PIRES v. YOUREE

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Docket Number

No. 29697.

Attorney(S)

Cantey, Hanger McMahon, of Fort Worth, Tex., and Wilkinson, Lewis, Wilkinson Burford, of Shreveport, for appellants. John L. Young, of Dallas, Tex., and Barksdale, Bullock, Warren, Clark Van Hook, of Shreveport, for appellees.

Judges

ST. PAUL, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On July 12, 1916, L.A. Pires executed his will, which included a bequest of certain real estate in Shreveport, Louisiana, to Mrs. Bettie Scott Youree in trust. The will directed that the net income from the property be used by Mrs. Youree for charitable work in Shreveport, with the authority to name her successor trustee to perpetuate the trust. L.A. Pires died on July 3, 1922, and his will was duly probated.

The plaintiffs, who are blood relatives and nearest kin of L.A. Pires, challenged the validity of the will’s fifth paragraph, arguing that the bequest contained a prohibited fidei commissum and substitution in violation of Louisiana Civil Code article 1520. The defendant filed an exception of no cause of action, which was sustained by the trial court. Plaintiffs appealed from this judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the bequest in the will, creating a trust for charitable purposes with a trustee empowered to name successors, constituted an illegal fidei commissum or prohibited substitution under Louisiana law.
Whether Act No. 72 of 1918, which authorizes donations inter vivos or mortis causa to trustees for charitable purposes without designating specific beneficiaries, is valid and applicable to this case.
Whether Act No. 72 of 1918 violates section 16 of article 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, which limits the duration of substitutions, fidei commissa, and trusts to ten years after the testator’s death, except for educational, charitable, or religious donations.
Whether Act No. 72 of 1918 improperly has more than one object, thereby violating statutory requirements for legislation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

The legacy contains a fidei commissum and prohibited substitution, contrary to Louisiana Civil Code article 1520.
Act No. 72 of 1918 is unconstitutional as it violates the Louisiana Constitution’s prohibition on substitutions and fidei commissa lasting more than ten years after the testator’s death.
The statute has more than one object, which they argue is impermissible under statutory construction principles.

Appellees' Arguments

The bequest is valid under Act No. 72 of 1918, which authorizes the creation of charitable trusts without naming specific beneficiaries and allows trustees to appoint or change beneficiaries.
The statute expressly exempts such donations from the prohibitions against fidei commissa and substitutions.
The constitutional provision exempting educational, charitable, or religious donations from the ten-year limitation applies, making the act constitutional.
The statute has one object—to permit charitable trusts—and incidental effects on other laws do not invalidate it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Criswell v. Seay, 19 La. 528	Determining capacity to give or receive and validity of testamentary dispositions by reference to the donor's death date.	Established that the validity of the will’s disposition must be judged as of the testator’s death in 1922, when Act No. 72 of 1918 was in effect.
Succession of Marion, 163 La. 734, 112 So. 667	Interpretation of Act No. 72 of 1918 authorizing charitable trusts without naming specific beneficiaries and allowing trustees to select beneficiaries.	Confirmed that the statute permits creation of perpetual charitable trusts with trustee discretion to designate beneficiaries, directly supporting the validity of the Pires trust.
State v. Craig, 158 La. 866, 104 So. 744	Legislative principle that a statute may have one object even if it affects multiple branches or laws incidentally.	Supported the court’s rejection of the argument that Act No. 72 of 1918 had multiple impermissible objects, affirming the statute’s validity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by applying the principle that the validity of a testamentary disposition is judged as of the testator's death, citing Criswell v. Seay. Since Act No. 72 of 1918 was in effect at that time, the court examined its provisions, which expressly authorize donations to trustees for charitable purposes without specifying beneficiaries and permit trustees to appoint or change beneficiaries freely.

The court found that the testator’s bequest created a perpetual charitable trust consistent with the statute, with Mrs. Youree appointed as trustee empowered to select beneficiaries, thus complying with the law.

Further, the court noted that the statute explicitly exempts such donations from the prohibitions on fidei commissa and substitutions found in the Civil Code, negating the plaintiffs’ challenge on those grounds.

Addressing constitutional concerns, the court observed that the Louisiana Constitution’s prohibition on long-term substitutions does not apply to charitable donations, affirming the statute’s constitutionality.

Finally, the court rejected the argument that the statute had multiple objects, explaining that the statute’s sole object is to permit charitable trusts, and incidental effects on other laws do not invalidate it, relying on State v. Craig.

Holding and Implications

The court AFFIRMED the judgment sustaining the defendant’s exception of no cause of action, thereby upholding the validity of the will’s charitable trust provision.

This decision means that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the will’s fifth paragraph based on alleged fidei commissum and prohibited substitution was rejected. The trust created by the testator is valid under Act No. 72 of 1918 and constitutional provisions. No new precedent was established beyond affirming the applicability of the existing statute and constitutional exemptions to charitable trusts.

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PIRES ET AL. v. YOUREE ET AL.

ST. PAUL, J.

On July 12, 1916, L.A. Pires made his will, by the terms of which, after making other bequests and legacies, he gave and bequeathed to Mrs. Bettie Scott Youree certain real estate in Shreveport, La., in trust, with the request that the net income thereof "shall be used by her in charitable work in Shreveport, Louisiana, as she in her wisdom may determine wise and prudent," with the right in her to name her successor; and in case of her failure to do so, then such successor should be named by one of the district judges of Caddo parish "to the end that this trust shall be perpetuated."

Pires died on July 3, 1922, and his will was duly probated.

Plaintiffs are the blood relatives and nearest of kin of said Pires, and attack said legacy on the ground that it contains a fidei commissum and prohibited substitution, contrary to the provisions of Rev. Civ. Code, art. 1520.

The defendant filed an exception of no cause of action, which was sustained by the trial judge; and plaintiffs appeal.

We agree with the district judge that the exception was well founded. "In donations mortis causa, the rule is well settled that in order to determine on the capacity to give or to receive, or on the validity of a disposition in relation to its amount, reference must be had to the time of the donor's death, because it is not until then that the donation is to take effect." Criswell v. Seay, 19 La. 528. And at the time of the testator's death there was in effect in this state a statute, which in our opinion covers this case exactly, to wit, Act No. 72 of 1918, p. 108.

That act provides: "That it shall be lawful for anyone to make a donation inter vivos or mortis causa of any description of property to a trustee or trustees for educational, charitable or literary purposes generally, without designating the particular purpose to be fostered or aided, and in such cases to permit the trustee or trustees to appoint, create or change, from time to time and as often as they may deem wise, the beneficiary of such trust estate or any part thereof. * * *" Section 1.

In interpreting this act in Succession of Marion, 163 La. 734, 112 So. 667, 671, we said: "This act clearly authorized the creation of trust estates for educational, charitable, or literary purposes. It even dispenses with the necessity of the testator's naming the particular purpose to be fostered by the disposition, and makes it possible for him to arrange matters so that the trustee named by him may designate the particular purpose to be aided, and may name, create, or change from time to time the beneficiary of the trust estate. Primarily the act was intended to provide for the creation of trust estates for the purposes named, without designating a beneficiary or legatee, but leaving it to the trustee named by the testator to select from time to time the beneficiary."

That is precisely what the testator has done in this case. He has created a perpetual trust for charitable purposes; he has appointed Mrs. Youree the trustee for this estate; he has left to her to select the beneficiaries of the charity intended by him.

And the act expressly provides (section 7) that the provisions of the Revised Civil Code relative to substitutions, fidei commissa, or trust dispositions shall not apply to, or in any manner affect, donations made in accordance with the act.

II.

It is argued that Act No. 72 of 1918 violates section 16 of article 4 of the Constitution of 1921, which forbids the creation of substitutions, fidei commissa, and trust estates for a period of more than ten years after the death of the testator. But this very article itself provides that this prohibition shall not apply to donations for educational, charitable, or religious purposes.

It is further argued that Act No. 72 of 1918, has more than one object. We do not think so. The only object of the statute is to permit the creation of trust estates for educational, charitable, or literary purposes. The rest of the statute merely provides the manner in which this object may be carried out. "The requirement that a statute shall have only one object does not forbid the Legislature to deal with several branches of the subject stated in the title of the act, or to provide in one act all of the means necessary for carrying out its object." State v. Craig, 158 La. 866, 104 So. 744, 745. The fact that the provisions of the act for the carrying out of the object thereof affect a number of laws, on the same or on other subjects, does not in the least alter the case. This is merely incidental to the new law and not an object thereof. Whenever a new law is passed on any subject, its provisions necessarily affect some, perhaps many, laws on the same subject-matter. Nevertheless the new statute has but one object, and its effect on other laws is merely incidental to the carrying out of that one object. To say that new legislation could not be had unless its provisions accord with and do not affect prior legislation would be simply to say that no new legislation could be had at all.

Decree.

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.

O'NIELL, C.J., concurs in the result, but is of the opinion that the effect of the bequest was to make Mrs. Youree virtually the owner of the property.