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  • For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by James T. McGuckin, of Sundance, Wyoming. Plaintiff is not entitled to a divorce. The evidence established the fact that plaintiff's parents were primarily responsible for domestic difficulties of the parties. There is no evidence of any cruelty practised on plaintiff by defendant. Mental suffering is not ground of divorce, unless it impairs health. 14 Cyc. 604; Robinson v. Robinson, 23 A. 362; Mahnken v. Mahnken, 82 N.W. 870; Barnes v. Barnes, (Calif.) 16 L.R.A. 664. Divorce should not be granted upon trivial grounds. Public policy requires the preservation of the marriage relation. Vanduzer v. Vanduzer, (Ia.) 31 N.W. 956. Divorce will be denied in the absence of testimony indicating that any effect mentally or physically resulted to plaintiff, from language used by defendant. Maben v. Maben, (Ia.) 34 N.W. 462. The trial court erred in granting the plaintiff a divorce. For the respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Otis Reynolds, of Sundance, Wyoming. The evidence fully established cruelty, practised by defendant, and the decree of the trial court is well supported by the evidence. The unfriendliness of plaintiff's parents toward defendant was shown to be justified, by reason of his conduct. It was unnecessary to show that defendant's conduct caused physical or mental suffering. 19 C.J. 49; Carpenter v. Carpenter, (Kas.) 2 P. 122; Dunn v. Dunn, (Mich.) 114 N.W. 385. The youth of plaintiff called for the greatest consideration and kindness of treatment for plaintiff. Boyle v. Boyle, (N.J.) 72 A. 1118. A judgment will not be reversed where sustained by substantial evidence. James T. McGuckin, in reply. The authorities cited by respondent do not apply to the facts here. There was no abortion, nor a showing that the husband insisted upon it. The general rule laid down by the authorities is that alleged cruelty must be shown to have caused impairment of health. The causing of mere unhappiness is insufficient. McClenahen v. McClenahan, 80 A. 677; Cline v. Cline, 10 Or. 474; Lyon v. Lyon, 134 P. 650.
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  • BLUME, Justice.
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  • For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by James T. McGuckin, of Sundance, Wyoming. Plaintiff is not entitled to a divorce. The evidence established the fact that plaintiff's parents were primarily responsible for domestic difficulties of the parties. There is no evidence of any cruelty practised on plaintiff by defendant. Mental suffering is not ground of divorce, unless it impairs health. 14 Cyc. 604; Robinson v. Robinson, 23 A. 362; Mahnken v. Mahnken, 82 N.W. 870; Barnes v. Barnes, (Calif.) 16 L.R.A. 664. Divorce should not be granted upon trivial grounds. Public policy requires the preservation of the marriage relation. Vanduzer v. Vanduzer, (Ia.) 31 N.W. 956. Divorce will be denied in the absence of testimony indicating that any effect mentally or physically resulted to plaintiff, from language used by defendant. Maben v. Maben, (Ia.) 34 N.W. 462. The trial court erred in granting the plaintiff a divorce. For the respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Otis Reynolds, of Sundance, Wyoming. The evidence fully established cruelty, practised by defendant, and the decree of the trial court is well supported by the evidence. The unfriendliness of plaintiff's parents toward defendant was shown to be justified, by reason of his conduct. It was unnecessary to show that defendant's conduct caused physical or mental suffering. 19 C.J. 49; Carpenter v. Carpenter, (Kas.) 2 P. 122; Dunn v. Dunn, (Mich.) 114 N.W. 385. The youth of plaintiff called for the greatest consideration and kindness of treatment for plaintiff. Boyle v. Boyle, (N.J.) 72 A. 1118. A judgment will not be reversed where sustained by substantial evidence. James T. McGuckin, in reply. The authorities cited by respondent do not apply to the facts here. There was no abortion, nor a showing that the husband insisted upon it. The general rule laid down by the authorities is that alleged cruelty must be shown to have caused impairment of health. The causing of mere unhappiness is insufficient. McClenahen v. McClenahan, 80 A. 677; Cline v. Cline, 10 Or. 474; Lyon v. Lyon, 134 P. 650.
Judges
  • BLUME, Justice.
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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Mahoney v. Mahoney (May 19, 1931)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Murel Mahoney, was granted a divorce from the defendant, Lowell Mahoney, and the defendant appealed. The parties were married in 1928; plaintiff was 18 and defendant 22. According to plaintiff's testimony, difficulties arose when she became pregnant: defendant was displeased, gave her medicine to produce an abortion and attempted for months to induce her to have an abortion, persisted even after the child's birth, and ultimately presented the plaintiff with the choice to "dispose of the child or to leave him." Plaintiff testified she initially took the medicine but later changed her mind, and within about two weeks after the child's birth she left defendant's home and returned to her parents' house. Plaintiff's account was corroborated in part by her step-mother's testimony of an admission by defendant and by a letter from defendant admitting he caused the separation and begging forgiveness. The trial court found for the plaintiff and granted a divorce; defendant appealed from that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the facts shown — including attempts to induce abortion, the defendant's rejection of the child, and the presentation of an ultimatum to the plaintiff — constituted "extreme cruelty" or other statutory grounds sufficient to support a divorce.
  2. Whether proof of impairment of physical or mental health is required to establish extreme cruelty (i.e., whether mere mental suffering or unhappiness is sufficient to ground a divorce).
  3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in accepting the plaintiff's testimony and granting the divorce on the record presented.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (defendant's) Arguments

  • Plaintiff is not entitled to a divorce; the evidence showed plaintiff's parents were primarily responsible for the domestic difficulties.
  • There was no evidence that defendant practiced cruelty upon plaintiff.
  • Mental suffering alone is not a ground for divorce unless it impairs health; the evidence did not show impairment of health.
  • Cited authorities to support these contentions included: "14 Cyc. 604; Robinson v. Robinson, 23 A. 362; Mahnken v. Mahnken, 82 N.W. 870; Barnes v. Barnes (Calif.) 16 L.R.A. 664; Vanduzer v. Vanduzer (Ia.) 31 N.W. 956; Maben v. Maben (Ia.) 34 N.W. 462."

Respondent's (plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The evidence fully established cruelty by defendant and supports the trial court's decree.
  • The unfriendliness of plaintiff's parents toward defendant was shown to be justified by defendant's conduct.
  • It was unnecessary to show that the defendant's conduct caused physical or mental suffering impairing health; mental cruelty may suffice.
  • Cited authorities included: "19 C.J. 49; Carpenter v. Carpenter (Kas.) 2 P. 122; Dunn v. Dunn (Mich.) 114 N.W. 385; Boyle v. Boyle (N.J.) 72 A. 1118."

Reply (by appellant's counsel)

  • Argued that respondent's authorities do not apply to the facts; there was no abortion shown nor a showing that husband insisted upon it.
  • Restated that the general rule requires alleged cruelty to have caused impairment of health; mere unhappiness is insufficient.
  • Cited authorities in support of that rule: "McClenahen v. McClenahan, 80 A. 677; Cline v. Cline, 10 Or. 474; Lyon v. Lyon, 134 P. 650."

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
14 Cyc. 604 Cited by appellant to support that mental suffering is not a ground for divorce unless it impairs health. The court acknowledged authorities requiring impairment but did not adopt an absolute rule that impairment of health is necessary.
Robinson v. Robinson, 23 A. 362 Cited by appellant in support of the proposition that mere mental suffering is insufficient without impairment. Cited by appellant; the court did not follow this as a mandatory rule for all cases and recognized contrary authorities.
Mahnken v. Mahnken, 82 N.W. 870 Cited by appellant to show authorities requiring impairment of health for cruelty to warrant divorce. Cited by appellant; the court considered that some courts hold this view but found other authorities persuasive that mental cruelty may suffice.
Barnes v. Barnes, (Calif.) 16 L.R.A. 664 Cited by appellant for the rule that trivial causes or mere unhappiness are insufficient to grant divorce. Cited by appellant; the court emphasized preservation of marriage but concluded the facts here warranted relief.
Vanduzer v. Vanduzer, (Ia.) 31 N.W. 956 Cited by appellant to stress public policy favoring preservation of marriage and denying divorce on trivial grounds. Cited by appellant; court acknowledged public policy but held the record supported the trial court's finding of sufficient grounds.
Maben v. Maben, (Ia.) 34 N.W. 462 Cited by appellant for the proposition that divorce will be denied absent testimony showing mental or physical effect on the plaintiff caused by defendant's language or conduct. Cited by appellant; court concluded plaintiff's mental suffering was sufficiently shown and that indignities could render marriage intolerable without proof of health impairment.
19 C.J. 49 Cited by respondent to support that it is unnecessary to show impairment of health and that mental cruelty can constitute ground for divorce. The court relied on and cited 19 C.J. in support of the view that mental cruelty may suffice as a ground for divorce.
Carpenter v. Carpenter, (Kas.) 2 P. 122 Cited by respondent to support that showing impairment of health is unnecessary. Cited by respondent; court cited similar authorities and adopted the position that physical injury is not always required.
Dunn v. Dunn, (Mich.) 114 N.W. 385 Cited by respondent for the proposition that proof of impairment is unnecessary to establish cruelty in some jurisdictions. Cited by respondent; court treated these authorities as part of the body of precedent supporting mental cruelty as sufficient.
Boyle v. Boyle, (N.J.) 72 A. 1118 Cited by respondent to emphasize special consideration owed to the youth of the plaintiff and need for kindness of treatment. Cited by respondent; court noted the youth of the plaintiff and the need for consideration in judging the conduct complained of.
McClenahen v. McClenahan, 80 A. 677 Cited by appellant in reply to reaffirm the general rule that cruelty must show impairment of health. Cited by appellant in reply; court did not adopt this as a controlling rule for the case before it.
Cline v. Cline, 10 Or. 474 Cited by appellant in reply as authority requiring impairment of health for cruelty to warrant divorce. Cited by appellant in reply; court acknowledged that some courts so hold but applied contrary authorities to the facts here.
Lyon v. Lyon, 134 P. 650 Cited by appellant in reply supporting the impairment-of-health requirement. Cited by appellant in reply; court addressed the split in authority and found mental suffering/indignities sufficient under the circumstances.
9 R.C.L. 342-343 Cited by the court to show that some courts recognize mental cruelty as sufficient where statutory definitions include grievous mental suffering. Used by the court to explain the split of authority and to support the proposition that physical cruelty is not always necessary.
Donaldson v. Donaldson, 31 Ida. 180, 170 P. 94 Cited by the court as an example of authority holding mental cruelty sufficient for divorce. Relied upon by the court as part of the line of authorities supporting mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
Williams v. Williams, 85 Mont. 446, 278 P. 1009 Cited by the court as another authority recognizing mental cruelty as sufficient under statute. Relied upon by the court as part of the authorities showing that impairment of health is not required in all jurisdictions.
19 C.J. 45 Cited by the court for the proposition that if the peace of mind and happiness of the injured party is destroyed to the extent of defeating the legitimate objects of marriage, divorce is warranted. Quoted by the court to support the view that destruction of peace of mind and happiness may justify divorce.
Polakoff v. Polakoff, 51 Cal.App. 359, 196 P. 778 Cited by the court for the principle that trial courts have latitude and discretion in determining sufficiency of grounds for divorce. Used by the court to justify deference to the trial court's credibility determinations and findings of fact.
Krupp v. Krupp, 95 Pa. Super. 474 Cited by the court for the proposition that where the defendant is guilty of indignities, impairment of health need not be shown. Relied on by the court to support granting divorce on the alternate ground of indignities without a showing of impaired health.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first noted that the credibility of competing testimony was for the trial court to decide and that the record contained corroborative evidence supporting plaintiff's account (the step-mother's testimony and a letter from defendant admitting responsibility for the separation). The court identified the petition's stated ground as extreme cruelty and examined whether the facts shown met that standard.

The court recognized a division in authority: some courts require impairment of health to establish extreme cruelty, while others — particularly under statutes defining extreme cruelty to include grievous mental suffering — hold mental cruelty alone may suffice. The court cited authorities (9 R.C.L., Donaldson, Williams, and 19 C.J.) indicating that physical cruelty is not necessary and that destruction of peace of mind to the extent of defeating the marriage's legitimate objects can warrant divorce.

Applying these principles to the record, the court concluded that plaintiff's continual crying after the child's birth and the virtual rejection of the child by defendant necessarily produced mental suffering. The court found that plaintiff had no assurance defendant's conduct would not be repeated upon another pregnancy, and therefore the trial court was not unwarranted in finding facts sufficient for divorce.

The court further reasoned that even if the conduct could not be labeled "extreme cruelty" in the strict sense, the defendant's conduct amounted to indignities rendering the plaintiff's condition intolerable — a statutory ground for divorce. Since the petition detailed the facts supporting those allegations, the court considered the judgment adequately supported on that alternative ground. The court relied on authorities (including Krupp v. Krupp) holding that impairment of health need not be shown when indignities are proven.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff a divorce is AFFIRMED.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is to sustain the trial court's decree granting Murel Mahoney a divorce from Lowell Mahoney.
  • The court's opinion endorses the view — supported by cited authorities — that mental cruelty or the offering of such indignities as to render a spouse's condition intolerable can suffice as statutory grounds for divorce, and that impairment of health is not an absolute prerequisite in such circumstances.
  • The court affirmed the deference due to trial courts on credibility and factual findings and did not disturb the trial court's exercise of discretion on the sufficiency of grounds in this record.
Show full summary ...

MAHONEY v. MAHONEY

BLUME, Justice.

The plaintiff herein, Murel Mahoney, was granted a divorce from the defendant Lowell Mahoney, and the latter has appealed.

No good purpose would be subserved in setting forth the details of the facts as shown by the record. Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1928, the former 18, the latter 22 years of age. They had no trouble or difficulties until a child was expected. Plaintiff claims and testified that the defendant was displeased with that fact, gave her medicine to produce an abortion, attempted for months to induce her to get rid of the child, persisting therein even after its birth, and then, after the baby was born, virtually gave her the choice, either to dispose of the child or to leave him. While, during the early period of pregnancy, she willingly took the medicine, it seems clear that she afterwards changed her mind, and she testified that when the choice above mentioned was presented to her, she informed her husband that she would live with her child, and that she soon thereafter, and within about two weeks after the child's birth, left defendant's home and returned to the home of her parents. There is, contrary to defendant's contention, corroborative testimony of plaintiff's claim. The latter's step-mother testified to an admission on defendant's part of the vital portion of plaintiff's charge. And a few days after the parties separated, defendant wrote a letter, admitting that he was the cause of the separation and begged forgiveness, and promised that he would do better in the future. No adequate explanation of this letter, or of the causes of separation were given by defendant in his testimony. True, the facts above mentioned were denied by him, and he was to some extent corroborated by other testimony, but the credibility of the witnesses was for the trial court, and we cannot interfere with its finding on this point.

The basis for the divorce, as stated in the petition, was extreme cruelty, and counsel for the defendant contends that the facts shown by the plaintiff are not such as to authorize a divorce on the ground mentioned, first, because the plaintiff failed to testify to any physical or mental suffering, and second, because the record fails to disclose that plaintiff's health was impaired. There is testimony, however, that immediately after the birth of the child, plaintiff cried continually, and mental suffering on the part of the plaintiff, assuming that her testimony is true, must have been the inevitable result of defendant's conduct. Virtual rejection by the defendant of his child must have wounded the plaintiff's feelings deeply.

A number of courts seem to hold that impairment of health is necessary to constitute extreme cruelty. Other courts, however, under a statute which defines extreme cruelty as consisting of the infliction either of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering, hold the contrary. 9 R.C.L. 342-343; Donaldson v. Donaldson, 31 Ida. 180, 170 P. 94; Williams v. Williams, 85 Mont. 446, 278 P. 1009. Our statute does not define extreme cruelty. Still we think that the cases last cited are not inapplicable, for the statute in these states merely recognizes the general rule, prevailing in modern times, that physical cruelty is not necessary in order to constitute a ground for divorce, but that mental cruelty is sufficient. 19 C.J. 49. And a number of courts hold, as shown by 19 C.J. 45, that if the peace of mind and happiness of the injured party is destroyed to the extent of defeating the legitimate objects of the marriage, a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty is warranted. In the case at bar, plaintiff had no assurance that, in case of another pregnancy, defendant's conduct would not be repeated, and we cannot say that the trial court was unwarranted in finding the facts to be sufficient to constitute grounds for divorce. Some latitude for the exercise of discretion is permitted to the trial court in determining the sufficiency of such grounds, and its finding will stand in the absence of abuse of discretion. Polakoff v. Polakoff, 51 Cal.App. 359, 196 P. 778. Even if it cannot be held that the defendant was guilty of extreme cruelty, the court was, we think, warranted in granting a divorce on the ground that the defendant offered such indignities to the plaintiff as to render her condition intolerable. That is one of the grounds for divorce under our statute. The petition in this case, while alleging that the defendant was guilty of extreme cruelty, further stated the facts in detail, and hence, we may well, in support of the judgment of the trial court, consider it as being based on the ground last stated. And it has been held that where the defendant is guilty of such indignities, impairment of health need not be shown. Krupp v. Krupp, 95 Pa. Super. 474 and cases cited.

The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and it is so ordered.

Affirmed.

KIMBALL, Ch. J., and RINER, J., concur.

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MAHONEY v. MAHONEY
(May 19, 1931)