers," that he "takes a certain percentage" of what they receive, that "Dobson is sure of 'getting his,'" and that "Langevin Post is staging boxing shows in order to fatten Dobson's pocketbook," followed by the commentator's wonder "how much longer the members of Langevin Post intend to allow this state of affairs to exist."

The declaration also alleged injury to Dobson's reputation and an instance in which one George R. Bush, who was about to employ him, refused to do so because of the publication. In the Superior Court a justice sustained a demurrer to the declaration. The plaintiff excepted to that ruling, and the matter came before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island on that exception.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, in its natural and ordinary meaning, the published language necessarily charged the plaintiff with acting dishonestly or unskillfully (i.e., whether the publication was defamatory as a matter of law).
Whether, where allegedly defamatory words are equally capable of an innocent meaning, the declaration must contain averments and innuendo showing both that the words were intended in a defamatory sense and that listeners/hearers so understood them.
Whether, if the plaintiff owed a duty to the organization (Langevin Post) such that an allegation of breach would be defamatory, the facts establishing that duty must be pleaded as a prefatory averment.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Kelley v. Flaherty, 16 R.I. 234	Cited for the proposition that if the plaintiff owed a duty by reason of employment such facts should be stated in a prefatory averment.	The court relied on this authority to explain that, because the declaration did not allege that Dobson owed any duty to Langevin Post, the complaint failed to show that the alleged conduct would necessarily be a breach of duty; thus, the declaration lacked necessary prefatory averments if such a duty existed.
Hebert v. Handy, 28 R.I. 317	Cited for the principle that the Superior Court has discretion to permit amendment to a declaration.	The court invoked this case to state that the Superior Court may, in its discretion, allow the plaintiff to amend the declaration to remedy any pleading deficiencies.
25 Cyc. 452–453 (legal encyclopedia)	States the rule: when words are capable of conveying both a defamatory and an innocent meaning, the plaintiff must aver and allege innuendo showing both that the words were intended in a defamatory sense and that hearers so understood them.	The court quoted this rule and applied it to the publication at issue, finding that the language could reasonably be read in an innocent way as well as a defamatory one; therefore the declaration was deficient for failing to allege intent and understanding (by innuendo or averment).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by treating the case as presenting a question on a demurrer to the declaration in a libel action. Applying the "natural and ordinary meaning" test to the published language, the court concluded that the words did not necessarily charge the plaintiff with acting dishonestly or unskillfully. The court observed that the declaration did not allege that Dobson owed any duty to the Langevin Post which he breached; absent such an allegation, statements that he profited from shows did not necessarily amount to a defamatory charge of dishonest or unskilful conduct. The court noted that if employment and attendant duties existed such facts should have been pleaded as a prefatory averment, citing Kelley v. Flaherty.

The court further explained and relied on the principle from 25 Cyc. that where words are susceptible of both a defamatory and an innocent meaning, the pleader must plead averment and innuendo demonstrating (1) that the words were intended in a defamatory sense and (2) that the hearers so understood them. Because the declaration failed to make those averments or to show facts (such as an employment relationship imposing a duty) that would make the alleged statements necessarily defamatory, the demurrer was properly sustained.

Finally, the court recognized that the Superior Court has discretion to permit an amendment to the declaration; accordingly, the matter was remitted for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff the possibility of amending his pleading.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The plaintiff's exception was overruled. The Supreme Court affirmed the sustaining of the demurrer to the declaration and remitted the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings (including the Superior Court's discretion to permit amendment).

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the plaintiff's declaration was held insufficient as pleaded and the demurrer was properly sustained, but the plaintiff may be allowed to amend. The opinion applies and reiterates the rule that allegedly defamatory language capable of an innocent meaning requires pleading showing intent and understanding (averment and innuendo) to support a libel claim. The opinion does not announce any broad new precedent beyond applying established principles to the pleadings in this case.

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RAYMOND W. DOBSON vs. PROVIDENCE TRIBUNE CO.

( 1) Libel. Defamatory and Innocent Meaning of Words. In an action for libel: — Held, that in its natural and ordinary meaning the language used did not necessarily charge plaintiff with acting dishonestly or unskilfully; that where the language is capable of conveying the defamatory meaning claimed for it and also equally of conveying an innocent meaning there must be an averment and innuendo showing not only that the words were intended in a defamatory sense but that the hearers understood them as conveying such meaning.

RATHBUN, J.

This is an action on the case for libel. The case is before us on the plaintiff's exception to the ruling of a justice of the Superior Court sustaining a demurrer to the declaration.

The declaration alleges that the plaintiff had been and was engaged in the business of managing boxers and of conducting and managing boxing and other athletic exhibitions and had conducted himself therein with skill, care, judgment and integrity, and had deservedly obtained the good opinion and credit of his neighbors and all others to whom he was known, and that the defendant, on January 29, 1924, in The Evening Tribune, published the following libel concerning him:

"Langevin Post, Veterans of Foreign Wars, has been promoting boxing shows down Arctic way since last summer and to date the books fail to reveal any profit in money. Plenty of experience, of course. Ray Dobson sees to that. Dobson is a manager of boxers. He also acts as matchmaker for Langevin Post. Dobson makes a practice of featuring his own boxers, and like all managers he `cuts' his boxers, meaning that he takes a certain percentage of what they receive. The boxers are always paid, so Dobson is sure of `getting his'. But Langevin Post is not making money. The whole thing sifts down to this: Langevin Post is staging boxing shows in order to fatten Dobson's pocketbook. I'm wondering how much longer the members of Langevin Post intend to allow this state of affairs to exist."

The declaration alleged that the plaintiff by reason of the publication complained of has been injured in his good name, fame and credit; that he has been suspected of having acted dishonestly and unskilfully and that one George R. Bush, who was about to employ him, refused to do so by reason of said publication.

Applying to the language complained of the natural and ordinary meaning it can not be said that the publication necessarily charges that the plaintiff acted dishonestly or unskilfully. It does not appear from the declaration that the plaintiff owed to Langevin Post any duty to use his efforts to protect the interests of the Post. For aught that appears the plaintiff was free to further his own financial interests instead of those of the Post. If the plaintiff was in the employ of Langevin Post so that it was his duty by reason of such employment to be faithful to the Post the facts should have been stated in a prefatory averment. See Kelley v. Flaherty, 16 R.I. 234. The rule is stated in 25 Cyc. 452, 453, as follows: "Where the words declared are capable of conveying the defamatory meaning claimed for them, and also equally capable of conveying some other and innocent meaning, there must be an averment and innuendo showing not only that the words were intended by plaintiff ( sic.) in a defamatory sense but that the hearers understood the language as conveying the alleged defamatory meaning."

It is within the discretion of the Superior Court to permit an amendment to the declaration. See Hebert v. Handy, 28 R.I. 317.

The plaintiff's exception is overruled and the case is remitted to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

DOBSON v. PROVIDENCE TRIBUNE CO