HULSE v. PACIFIC ETC. RY. CO

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Docket Number

No. 5105.

Attorney(S)

Scatterday Stone, for Appellants. As to whether the employee was engaged in interstate commerce and therefore governed by the federal Employers' Liability Act, the test is: Was the employee at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically part of it? ( Shanks v. Delaware, L. W. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 36 Sup. Ct. 188, 60 L. ed. 436, L.R.A. 1916C, 797; Glidewell v. Quincy, O. K. C. R. Co., 208 Mo. App. 372, 236 S.W. 677; Pedersen v. Delaware, L. W. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57 L. ed. 1125; McLean v. Boston M. R. R., 80 N.H. 252, 116 Atl. 435; Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Gubler, 9 Fed. (2d) 494; Kinzell v. Chicago, M. St. P. By. Co., 250 U.S. 130, 39 Sup. Ct. 412, 63 L. ed. 893.) If there is an element of interstate commerce in a traffic or employment, it determines the remedy of the employee. ( Philadelphia Reading Ry. Co. v. Polk, 256 U.S. 332, 41 Sup. Ct. 518, 65 L. ed. 958; Mondou v. New York, N. H. H. R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 44; New York Central Ry. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139, 37 Sup. Ct. 546, 61 L. ed. 1045, L.R.A. 1918C, 439; Hilliard v. Clifford, 134 Wn. 590, 236 P. 108.) James Harris, for Respondents. The federal Employers' Liability Act does not prevent the operation of a state Workmen's Compensation Law in respect of injuries suffered by one not at the time employed in interstate commerce within the decisions construing and applying the federal statute, even though he was at the time employed by a railway company which was, in a general sense, engaged in interstate commerce. ( Raymond v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 243 U.S. 43, 37 Sup. Ct. 268, 61 L. ed. 583; New York Cent. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. ed. 667.) Where an employee of an interstate railroad is injured, but at a time when such employee was not engaged in interstate traffic, a recovery may be had, if at all, either under the common law or under some state statute. ( Wabash R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U.S. 86, 34 Sup. Ct. 729, 58 L. ed. 1226; Vandalia R. Co. v. Stringer, 182 Ind. 676, 106 N.E. 865, 107 N.E. 673.)

Judges

GIVENS, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Arthur Pierce Hulse, employed as a section foreman by the appellant railway company engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, was killed in the course of his employment. His widow sought compensation under the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act. The appellant company permitted the use of an extra gasoline motor-car by sectionmen for personal travel to their farms, an informal arrangement not part of their employment contract. At the time of the fatal accident, Hulse was towing the company's motor-car to return it to the designated section headquarters after repairs to his own car were completed. The central procedural posture is an appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Adams County, affirming the award of compensation by the Industrial Accident Board for accidental death.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the deceased employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his injury, thereby determining whether the federal Employers' Liability Act or the state Workmen's Compensation Act applied.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of injury because he was performing maintenance of way work, which is closely related to interstate transportation.
The test for interstate commerce is whether the employee was engaged in interstate transportation or work so closely related to it as to be practically part of it.
Because the employee’s duties generally involved interstate commerce, the federal Employers' Liability Act should govern, excluding recovery under the state act.

Respondents' Arguments

The federal Employers' Liability Act does not prevent application of the state Workmen's Compensation Law when the employee was not engaged in interstate commerce at the time of injury, even if employed by a railroad generally engaged in interstate commerce.
If the employee was not engaged in interstate traffic at the time, recovery may be had under common law or state statute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Shanks v. Delaware, L. W. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556	Test for determining engagement in interstate commerce: whether the employee was engaged in interstate transportation or work closely related to it.	Used as the primary standard to evaluate whether Hulse was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of injury.
Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473	Focus on the employee’s activity at the precise time of injury, not general duties.	Supported the conclusion that Hulse’s specific activity was not part of interstate commerce.
Morrison v. Chicago, M. St. P. R. Co., 103 Wn. 650	Whether the act performed directly and immediately facilitates interstate commerce.	Referenced to emphasize the immediacy and directness required to qualify as interstate commerce.
Pedersen v. Delaware L. W. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146	Distinguished because the employee’s work was directly connected with an interstate instrumentality.	Distinguished from the present case to show Hulse’s work was not similarly connected.
Delaware L. W. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439	Supplying or storing equipment for future interstate commerce is not itself interstate commerce.	Used to analogize Hulse’s returning of the motor-car as a secondary relation to interstate commerce.
Chicago, B. Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177	Similar principle regarding handling of interstate commerce instruments not yet in active interstate use.	Supported the court’s conclusion about the remoteness of Hulse’s activity to interstate commerce.
Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Barlow, 244 U.S. 183	Further clarifies scope of interstate commerce with regard to employee activities.	Reinforced the conclusion that Hulse’s activity was not part of interstate commerce.
Lowisville N. R. Co. v. Carter, 195 Ala. 382	Employment connected with an instrumentality of interstate commerce must be direct to qualify.	Supported the distinction between direct and secondary relations to interstate commerce.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused on the specific activity of the employee at the time of injury rather than his general employment duties. It applied the established legal test asking whether the employee was engaged in interstate transportation or work so closely related as to be practically part of it. The court found that although Hulse’s general duties involved maintenance of way work connected to interstate commerce, the act of towing the motor-car to return it to the section headquarters was sufficiently remote from interstate commerce. This activity was characterized as a secondary relation to an interstate instrumentality, akin to storing or furnishing supplies for future use, which does not constitute interstate commerce for purposes of the federal Employers' Liability Act. The court distinguished this case from precedents where the employee’s work was directly connected to interstate commerce. Consequently, the court concluded that the state Workmen's Compensation Act applied.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the District Court affirming the award of compensation under the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act is affirmed.

The direct effect of this decision is to allow recovery under the state compensation statute rather than the federal Employers' Liability Act, as the employee was not engaged in interstate commerce at the time of injury. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond affirming the application of existing legal standards to the facts.

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MARY ERMINA HULSE and MARY ERMINA HULSE, Guardian of ESTHER MAY HULSE and EDNA PEARL HULSE, Minors, Respondents, v. PACIFIC AND IDAHO NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Appellants.

GIVENS, J.

Arthur Pierce Hulse was killed in the course of his employment with appellant as a section foreman. His widow sought as a dependent compensation under the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act (C. S. 1919, sees. 6218-6339, as amended).

Appellant railway is a common carrier engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce. Deceased was employed in maintenance of way work. Each section of the right of way was provided with a gasoline motor-car, and, in addition, the railroad provided an extra one to be used in the event that any of the others were out of commission. When not in such use the company permitted the extra car to be used by two of its sectionmen in traveling to and from their farms at Diamond and for this reason required that it be kept, when not in use, at Midvale, the section headquarters nearest Diamond.

The company permitted this use of the car in order to keep in its service two sectionmen who owned farms near their work. Mr. Young, the general manager of the railroad company, testified that the company did not assume to transport its sectionmen and that in this case it was done temporarily and at the convenience of the company. In addition to permitting its use for going to and fro in their work, the men were permitted to use the car, as testified by Superintendent O'Leary, for "their personal use in going to town or anything they wanted." It was an informal arrangement, was not a part of their contract of employment, and while in such use the car could hardly be said to have been in the service of the company.

Hulse, the deceased, for several weeks prior to the fatal accident, had been using the extra motor belonging to the company, pending repairs on his own. He was under instructions to return the company's car to Midvale as soon as his own was returned to him, and he was engaged in this task at the time of the fatal accident. The evidence indicates that when he left his own section at Fruitvale he was riding his own car and towing the car belonging to the company. Several hours later he was found alongside the tracks, seriously injured, from which injuries he later died. The car on which he was riding was found derailed near by.

The sole question to be determined is whether deceased was engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce at the time he was injured. The general nature of the employee's duties is not determinative of this question. Inquiry must be directed to the particular employment at the precise time of the accident. ( Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 163, 34 Sup, Ct. 646, 58 L. ed. 1051; Colasurdo v. Central R. R., 180 Fed. 832; Foley v. Hines, 119 Me. 425, 111 Aft. 715; Ewing v. Coal Coke Ry. Co., 82 W. Va. 427, 96 S.E. 73.)

The test for determining whether any particular employment is a part of interstate commerce has often been declared in the following language:

"Was the employee, at the time of the injury, engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it?" ( Shanks v. Delaware L. W. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 36 Sup. Ct. 188, 60 L. ed. 436, L.R.A. 1916C, 797.)

In the case of Morrison v. Chicago, M. St. P. R. Co., 103 Wn. 650, 175 P. 325, the supreme court of Washington suggested the following inquiry to determine whether, in any given instance, an employee was or was not engaged in interstate commerce:

"Would the performance of the act in which the employee was engaged directly and immediately tend to facilitate the movement of interstate commerce, or, conversely, would the failure to perform the act directly and immediately interfere with or hinder the movement of such commerce?"

See 10 A.L.R. 1184, note; 14 A.L.R. 732, note; 24 A.L.R. 634, note; 29 A.L.R. 1207, note; 49 A.L.R. 1339, note.

Appellants contend that in returning the motor-car, Hulse was continuing in his employment as a sectionman engaged in maintenance of way work. It cannot be disputed that Hulse's duties, in general, involved maintenance of way, which, it may be conceded, involves interstate commerce ( Williams' Admr. v. Chesapeake O. Ry. Co., 181 Ky. 313, 204 S.W. 292; Frazier v. Hines, 260 Fed. 874), and consequently injuries received in such work are within the protection of the federal Employers' Liability Act and conversely are excluded from the protection of the state act. But we are unable to agree that Hulse, at the time of the accident, was "engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it."

This particular employment involved towing a motor-car from Fruitvale to Midvale. For several weeks prior to the accident the car had been used in the furtherance of interstate commerce in maintenance of way work. But that work was completed when Hulse took the car in tow to return it to the place provided by the railroad for its future use. Whether that use would be in interstate transportation or in the furtherance of it was uncertain. Towing a car to permit its use by sectionmen in returning to their farm, or in engaging otherwise in their own business — its next probable — use was too remote from interstate transportation to be classified as such. Its further use in maintenance of way work, in connection with interstate commerce, might be indefinitely in the future. The rule appears to be that when a car or other instrumentality of commerce has completed its interstate business, and has not yet been designated specifically for further interstate business, an employee engaged in switching or otherwise handling it, is not engaged in interstate commerce. ( Illinois Cent. R. R. Go. v. Behrens, supra; Chicago, B. Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 36 Sup. Ct. 517, 60 L. ed. 941; Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Barlow, 244 U.S. 183, 37 Sup. Ct. 515, 61 L. ed. 1070; Johnson v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 199 Cal. 126, 49 A.L.R. 1323, 248 P. 501; Ewing v. Coal Coke Ry. Co., supra; Barnett v. Coal Coke Ry. Co., 81 W. Va. 251, 94 S.E.] 150; see, also, Minneapolis St. L. R. Co. v. Winters, 242 U.S. 353, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 54, 37 Sup. Ct. 170, 61 L. ed. 358.)

Returning the car to be used in the future in maintenance of way work — assuming such was the case — involved merely a secondary relation with an interstate instrumentality, namely, the right of way or tracks. At the time of Hulse's injury, he was employed in connection with the car and not with a direct instrumentality of interstate commerce. ( Lowisville N. R. Co. v. Carter, 195 Ala. 382, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 292, 70 So. 655; Shanks v. Delaware, L. W. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 36 Sup. Ct. 188, 60 L. ed. 436, L.R.A. 1916C, 797.) This fact distinguishes this case from Pedersen v. Delaware L. W. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57 L.ed. 1125, relied on by appellant. There the injured employee's service was directly connected with the maintenance of an instrumentality of interstate commerce, namely, a bridge over which passed the tracks of the railroad.

We believe the situation in this case is analogous to the furnishing of supplies to a railroad. The general rule in this connection is that such an activity is not interstate commerce if it merely consists in the storing or transporting of supplies, which may eventually be used in the furtherance of such commerce. In returning the car, Hulse was merely furnishing a part of the equipment to be used at some future time by a section gang in its work. ( Delaware L. W. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439, 35 Sup. Ct. 902, 59 L. ed. 1397; Chicago, B. Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 36 Sup. Ct. 517, 60 L. ed. 941; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Barlow, supra; Hudson M. R. Co. v. Iorio, 239 Fed. 855, 152 C.C.A. 641.)

We conclude that deceased's employment at the time of his injury was not in interstate transportation or so closely associated with it as to be a part of it. Therefore recovery was properly sought and allowed under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state.

The judgment is affirmed.

Costs awarded to respondents.

Budge, C.J., Varian, J., and Baker, D.J., concur.

Wm. E. Lee, J., dissents.