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Attorney(S)

William Hayward, U.S. Atty., of New York City, Hiram C. Todd, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Clifford H. Byrnes, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States. Frank P. Walsh and Robert S. Johnstone, both of New York City, Thomas W. Hardwick, of Dublin, Ga., and Emanuel Harris, of New York City, for defendant Thomas B. Felder. Abraham I. Menin, of New York City, for defendant Means.

Judges

LINDLEY, District Judge.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: United States v. Felder (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1926)

Factual and Procedural Background

Thomas B. Felder and others were convicted of a crime. Felder's conviction occurred prior to the enactment of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, and his conviction has subsequently been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit. After affirmation, Felder filed a petition in the trial court seeking remission of a $10,000 fine, invoking the authority of the Probation Act (chapter 521 of the Act of Congress approved March 4, 1925). The district court considered whether it had power under that Act to grant the relief requested. The court denied the motion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 (Comp. St. Supp. 1925, §§ 10564 4/5–10564 4/5c), a trial court has power after conviction (and after the expiration of the term at which judgment was entered) to remit or vacate an existing sentence—in this instance, to remit a $10,000 fine—when the conviction occurred before the Act's passage.
Relatedly, whether the statute's grant of power "to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence" should be construed to allow modification or elimination (remission) of an already imposed sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Nix v. James, 7 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.)	Holds that the Probation Act was applicable to defendants sentenced before the passage of the Act and inferentially suggests the court under the Act might have power to alter or modify the original sentence.	The district court cited Nix as one interpretation favoring application of the Probation Act to pre-Act sentences and as an example of a more expansive reading of the Act's powers; but the court contrasted this view with other authorities and statutory language to conclude it did not support outright remission of a fine.
Kriebel v. United States, 10 F.2d 762 (7th Cir.)	Holds that a trial court in such a situation might suspend the execution of the sentence, but indicates the court might not modify the sentence.	The district court relied on Kriebel as an example of a narrower interpretation—permitting suspension of execution but not modification—and used that contrast to support the view that suspension is distinct from elimination or remission of a sentence.
U.S. v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 (1914)	States the general principle that, absent statute to the contrary, a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered unless the proceeding to do so was begun during that term.	The district court invoked Mayer to emphasize the longstanding limitation on a trial court's power to alter final judgments after the term has ended, thereby framing the Probation Act as a statute that must clearly authorize any departure from that rule.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the statutory language and basic principles about the scope of judicial power over final judgments:

Statutory text: The Probation Act expressly grants the court "power, after conviction or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for any crime or offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the defendant upon probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as they may deem best." The court emphasized that the measure of power must be found within those terms.
Plain meaning: The court examined the ordinary meanings of the terms "suspend" and "modify." It noted "suspend" ordinarily means to cause to cease for a time, to interrupt or delay temporarily; "modify" means to change in form, qualities, or to limit or reduce in extent or degree.
Distinction between suspension and remission: The defendant sought not a temporary delay in collection but a complete vacatur or remission of the fine—i.e., elimination of the sentence. The court found that a request to remit an entire fine is qualitatively different from a request to suspend execution for a time.
Limits on judicial clemency: The court observed that the power to eliminate punishment in the sense of clemency or pardon has traditionally been exercised by the executive (pardon power). It stated skepticism that Congress, by enacting the Probation Act, intended to confer upon trial judges the power to exercise clemency by eliminating sentences after the term had expired when no motion to modify was made during the judgment term.
Precedent comparison: The court discussed appellate decisions: Nix (suggesting applicability of the Act to pre-Act sentences and possibly broader power) and Kriebel (indicating suspension but not modification). It also relied on U.S. v. Mayer to highlight the default rule that courts cannot alter final judgments after the term unless a statute clearly permits it.
Conclusion of law: Given the statutory wording (power to "suspend" execution), the common meaning of that word, the traditional allocation of clemency to the executive, and limitations on altering final judgments, the court concluded the Probation Act did not authorize the trial court to vacate the judgment by remitting the fine in full under the circumstances presented.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court denied the petition and found that it did not have the power under the Probation Act to remit the entire $10,000 fine.

Implications:

The direct effect of the decision is that Felder's request for remission of the fine was denied and the fine remained in place.
The court limited its holding to the question of vacating the judgment by remission of the fine; it explicitly did not decide or address the court's power to suspend the execution of a sentence temporally.
The opinion relied on statutory construction, the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the Act, and precedent about the inability of a court to alter final judgments after the term, rather than announcing a broader novel rule of law beyond the scope of the case; no broader remedial grant of clemency to trial judges was recognized in these circumstances.

The defendant was advised that he "may have any proper order for the protection of his right to have a review of this order."

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UNITED STATES v. FELDER et al.

Thomas B. Felder and others were convicted of a crime. On application by the named defendant for remission of fine. Motion denied.

LINDLEY, District Judge.

The defendant Thomas B. Felder, convicted herein prior to the enactment of the law known as the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 (Comp. St. Supp. 1925, §§ 10564 4/5-10564 4/5c), whose conviction has since said date been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit, has filed herein his petition, wherein he prays "that, pursuant to the authority granted by chapter 521 of the Act of Congress approved March 4, 1925, the court may remit the fine of $10,000." The question immediately arises as to whether or not this court has any power to grant the relief prayed.

The Probation Act provides that the court shall have "power, after conviction or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for any crime or offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the defendant upon probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as they may deem best. * * * The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation, or may change the period of probation." Section 1 (Comp. St. Supp. 1925, § 10564 4/5).

In interpreting this statute, the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit, in the case of Nix v. James, 7 F.2d 590, held that the Probation Act was applicable to defendants sentenced before the passage of the act, and inferentially, at least, that the court under the said act might have the power to alter or modify the original sentence. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in the case of Kriebel v. United States of America, 10 F.2d 762, held that in such a situation the trial court might suspend the execution of the sentence, but indicated that the court might not modify the sentence.

The law prior to the passage of the act under consideration was stated by the Supreme Court as follows: "In the absence of statute providing otherwise, the general principle obtains that a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose was begun during that term." U.S. v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67, 35 S. Ct. 16, 19, 59 L. Ed. 129. The immediate question is: "Has the act of Congress above quoted so altered the prior existing law that the trial court may, after the expiration of its term, modify the sentence by the remission of the entire punishment; that is, in this instance, a fine of $10,000.00?"

The measure of the power granted by the act of Congress must be found within its own terms. The act expressly grants power "to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence." It does not grant any further or greater power than that which is included within the words quoted. Lexicographers define the word "suspend" to mean "to cause to cease for a time; to interrupt; to delay; to withhold for a time on certain conditions; to cause to cease for a time from operation or effect; to cease temporarily from operation or activity." The word "modify" is similarly defined as follows: "To limit or reduce in extent or degree; to change the form or qualities of."

The defendant seeks to have the court vacate the order fining him. He does not ask the court to suspend for a time the collection of the fine, but he prays that the judgment fining him shall be reduced in extent, that its form and quality be changed, and that the entire fine shall be remitted. It may be that this act should be construed as a remedial statute — that is, liberally; but we should remember, also, that it is a statute changing the pre-existing law, and therefore is governed by certain well recognized limitations of interpretation. With these principles in mind, it is not perceived how it can be said logically that, when Congress provided that the court should have the power to suspend the execution of a sentence, it thereby intended to include the power to eliminate the sentence. It has always been understood that such power lies with the executive by virtue of the pardoning power. This court does not believe that Congress intended, in enacting the Probation Act, to grant to trial judges power to extend clemency, or pardon, by way of elimination of sentences after the term has expired at which the final judgment was entered, there having been no motion to modify the sentence entered at the judgment term.

We are not now concerned with the power of the court to suspend the execution of the sentence. We are concerned only with the power of the court to vacate the judgment by the remission of the fine. From what has been said, it is evident that the court is without power in the premises, and that the petition must be and is hereby denied.

The defendant may have any proper order for the protection of his right to have a review of this order.

UNITED STATES v. FELDER, (S.D.N.Y. 1926)