Summary of Opinion — Georgianna Carey et al. v. Israel Klein et al. (Wait, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are two tort actions: one by Georgianna Carey for personal injuries suffered when she fell on an unlighted common stairway in a tenement building owned by the defendants, and a second by her husband, Arthur J. Carey, for consequential damages. The writs were dated October 17, 1923. The actions were tried together in the Superior Court before Judge Whiting. The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs — $3,000 for Georgianna and $500 for Arthur — but, before the verdicts were recorded, the judge reserved leave, with the assent of the jury, to enter a verdict for the defendant if questions of law so required. After the verdicts were returned, and upon consideration of exceptions and questions of law, the judge set aside the plaintiff verdicts and entered verdicts for the defendants. The plaintiffs excepted. The cases were submitted to the Supreme Judicial Court on briefs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant landlord owed a legal duty to keep the common hall and stairway lighted such that he could be held liable in tort for the plaintiff's fall.
Whether the evidence warranted a finding that the landlord had undertaken, by express or implied agreement, to light the common halls and stairways.
Whether the city ordinance (Section 83 of chapter 30 of the Springfield ordinances) imposed upon the owner the duty to keep the particular hall and stairway lighted under the circumstances of the premises involved.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Polansky v. Heller, 241 Mass. 484	Cited for the settled law that a landlord is under no obligation to light common halls and stairways unless he has undertaken to do so (expressly or impliedly) or is bound by statute.	Relied upon as authority for the proposition that no duty to light existed here absent an undertaking or statutory mandate; used to support the directed verdict for defendant.
Gallagher v. Murphy, 221 Mass. 363	Cited in support of the general rule limiting a landlord's duty to light common areas absent agreement or statute.	Used alongside other cases to establish the controlling legal standard on landlord duty to light.
Stone v. Lewis, 215 Mass. 594	Applied to the rule that mere landlord-tenant relation and the construction leaving halls unlighted do not, standing alone, impose a duty to light.	Referenced to show the tenant takes premises as found and visitors have no greater right than tenant; supported court’s conclusion for defendant.
McGowan v. Monahan, 199 Mass. 296	Included among authorities stating that the landlord's duty to light arises only by agreement or statute.	Cited by the court to reinforce that no such duty was established in this case.
Jordan v. Sullivan, 181 Mass. 348	Cited for related principles on landlord obligations (grouped with other landlord-tenant cases).	Used as supporting precedent in the court’s statement of settled law.
Dean v. Murphy, 169 Mass. 413	Cited as an authority on landlord responsibility for common areas under particular conditions.	Grouped with other authorities to state the general rule that no duty to light exists absent undertaking or statute.
Marwedel v. Cook, 154 Mass. 235	Cited among earlier decisions on landlord duties concerning premises control.	Referenced to support the court's summary of the governing precedent.
Faxon v. Butler, 206 Mass. 500	Listed as a compare authority (indicating related or potentially distinguishing precedent).	The court noted it for comparison but did not rely on it to impose duty in this case.
Coupe v. Platt, 172 Mass. 458	Also cited for comparison with the general rules stated.	Not applied to change the court's conclusion; cited for context and contrast.
Pizzano v. Shuman, 229 Mass. 240	Cited for the principle that the mere relation of landlord and tenant does not place the obligation to light upon the landlord.	Used to support the court's holding that no duty arose simply from the landlord-tenant relationship or the construction of the premises.
Andrews v. Williamson, 193 Mass. 92	Cited for the proposition that a tenant takes premises as he finds them.	Applied to show visitors have no greater right than the tenant and thus cannot claim a higher right to lighting than the tenant possessed.
Alessi v. Fitzgerald, 217 Mass. 576	Cited regarding the rights of persons who come to premises by virtue of social or business relations with the tenant.	Used to support the proposition that such visitors have no rights greater than the tenant’s; supported court’s outcome for defendants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps grounded in fact and precedent:

Identification of dispositive legal question: The court observed that no contention existed that the defendant was liable unless he owed a duty to light the place where the plaintiff fell. Thus the dispute turned on whether such a duty existed.
Statement of governing law: The court summarized settled Massachusetts law (citing a series of cases) that a landlord is under no obligation to light common halls and stairways unless he (a) has undertaken to do so by express or implied agreement, or (b) is bound to do so by statute or municipal ordinance.
Application of precedent to factual record: Reviewing the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, the court noted facts that could be found by a jury — single apartment on each floor; presence of gas fixtures originally; landlord agreed to furnish the gas but required tenants to attend to the light; janitor did not attend to lights; tenants testified they did light the gas jets; conflicting testimony from first-floor tenant regarding whether the light had been lit on the evening in question. The court concluded this evidence did not warrant a finding that the landlord had undertaken, either expressly or impliedly, to light the halls. The only legitimate conclusion, the court held, was that the landlord did not undertake that duty.
Evaluation of municipal ordinance: The court examined Section 83 of chapter 30 of the Springfield ordinances, which required that "public halls and stairways" within specified buildings have lights and that the owner keep them lighted from sunset to sunrise. The court analyzed whether that provision applied, focusing on the ordinance language and the facts: the hall and stairway in question were not used by more than four families and the two numbered premises (364 and 368 Chestnut Street) were arranged so that tenants of 368 had no access to the stairways and halls in 364 and made no common use of them. Because the ordinance’s quoted language concerned the "public halls and stairways" and the particular hall was not used by more than four families (nor commonly used by both numbered premises), the court concluded the ordinance did not impose a duty on the owner to light the specific entry hall at issue.
Procedural disposition: The court noted the Superior Court judge had allowed the jury to consider the issue but, after verdicts for the plaintiffs, set them aside and entered verdicts for the defendants pursuant to reserved power (in line with G.L. c. 231, § 120). The Supreme Judicial Court found no error in this action given the absence of legal duty.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court held that no legal duty to light the common stairway existed under the facts of this case, either by contract, implied undertaking, or municipal ordinance; consequently, the defendants were entitled to verdicts in their favor. The plaintiffs' exceptions were overruled and judgment was entered for the defendants on the verdicts.

Implications: The direct effect is that the plaintiffs' verdicts were set aside and final judgment was entered for the defendants. The decision applies settled Massachusetts authority limiting a landlord's obligation to light common areas to situations of express or implied undertaking or an applicable statutory/ordinance duty. The opinion does not announce a novel rule; it applies existing precedent and does not discuss any broader change to the law beyond its application to the facts here.

Opinion by WAIT, J.; panel included Rugg, C.J., Crosby, Pierce, Carroll, and Wait, JJ.; argued Nov. 9, 1926; decided Apr. 5, 1927.

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GEORGIANNA CAREY vs. ISRAEL KLEIN others. ARTHUR J. CAREY vs. SAME.

Landlord and Tenant, Landlord's liability to guest of tenant, Common stairway. Negligence, Of one owning or controlling real estate. Municipal Corporations, By-laws and ordinances: building laws.

A landlord of a tenement building, occupied by tenants for dwelling purposes, is under no obligation to light the common halls and stairways under his control unless he is bound to do so by statutory provisions or has undertaken to do so by express or implied agreement; no such implied agreement arises by the mere relation of landlord and tenant, nor merely from the fact that the construction of the premises left halls and stairways unlighted. In the absence of such an express or implied agreement or statutory provision, a tenant in such a building takes the premises as he finds them, and those who come to them because of social or business relations with him do not have any right greater than his. It was proper to order a verdict for the defendant at the trial of an action of tort for personal injuries received when the plaintiff, calling upon a tenant in a tenement building owned by the defendant, fell upon an unlighted stairway, where it appeared that, while the defendant furnished gas fixtures and gas for the lighting of the stairway, he required the tenants of the apartment on each floor to attend to the light on that floor, such evidence not warranting a finding that the defendant either expressly or impliedly undertook to light the stairway in question. The owner of two tenement houses under one roof, each three stories in height with a single apartment on each floor and having a separate entrance from the front leading to premises let separately to the tenants and not giving access to the tenements of the other house, is not placed under a duty to have such entry hall lighted by reason of a city ordinance requiring, "The public halls and stairways within every office building, three or more stories in height, and within every tenement house, three or more stories in height, if for more than four families, shall have gas or electric lights so located that the stairs and landings shall be adequately lighted, and it shall be compulsory on the part of the owner of such building to keep said lights lighted from sunset to sunrise."

WAIT, J.

These were actions by husband and wife to recover for damages alleged to have been received in consequence of the fall of the wife upon an unlighted stairway in a tenement building owned by the defendant. She had been calling upon her sister, whose husband was the defendant's tenant of the apartment upon the second floor of the building numbered 364 Chestnut Street, in Springfield, and was on her way out of the building when she fell on the last step of the common stairway between the second and first stories. Upon contradictory evidence, the jury could have found that the hall and stairs at the place were dark; that she was using due care; and that her injuries were caused by her fall and not by disease which led to the fall.

No contention is made that any liability rests upon the defendant unless he owed a duty to light the place of the fall.

The law is settled that a landlord is under no obligation to light the common halls and stairways under his control in tenement buildings occupied by his tenants, unless he has undertaken to do so by express or implied agreement, or is bound so to do by statutory provisions. Polansky v. Heller, 241 Mass. 484. Gallagher v. Murphy, 221 Mass. 363, 365. Stone v. Lewis, 215 Mass. 594, 597. McGowan v. Monahan, 199 Mass. 296, 298. Jordan v. Sullivan, 181 Mass. 348. Dean v. Murphy, 169 Mass. 413, 415. Marwedel v. Cook, 154 Mass. 235. Compare Faxon v. Butler, 206 Mass. 500; Coupe v. Platt, 172 Mass. 458.

The mere relation of landlord and tenant does not place the obligation upon him; nor standing by itself does the fact that the construction of the premises leaves halls and stairways unlighted. Pizzano v. Shuman, 229 Mass. 240. Stone v. Lewis, supra. Polansky v. Heller, supra. The tenant takes the premises as he finds them, Andrews v. Williamson, 193 Mass. 92, and those who come to them because of social or business relations with the tenant, do not have any right greater than the tenant's. Polansky v. Heller, supra. Pizzano v. Shuman, supra. Stone v. Lewis, supra. Alessi v. Fitzgerald, 217 Mass. 576.

The evidence taken most strongly for the plaintiff disclosed that there was a single apartment on each floor; that when the tenant took the second floor apartment, many years before this accident, there was a gas fixture in each hallway; that the landlord agreed to furnish the gas, but required the tenant of the apartment to attend to the light; that his employee who did janitor's work in the building did nothing about the lights. The tenants testified that they attended regularly to lighting the gas jets; and there was testimony, from the first floor tenant, which the jury were at liberty to disbelieve, that he had lighted the gas on the evening of the accident. This evidence does not justify a finding that the landlord undertook to light the halls and stairways. The only legitimate conclusion from it is that the landlord did not. The judge would have been right in refusing to submit it to the jury. The bill of exceptions shows that he allowed the jury to pass upon the question, but, after verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, apparently under power reserved under the statute, in accord with G.L.c. 231, § 120, he set them aside and entered verdicts for the defendant.

He was right in instructing the jury that no obligation to light the halls and stairways had been imposed upon the landlord by the ordinances of Springfield. Section 83 of chapter 30 of the ordinances, then in force, provided that: "The public halls and stairways within every office building, three or more stories in height, and within every tenement house, three or more stories in height, if for more than four families, shall have gas or electric lights so located that the stairs and landings shall be adequately lighted, and it shall be compulsory on the part of the owner of such building to keep said lights lighted from sunset to sunrise." The defendant's tenement property was three stories in height. We need not decide whether it was "for more than four families"; because the words quoted from the ordinance relate not to the house but to the "public halls and stairways." There is no dispute that the hall and stairway when the female plaintiff fell, were not used by more than four families; and that the premises numbered 364 and 368 Chestnut Street, whether in law one tenement house or more than one, were so arranged that the tenants of the apartments whose entrance was numbered 368 had no access from 368 to the stairways and halls in 364, here in question, and made no common use of them.

As no liability existed, imposed either by contract or by statutory provision, the defendants were entitled to the verdicts directed. The denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial presents no question of law.

Exceptions overruled. Judgment for defendants on verdicts.

CAREY v. KLEIN