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State v. Walker, Oregon Supreme Court (Argued Jan. 22, 1931; Affirmed Mar. 10, 1931; Rehearing denied Apr. 14, 1931)

Factual and Procedural Background

R.L. Walker was indicted by the Yamhill County grand jury on May 5, 1930, for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. He was tried, convicted, and on July 28 was sentenced to thirty days in the county jail, a fine of $500, and costs. The defendant seasonably moved to suppress certain intoxicating liquor seized by the sheriff, accompanying the motion with an affidavit alleging that the sheriff and deputy entered the defendant's barn without a search warrant, without permission, and unlawfully searched the premises and seized the liquor. The state filed a counter-affidavit by Sheriff G.W. Manning describing how he and his deputy observed lights and cars at the barn, entered to investigate, saw liquor in plain view during a dance, arrested the defendant, and seized the liquor. After a hearing on the affidavits the trial court denied the motion to suppress, admitted the seized evidence at trial, and convicted Walker. The only issue presented on appeal was whether the evidence admitted had been obtained in violation of section 9, article I, of the Oregon Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sheriff's warrantless entry onto the Walker barn premises rendered him an unlawful trespasser such that evidence seized therefrom must be suppressed as violative of Section 9, Article I of the Oregon Constitution (prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and warrant requirements).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • By affidavit, defendant asserted the barn event was an exclusive, invitational reception on premises belonging to his wife and under his control.
  • He claimed the sheriff and deputy "wrongfully and unlawfully entered" the premises on April 12, 1930, without any search warrant and without his permission or invitation, thereby committing trespass and violating his state constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

State's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • Sheriff G.W. Manning's counter-affidavit stated that while driving past the Walker farm he observed lights and a number of cars at the barn, and, being familiar with the property as ordinarily vacant, he entered to investigate.
  • Upon entry he and his deputy observed music and dancing in the barn loft and saw intoxicating liquor in plain view; he asserted he did not enter for the purpose of searching for liquor but found it in plain sight, made arrests, and seized the liquor.
  • The sheriff further averred he had interviewed attendees who stated they had not been invited by the defendant but had heard of the party indirectly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 496 (204 P. 958, 206 P. 290) That where alleged contraband is in plain view and not concealed, no search is required to discover it. The court relied on this precedent to conclude the liquor was discoverable in plain view and therefore its discovery did not require a warrant or constitute an unreasonable search.
State v. McDaniel, 115 Or. 187 (231 P. 965, 237 P. 373) That when an arrest is lawful, subsequent seizure of evidence or search of the premises incident to that arrest is lawful. The court applied this principle to hold that once the arrest of the defendant was lawful, the seizure of the liquor and further search were lawful and the evidence was admissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused on whether the sheriff was an unlawful trespasser at the time he entered the barn. It examined the circumstances: it was late at night; lights shone from the barn; cars were parked at the barnyard; the barn was plainly visible from the road; the barn door was open; and the sheriff was familiar with the property as ordinarily vacant. Given these facts, the court concluded the sheriff's entry to investigate was reasonable. The court observed that the sheriff was not invited but also had not been forbidden entry; under Oregon Code 1930, 14-371, he therefore was not an unlawful trespasser. Because the liquor was in plain view on the loft where dancing occurred, discovery required no search (citing State v. Laundy). Seeing the liquor and the defendant in possession authorized a warrantless arrest (citing Oregon Code 1930, 13-2111). Having found the arrest lawful, the court held that the seizure of evidentiary items and any subsequent search of the premises were lawful (citing State v. McDaniel). The trial court's factual finding as to the sequence of arrest and seizure (that arrest preceded seizure) was accepted by the appellate court.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The conviction and sentence of R.L. Walker were AFFIRMED. Rehearing was denied.

Implications: The direct effect is that the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and the conviction for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor were upheld; the defendant's sentence (thirty days' imprisonment, $500 fine, and costs) stands. The opinion resolves the appeal on the particular facts presented and applies established state authorities (as cited) to permit warrantless arrest and seizure where contraband is observed in plain view and the arrest is lawful. The opinion does not purport to announce any new, broader rule beyond its application to these facts.

STATE v. WALKER

CAMPBELL, J.

On the 5th of May, 1930, the defendant, R.L. Walker, was indicted by the grand jury of Yamhill county of the crime of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. On this indictment he was tried and convicted, and on July 28 was sentenced to be imprisoned in the county jail for thirty days and to pay a fine of $500 and the costs of the action. From this judgment defendant appeals.

Seasonably the defendant filed the following motion:

"Comes now the defendant by John J. Beckman, his attorney, and moves to suppress certain evidence, to wit: certain intoxicating liquor now in possession of plaintiff based upon the affidavit of defendant hereto annexed and made a part of this motion."

Accompanying the motion was the following affidavit:

"I, R.L. Walker, being first duly sworn say: That I am the defendant in the above entitled cause. That on April 12, 1930, in the evening of said day there was a dance and reception being held in a certain barn on the premises belonging to my wife, Mrs. Mary E. Walker, and which I had full management and control thereof, near Bellvue, Yamhill county, Oregon. That this dance and reception was purely for invited guests and not open to the public and the guests were there at my invitation. That on to wit: 10:30 p.m. of said day while said reception was in progress, G.W. Manning, the sheriff of said county, and his deputy wrongfully and unlawfully entered the said premises and the said barn without any search-warrant of any sort and without permission or invitation on my part and then and there searched the premises and claimed to have found there a certain quantity of beer, and thereupon arrested me and others on the premises, and based upon their said actions caused the charge and indictment against me in the above entitled cause.

"That the said sheriff and his deputy committed trespass in entering upon said premises and making such search of the same in violation of the rights guaranteed to me by the Constitution of the State of Oregon against unreasonable searches and seizures."

The state filed the following counter-affidavit:

"Comes now the Plaintiff and in answer to Defendants Affidavit and Motion to suppress evidence, submits the following Counter-Affidavit:

"I, G.W. Manning, being first duly sworn depose and say that on the evening of April 12th, 1930, I was driving with my son, Elisha, who was then and there a duly qualified and acting deputy sheriff, on official business along the county road past the farm owned by Mrs. Mary E. Walker, referred to in Defendant's Affidavit; that as I drew nearer said barn on said place I saw a light in the barn and a number of cars parked about it; that at said time and place I was and am familiar with the said farm and the community where it is located, and I knew that the buildings on said premises were vacant and seeing the lights and cars, I drove in to see what was going on. As we turned from the county road into the premises I heard music and dancing and the doors to the lower part of said barn were open: I, with Elisha Manning, walked in and went up the stairway to the upper floor where there was a crowd of people and a dance in progress; when we entered the loft of the barn where the dancing was in progress, we saw certain intoxicating liquor in the possession of the Defendant and I then and there placed the Defendant under arrest and seized said liquor, that I did not know that there was any intoxicating liquor in said barn and did not go into said barn for the purpose of making any search for intoxicating liquor, but saw said liquor and seized it, as above stated and not otherwise; that I have personally talked with a large number of people, who were in attendance at said party and dance, and who stated that they were not invited by Defendant, but heard of the party in other and indirect ways and attended; that among said persons so interviewed and who stated that they attended said party without an invitation from the Defendant were, Mary Orndoff, Alice Barcroft, Howard Copeland, and Mrs. G.E. Vannice."

After a hearing and consideration of the affidavits, the court denied the motion to suppress. On the trial of the cause, the evidence of the arrest and the circumstances of the finding and taking possession of the intoxicating liquor mentioned in the motion was substantially as alleged in the sheriff's affidavit. When the evidence sought to be suppressed was offered in the trial, the defendant objected. The objection was overruled and an exception saved. This is the only question raised in the appeal.

The defendant claims that the evidence admitted was obtained in violation of section 9, article I, of the Oregon Constitution, which reads as follows:

"No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized."

On the night of April 12, 1930, G.W. Manning, sheriff of Yamhill county, accompanied by his son, Elisha, who was a deputy sheriff, was traveling in his automobile along a county road which passes a farm owned by Mrs. Mary E. Walker, wife of the defendant. This farm is located about twelve miles southeasterly of McMinnville in said county. The sheriff was well acquainted with defendant and familiar with this community and this particular farm. He knew that the buildings on the farm were vacant and had been unoccupied for considerable time. The sheriff was on his way to one Tillman Johnson's who lived some distance beyond the Walker place. As he came close to the Walker place he saw lights in the barn and automobiles standing in front of it. The barn is about 150 feet distant from the road and there is nothing to obstruct the view, and it can be seen by persons travel the road for quite a distance. The barn is a large structure, two stories high. As the plaintiff entered the lane leading to the barn, he was like Tam o' Shanter approaching Alloway's old haunted kirk, "It seemed all in a bleeze, thro ilka bore, the gleams were glancing, and loud resounded mirth and dancing." As the sheriff entered the barnyard he glanced around the lot where the cars were parked and observed that the cars were unoccupied; then walked into the main part of the barn through the front door which was open; then turned through a passage by the side of a stairway into a portion of the barn where the horse stalls were located. He and his deputy glanced around again to see if any people were located here and found none. There being no lights on the first floor, the officers used their flashlights. They then proceeded up a stairway leading to the second floor which was lighted and where the dancing was in progress. As the sheriff looked out over the dance floor, he saw parties with glasses containing liquor in their hands, and a pitcher partially filled with the same kind of liquor setting on the floor. Upon the appearance of the officers, these glasses were emptied to the floor.

The sheriff's deputy saw the defendant, who had control of the building, setting down a glass jug nearly full of liquor. He also observed a box containing bottles of liquor which proved to be beer. The sheriff then informed the party that they were all under arrest and immediately seized all the intoxicating liquor in sight and proceeded to search the building for more. His search was rewarded by the discovery of another case of beer which he also seized. He then took the whole party to McMinnville where he detained them three or four hours, when he released all except defendant against whom he filed a charge of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. On this charge the indictment and conviction was had.

The defendant, in his affidavit, claims that the party that was being held in the barn loft on this particular night was intended as a very exclusive function. In fact, he says, it was strictly an invitational affair, and that no one was invited except his friends and such friends as his friends might invite. And it is quite evident from his viewpoint, that the sheriff of Yamhill county did not belong in either catagory. In other words, he looked upon the sheriff as a rank outsider. His affidavit says that the party was intended as a reciprocal reception and dance. He does not state precisely for whom the reception was intended, but leaves no doubt that it was not the sheriff.

This case depends entirely upon whether the sheriff at the time he visited the premises was an unlawful trespasser. Let us consider the time, the place and the circumstances of the sheriff's visit. It was between ten-thirty and eleven o'clock at night. The gates leading to the barn were ajar. Light was shining from the loft of the barn. The dwelling house was still dark and unoccupied. Music and dancing were in progress. The door to the barn was open. The owner was not temporarily absent, but had not occupied the premises for months. This was such an unusual occurrence that the sheriff might well be induced to make inquiries. It would be considered a very reasonable thing for him to do. Suppose that the owner was not found on the premises, and those that were there were using the barn, without authority, for an unlawful purpose. Then the sheriff's act would have been highly commended. The sheriff was not in search of evidence of any particular crime, but having entered and found a crime being committed in his presence, he had a right to take the steps which he had taken. While there is some dispute in the testimony as to the sequence of the steps taken, the sheriff claims that he made the arrest before seizure or search. The learned trial court accepted the sheriff's view, as he had a right to do, as to the way in which the events occurred.

It will not be contended that the sheriff could have been arrested for going upon the premises at the time and in the manner in which he paid his visit. While he was not invited to come either orally or in writing, neither was he forbidden to come upon the premises, nor was he asked to depart therefrom, so that he was not an unlawful trespasser: Oregon Code 1930, 14-371. It required no search to discover the liquor. It was not concealed. It was in plain view, in the presence of the sheriff and every other person on the floor: State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 496 ( 204 P. 958, 206 P. 290). Therefore, seeing the liquor and the defendant in possession, he had a right to make the arrest without a warrant: Oregon Code 1930, 13-2111. The arrest being lawful, seizure of anything of evidentiary value or search of the premises thereafter was lawful: State v. McDaniel, 115 Or. 187 ( 231 P. 965, 237 P. 373). Evidence coming lawfully into the possession of the state could be used against the defendant.

The court committed no error in refusing to suppress, nor in admitting the seized exhibits in evidence. None of defendant's constitutional rights were invaded. The judgment is affirmed.

BEAN, C.J., BROWN and BELT, JJ., concur.

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STATE v. WALKER
(Apr 14, 1931)