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Attorney(S)

F. Adams, for the defendant. H.F. Wood C.T. Sexton, for the plaintiff.

Judges

SANDERSON, J.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Grace Tully v. Israel Mandell

Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Suffolk)

Argued: October 10, 1929 — Decided: November 27, 1929

Panel: Rugg, C.J.; Pierce; Wait; Sanderson; Field, JJ. (Opinion by Sanderson, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an action in tort by the plaintiff, a patient of the defendant dentist, seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly resulting from the breaking of a hypodermic needle used to administer anesthesia during a tooth extraction. It was admitted that the needle broke while inserted in the plaintiff's jaw by the defendant. At trial in the Superior Court (before D. T. O'Connell, J.) the plaintiff testified that the defendant immediately after the occurrence said he did not know how it could have happened, that it was all his fault and not to worry about it, and that he would take care of everything. The defendant denied making such statements and testified that the needle broke because the plaintiff suddenly turned her head after he had warned her not to move; he also described sterilization procedures, the technique used, and that a new needle from a regular dealer and known manufacturer had been used. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $3,000. The defendant took exceptions, challenging, among other things, the judge's refusal to give certain requested rulings and the judge's instructions to the jury regarding the legal effect of the defendant's alleged admission.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a defendant's out-of-court statement that an accident "was all his fault" conclusively establishes negligence as a matter of law, such that the jury is bound to find the defendant negligent if they find the statement was made.
Whether, after introduction of such a statement, the trial judge should instruct the jury that the statement is not conclusive, that the burden of proof on negligence remains on the plaintiff, and that the statement is to be considered only as evidence bearing on negligence.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Evidence / Position

The plaintiff testified that immediately after the needle broke the defendant said he did not know how it could have happened, that it was all his fault, and that she should not worry because he would take care of everything. This testimony was presented to support the claim that the defendant was negligent.

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant testified that he did not make the alleged admission.
He asserted that the cause of the needle's breaking was the plaintiff's sudden turning of her head after he had warned her not to move.
He offered testimony concerning sterilization, the use of a new needle purchased from a regular dealer and made by a well-known manufacturer, and that he used his customary injection technique—material offered to show nonnegligent care in the procedure and the instrument.
At trial the defendant requested rulings that (a) if the jury found he said the needle broke through his fault, that statement was not conclusive against him; (b) the burden remained on the plaintiff to prove negligence; and (c) the statement was to be considered only as evidence bearing on whether the defendant was negligent. The judge refused these requested rulings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Zandan v. Radner, 242 Mass. 503, 505	Cited for the proposition that an admission by a defendant is evidence of negligence sufficient to require submission of the issue to the jury.	The court invoked this authority to support the statement that the defendant's admission was evidence requiring submission to the jury.
Barnett v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 233, 236	Also cited for the proposition that an admission is evidence of negligence necessitating jury consideration.	The court relied on it together with Zandan to justify that the admission required the case to go to the jury.
Bowditch Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Buffum, 2 Gray, 550, 552	Cited for the principle that an admission is not necessarily conclusive against a party as to the ultimate issue of negligence.	The court cited this authority to support its conclusion that the trial judge erred in ruling that proof of an admission bound the jury to find negligence.
Conant v. Evans, 202 Mass. 34	Cited in support of the rule that an admission is not conclusive and must be weighed with other evidence.	The court applied it to demonstrate that the judge's instruction making the admission conclusively establish negligence was erroneous.
Hawkes v. Lackey, 207 Mass. 424, 433	Cited for the same general proposition that admissions are evidentiary and not necessarily binding on the jury regarding negligence.	The court used this case among others to justify reversing the portion of the charge that treated the admission as conclusively establishing negligence.
Leary v. Keith, 256 Mass. 157, 158	Cited to support the proposition that admissions are to be considered as part of the evidence, not as conclusive proof of negligence.	The court cited Leary to reinforce that jurors should weigh such admissions along with all other evidence rather than be bound by them.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the undisputed fact that the needle broke while inserted by the defendant. It recognized the plaintiff's testimony that the defendant immediately admitted the accident was "all his fault" and would "take care of everything," and it recognized the defendant's contrary testimony that the plaintiff moved contrary to warning and that he had used proper technique and a new needle.

The court observed two distinct legal points reflected in these facts and the trial judge's rulings. First, a defendant's admission that an accident occurred through his fault is evidence of negligence sufficient to require submission of the negligence question to the jury. The court cited Zandan v. Radner and Barnett v. Roberts for that proposition.

Second, and dispositive here, the court concluded that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury, in effect, that if they found the defendant had made the statement that the accident was his fault, they were bound to find him negligent. The court relied on prior authorities (Bowditch Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Buffum; Conant v. Evans; Hawkes v. Lackey; Leary v. Keith) for the proposition that an admission is evidentiary and not conclusive of negligence as a matter of law.

The court explained the proper legal balance: while the admission is evidence that requires submission to the jury, it is only part of the evidence to be weighed. Jurors must consider the admission together with the defendant's testimony and all other evidence bearing on negligence. The jury might, after weighing all evidence, conclude that the plaintiff did not carry the burden of proving negligence even though an admission was made.

Because the trial judge refused the defendant's requested rulings that the admission was not conclusive and placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and instead charged that the admission established negligence as a matter of law, the court found error in the charge prejudicial to the defendant.

Holding and Implications

Exceptions sustained.

Direct effect: The defendant's exceptions to the trial court's refusal to give requested rulings and to the judge's charge on the legal effect of the alleged admission were sustained by the Supreme Judicial Court. The court held that although a defendant's admission that an accident was his fault is evidence requiring submission of the negligence issue to the jury, such an admission is not conclusive of negligence as a matter of law and must be weighed with all other evidence. The opinion does not state any broader rule beyond applying these principles to the charge in this case, and it does not purport to establish a new precedent beyond affirming the established rule that admissions are evidentiary and not necessarily decisive of negligence.

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GRACE TULLY vs. ISRAEL MANDELL.

Evidence, Admissions, Presumptions and burden of proof. Practice, Civil, Exceptions.

Belief by the jury, at the trial of an action of tort for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the defendant's negligence, of testimony by the plaintiff that the defendant said that the occurrence of an accident causing such injuries was all his fault, does not as a matter of law require them to find that the defendant was negligent: the issue of his negligence still is to be determined by them on all the evidence, including that testimony. After the introduction of evidence of the character above described at the trial of such an action, the defendant requested the trial judge to rule that, if the jury found that such a statement had been made by the defendant, it was not conclusive against the defendant; that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove the defendant negligent; and that the statement should be considered by them only as bearing on the issue of his negligence. The judge refused so to rule; and charged the jury that, if they found that the defendant had made the statement, he thereby admitted his negligence and was liable. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant alleged exceptions. Held, that the refusal of the defendant's request and the charge to the jury constituted error prejudicial to the defendant; and his exception must be sustained.

SANDERSON, J.

This is an action of tort to recover damages from a dentist for personal injuries, alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff because of the breaking of a hypodermic needle used for the purpose of anesthesia preparatory to the extraction of a tooth. It was admitted that the needle broke when inserted in the plaintiff's jaw by the defendant.

The plaintiff introduced testimony tending to prove that the defendant said immediately after the occurrence that he did not know how it could have happened, that it was all his fault and not to worry about it, that he would take care of everything. The defendant denied that he made the statement and testified that the cause of the breaking of the needle was the sudden turning by the plaintiff of her head after he had warned her not to move. He also described the sterilization of the instrument, the exact manner in which he made the injection, and testified that he used a new needle purchased from a regular dealer in dental supplies and made by a well known manufacturer, and that he adopted in making the injection the technique he had always used.

The judge charged the jury that if the defendant warned the plaintiff not to move her head when the injection was made, but she did move and the movement caused the needle to break, she could not recover. He refused to give the defendant's requests for rulings to the effect that if the jury found that the defendant told the plaintiff that it was his fault the needle broke, that statement was not conclusive against the defendant, that the burden was on the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent, and that such a statement was to be considered by them only as bearing on the question whether the defendant was in fact negligent. He charged the jury, in substance, that, if they should find that the defendant stated it was his fault that the needle broke, the defendant thereby admitted his negligence and was liable to the plaintiff for such damages as the plaintiff established to the satisfaction of the jury. At another place in his charge he instructed them that the plaintiff met the requirements of law as to the burden of proving negligence if she satisfied the jury that the defendant admitted the needle was broken by his fault; that if the defendant made that statement the jury would next take up the question of damages to be awarded. The exceptions of the defendant to the refusal of the court to give the ruling requested as to the effect of the admission, and to the rulings given on that subject, are the only questions of law argued by the defendant.

The admission of the defendant was evidence of negligence which required the submission of the case to the jury. Zandan v. Radner, 242 Mass. 503, 505. Barnett v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 233, 236. But the judge erred in ruling, in effect, that the jury would be bound to find the defendant negligent if he made the statement that the accident was attributable to his fault. Bowditch Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Buffum, 2 Gray, 550, 552. Conant v. Evans, 202 Mass. 34. Hawkes v. Lackey, 207 Mass. 424, 433. Leary v. Keith, 256 Mass. 157, 158. The verdict in favor of the plaintiff demonstrates that the jury did not find the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, but they should have been permitted to consider all of the testimony in passing upon the question of the defendant's negligence. His admission was but a part of that evidence to be weighed with the rest, and he was not concluded by it. The jury might have found if they had considered all the evidence on that issue that the plaintiff had not maintained the burden of proving the defendant negligent even though he made the admission attributed to him.

Exceptions sustained.

TULLY v. MANDELL