1. APPEAL AND ERROR — SUPREME COURT WILL PRESUME THAT TRIAL COURT FOUND EVERY FACT NECESSARY TO SUPPORT JUDGMENT. — Supreme Court, on appeal, will presume that trial court found every fact necessary to support the judgment, and such presumptive findings must be sustained if evidence on any reasonable construction justifies them.
2. HUSBAND AND WIFE — ALL PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING COVERTURE IS PRIMA FACIE PRESUMED TO BE COMMUNITY. — All property acquired during coverture, no matter in whose name the title is taken, is prima facie presumed to be community property.
3. HUSBAND AND WIFE — SEPARATE OR COMMUNITY CHARACTER OF PROPERTY BECOMES FIXED AT TIME IT IS ACQUIRED. — Character of property as to whether it constitutes separate or community property becomes fixed at time it is acquired.
4. HUSBAND AND WIFE — PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING COVERTURE AND PAID FOR OUT OF SEPARATE FUNDS OF ONE SPOUSE BECOMES SEPARATE PROPERTY. — When purchase price of property acquired during coverture is paid for out of the separate funds of one spouse, the property becomes separate property and estate of such spouse.
5. HUSBAND AND WIFE — PROPERTY PURCHASED IN PART WITH COMMUNITY FUNDS IS COMMUNITY PROPERTY TO EXTENT AND IN PROPORTION THAT CONSIDERATION IS FURNISHED BY COMMUNITY. — Where property acquired during coverture is paid for in part with community funds and in part with separate funds, it is community property to the extent and in the proportion that consideration is furnished by the community.
6. HUSBAND AND WIFE — PROPERTY PURCHASED IN PART WITH SEPARATE FUNDS WITH BALANCE BORROWED ON MORTGAGE IS SEPARATE PROPERTY, UNLESS MORTGAGE IS PAID FROM COMMUNITY FUNDS. — Where part of purchase price of property acquired during coverture is paid for out of separate funds and the balance is borrowed on a mortgage on the property and a note signed by both spouses at the instance of the mortgagee, the property, as between the spouses, is separate, unless mortgage is afterwards paid from community funds.
7. APPEAL AND ERROR — SUPREME COURT MUST TAKE EVIDENCE IN STRONGEST MANNER IN BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF SECURING JUDGMENT. Supreme Court, on appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiff, must consider the evidence in strongest manner in plaintiff's behalf.
8. HUSBAND AND WIFE — HUSBAND'S LABOR IN ERECTION OF BUILDING ON LOT ON WIFE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY EARNINGS FURNISHED FOR MAINTENANCE AND IMPROVEMENT DID NOT MAKE IT COMMUNITY PROPERTY. — Where purchase price of lot together with building thereafter erected on premises was paid for out of wife's separate estate together with mortgage on property, the fact that husband furnished labor in construction of building and certain community earnings for its maintenance and improvement did not operate to make it community property, in that at the most the community would merely have a claim against separate estate for amount so contributed.
See Appeal and Error, 4 C.J., sec. 2727, p. 777, n. 61; sec. 2728, p. 778, n. 75.
Husband and Wife, 31 C.J., sec. 1129, p. 37, n. 78; sec. 1131, p. 40, n. 3; sec. 1132, p. 40, n. 16; sec. 1142, p. 49, n. 3.
See 5 Cal. Jur. 310; 5 R.C.L. 836, 844, 845.
See 5 R.C.L. 833.
See 5 Cal. Jur. 282; 5 R.C.L. 836, 837.
See 5 Cal. Jur. 294-296; 5 R.C.L. 838.
LOCKWOOD, C.J.
Alma O. Horton, hereinafter called plaintiff, brought suit against Ira F. Horton, her husband, hereinafter called defendant, to quiet title to certain lots in Yavapai county, claiming the same to be her separate and individual property. Defendant answered, alleging that the lots in question were community property. The matter was tried to the court, sitting without a jury, and judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff, from which judgment, defendant has appealed.
The only finding of fact made by the trial court was, "That the plaintiff is the owner of and entitled to the possession of the premises described in the amended complaint and hereinafter described; that her title is in fee simple and that the said premises has at all times since she acquired title thereto been her separate and individual property, in which her husband, Ira F. Horton, the defendant herein, never at any time had any community interest or any other interest of any kind or character therein, . . ." and judgment was rendered accordingly. The so-called finding of fact was in reality more in the nature of a conclusion of law, but under our oft-repeated rule, it is presumed the court found every fact necessary to support the judgment, and such presumptive findings must be sustained if the evidence on any reasonable construction justifies them.
The law governing the case is well established. It may be stated in the following manner: All property acquired during coverture, no matter in whose name the title is taken, is prima facie presumed to be community. Malich v. Malich, 23 Ariz. 423, 204 P. 1020; Benson v. Hunter, 23 Ariz. 132, 202 P. 233. The character of the property as to being separate or community becomes fixed at the time it is acquired. Pendleton v. Brown, 25 Ariz. 604, 221 P. 213. When the purchase price of property acquired during coverture is paid for out of the separate funds of one spouse, the property becomes the separate property and estate of such spouse. Charauleau v. Woffenden, 1 Ariz. 243, 25 P. 652; 31 C.J. 37, and note. But when purchased in part with community funds and in part with separate funds, it is community property to the extent and in the proportion that the consideration is furnished by the community. In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wn. 137, 179 P. 103; Graves v. Columbia Underwriters, 93 Wn. 196, 160 P. 436. And when the part of the purchase price is separate funds and the balance is borrowed on a mortgage on the property and a note signed by both spouses at the instance of the mortgagee, as between the spouses, unless the mortgage was afterwards paid from community funds, the property is separate. In re Finn's Estate, supra; Graves v. Columbia Underwriters, supra.
Taking the evidence in the strongest manner in behalf of plaintiff, as we must, it appears that in 1921 the property in question was purchased for the price of $1,200, $250 in cash being paid at the time. This $250 was furnished by plaintiff from her separate funds. Thereafter a building was erected upon the premises, plaintiff paying over $3,000 of the cost from her separate funds, and defendant contributing nothing in cash toward the purchase of the lots or the construction of the house. When the structure was nearly completed, the property was mortgaged for some $1,500, both spouses signing the note and mortgage. This money was used in paying the balance due on the purchase price of the lots and certain carpentering and plastering bills incurred in the building of the house. At a later time another mortgage for $2,500 on the property was made in the same manner, and its proceeds used to pay off the $1,500 mortgage, and to pay for some paving in the street in front of the house, the cost of which had been assessed against the property. This mortgage is still unpaid. It thus appears that plaintiff had contributed at least $3,000 of her own funds toward the total cost of the premises, and the balance had been paid for from the proceeds of a mortgage still existing against the property. The only contribution defendant even claims the community has made is a large amount of work he says he did in the construction of the building, and certain community earnings he has paid since its completion for its maintenance and improvement.
Even assuming labor and money was contributed as he claims, this would not make the property community, but would at most give the community a claim against the separate estate for the amount so contributed. Legg v. Legg, 34 Wn. 132, 75 P. 130; 31 C.J. 89. No interest in the title to the property itself was acquired by such advancements. The owner of the property at the time of its purchase, in this case Mrs. Horton, was entitled to all the profits resulting from any increase in the value, and, as a corollary, was subject to any losses from a decrease in the value, the community having merely an equitable lien thereon for the amount advanced. Had defendant set up such a lien in a proper manner, it might be that the judgment would have been different. His answer, however, was merely that the property was community property.
Such being the case, the judgment of the trial court was correct, and the judgment is affirmed.
McALISTER and ROSS, JJ., concur.
Comments