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Case Summary: Martin Burns's Case

Factual and Procedural Background

Martin Burns was employed as a night watchman by the Windsor Print Works. Because of the condition of his heart he was obliged to cease work on April 30, 1927. The single member of the Industrial Accident Board found that Burns had valvular disease of the heart when he commenced work and that, during his employment, he walked from thirteen to fifteen miles every night through halls and up and down stairs for a period of about twenty months, after which he was forced to stop work by reason of his heart condition. The Board (on appeal from the single member) confirmed the finding and awarded compensation.

The award was certified to the Superior Court under the workmen's compensation act. The case was heard in the Superior Court by Judge Bishop, who entered a decree dismissing the claim. The claimant appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Additional factual background found in the opinion: Burns previously worked for the Arnold Print Works, later spent twenty-four or twenty-five years in New York, then returned and worked for the Hunter Machine Company from November 11, 1922, until October 27, 1923, when he became disabled. His trouble was diagnosed as acute rheumatism, and he received disability payments under a group health policy from November 3, 1923, until May, 1924. He did little regular work until beginning as watchman with Windsor Print Works in August, 1925.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the employee's condition constituted a "personal injury" within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act, arising out of and in the course of his employment as a watchman.
  2. If the employee had a preexisting valvular heart disease when he began the employment, whether the ultimate incapacity resulting from prolonged exertion in that employment is compensable under the act or is merely the natural decay or wearing out of a diseased organ.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 62 That this court has gone further than most courts in allowing recovery in cases of heart lesions where there has been a weak heart before the injury was received. The court stated the present case is controlled by the principles laid down in Maggelet's Case and used those principles to evaluate whether continuous exertion without a particular incident of strain could give rise to a compensable personal injury.
Brightman's Case, 220 Mass. 17 Cited as one of the cases in which recovery was allowed in heart-lesion cases involving a weak heart before injury. Referenced as an example of prior decisions allowing recovery; distinguished because those cases involved some special act or incident bringing a sudden strain on the weakened heart, which was absent here.
Fisher's Case, 220 Mass. 581 Cited as one of the cases in which recovery was allowed in heart-lesion cases involving a weak heart before injury. Used as an example of prior allowance of compensation; distinguished from the present case on the ground that those cases involved a special act or incident causing sudden strain.
Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487 Cited as one of the cases in which recovery was allowed in heart-lesion cases involving a weak heart before injury. Referenced and distinguished for the same reason: prior cases involved a special sudden strain upon the weakened heart, unlike the continuous exertion here.
Mooradjian's Case, 229 Mass. 521 Cited as one of the cases in which recovery was allowed in heart-lesion cases involving a weak heart before injury. Referenced as an example allowing recovery; distinguished because of the presence in those cases of some special act or incident bringing a sudden strain, absent in the present case.
Sullivan's Case, 265 Mass. 497 Cited in support of the proposition that in the absence of a particular incident of strain, the workmen's compensation act does not apply to the natural effect of exertion on a preexisting diseased organ. Used as supporting authority for the court's conclusion that where ultimate breakdown is merely the natural effect of exertion on an already weakened heart, the act does not apply.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court identified the essential question as whether Burns's condition was a compensable personal injury "arising out of and received in the course of his employment" or whether it was the inevitable decay of a diseased organ that preexisted his employment.

The court accepted the Board's factual finding (made by the single member and affirmed by the Board) that Burns had valvular disease of the heart when he began his work as a night watchman and that he walked thirteen to fifteen miles nightly while performing his duties. The court noted there was evidence to support that finding and, under familiar principles, would not disturb it.

The court reviewed relevant prior Massachusetts decisions, observing that the court had been liberal in allowing recovery in heart-lesion cases where the heart was weak before the injury. However, it distinguished those cases from the present one on a decisive point: in the prior cases that permitted compensation there was some special act or incident that brought a sudden strain upon the weakened heart. By contrast, Burns's employment involved prolonged, continuous exertion without any particular instance of extraordinary strain.

The court concluded that Burns's ultimate breakdown "appears to us to be merely the natural effect of exertion in this work upon a heart already weakened by valvular disease." On that basis, as a matter of law, the court held that the workmen's compensation act did not apply to his suffering and incapacity.

The opinion also records a dissent by one member of the Industrial Accident Board, who stated: "It seems to me that the employee's work did no more than help wear out a diseased organ of his body." The Supreme Judicial Court relied on the majority view and its legal distinction between sudden strain and gradual wear when applying the act.

Holding and Implications

Decree affirmed.

Implications:

  • The Superior Court's dismissal of the claim (and thereby denial of compensation) was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court.
  • The direct effect is that the claimant's award of compensation by the Industrial Accident Board was set aside and the claim remains dismissed.
  • The court distinguished this case from prior heart-lesion compensation cases on the ground that those involved a special or sudden strain; because the present case involved continuous exertion on a preexisting diseased heart without a specific traumatic incident, the workmen's compensation act was held inapplicable. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel rule beyond applying and distinguishing existing Massachusetts precedents.

MARTIN BURNS'S CASE.

Workmen's Compensation Act, Injuries to which act applies.

In proceedings under the workmen's compensation act, a single member of the Industrial Accident Board found that one, who commenced work as a night watchman while suffering from valvular disease of the heart and thereafter in the course of his duties walked from thirteen to fifteen miles through halls and up and down stairs every night for a period of about twenty months, when he was forced to cease work by the condition of his heart, had received a personal injury arising out of his employment. The Industrial Accident Board confirmed the finding and awarded compensation. On certification to the Superior Court, a decree was entered dismissing the claim. Held, that the decision of the board was not warranted and the decree of the Superior Court was affirmed.

WAIT, J.

The essential question in this case is whether the employee is suffering from a personal injury within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act, arising out of and received in the course of his employment as a watchman by the assured; or whether he is suffering from the inevitable decay of one growing older in an employment which he entered upon while suffering from a valvular disease of the heart. The single member and a majority of the Industrial Accident Board have found, that when he entered upon his work he had a valvular disease of the heart; and that this condition "was the remote cause of his incapacity and injury; the strain and exertion of his job was the proximate, contributing cause." One member of the board dissented stating that: "It seems to me that the employee's work did no more than help wear out a diseased organ of his body." The evidence is undisputed that after first working for the Arnold Print Works at North Adams, Burns went to New York for twenty-four or twenty-five years. He returned to North Adams and worked for the Hunter Machine Company from November 11, 1922, till October 27, 1923, when he became disabled. His trouble was diagnosed as acute rheumatism; and from November 3, 1923, until May, 1924, he was paid for disability from rheumatism under a "group health" policy issued to the Hunter Machine Company. He never returned to work with the Hunter Company and did little, if any, regular work until he began as watchman with the Windsor Print Works in August, 1925. In this work he traversed nightly, seven nights in the week, in going through halls and up and down stairs, from thirteen to fifteen miles.

Physicians testified that valvular disease of the heart is an usual consequence of acute rheumatism, and that Burns was suffering from valvular disease of the heart, when he began work for the assured. This was contradicted, but the single member so found. The finding was affirmed by the Industrial Accident Board on appeal, and we think it must be taken to be the finding of the Board, — a finding of fact with which, as there is evidence to support it, under familiar principles, we cannot interfere.

As was said in Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 62, this court has gone further than most courts in allowing recovery in cases of heart lesions, where there has been a weak heart before the injury was received. Brightman's Case, 220 Mass. 17. Fisher's Case, 220 Mass. 581. Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487. Mooradjian's Case, 229 Mass. 521. All the cases of heart lesion that have been called to our attention in which compensation has been allowed, however, differ from the case which is now before us in that there was in those cases some special act or incident bringing a sudden strain upon the weakened heart. In the case before us there is nothing of the kind. The employee, with a weakened heart when he entered the employment, undertook to do an amount of walking which involved going up and down stairs. There was, however, no particular instance of strain in the course of his work, and his ultimate breakdown appears to us to be merely the natural effect of exertion in this work upon a heart already weakened by valvular disease. In such circumstances we think that the workmen's compensation act does not apply; and that as matter of law the suffering which the employee has undergone cannot be said to be the result of a personal injury arising out of the employment entitling him to compensation under the act. See Sullivan's Case, 265 Mass. 497.

The case is controlled by the principles laid down in Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57. It results that the order must be

Decree affirmed.

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BURNS'S CASE
(Mar 25, 1929)