Case Summary: STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. EDWIN K. TULLIDGE v. State Board of Medical Examiners

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an original-jurisdiction mandamus proceeding. An Alternative Writ of Mandamus was granted by the Supreme Court of Florida directing the State Board of Medical Examiners to restore the relator Edwin K. Tullidge's name to the roll of licensed physicians in Florida, reinstate his license, and set aside the Board's prior order revoking that license. Respondents filed a timely motion to quash the alternative writ, invoking section 3415, Compiled General Laws of Florida (section thirteen, chapter 12285 Acts of 1927), as a bar to the mandamus relief.

The record shows that charges were preferred against the relator and that a time and place for hearing were fixed as the statute prescribes. However, the record does not show that a copy of the charges or notice of the hearing was served on the relator, nor that he was afforded the statutory rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses, produce witnesses in his defense, or appear personally or by counsel. The respondents nevertheless met and removed the relator's name from the roll without providing those statutory protections. The Supreme Court considered the motion to quash and the statutory scheme and ruled accordingly.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether section 3415 (chapter 12285, Acts of 1927) — providing administrative procedures, judicial review by certiorari, trial de novo in circuit court, and appeals — constitutes a complete and adequate remedy that bars mandamus relief.
Whether, given the alleged failure of the Board to follow the statutory procedural requirements (notice, opportunity to be heard, confrontation/cross-examination, and right to counsel), mandamus is an appropriate remedy to restore the relator pending proper proceedings under the statute.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ex Parte Beattie, 98 Fla. 785 and 885, 124 So.2d 459	That the statutory remedy provided for revocation/suspension is not necessarily the sole and exclusive relief for an accused.	The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that mandamus (or other relief) may remain available despite the statutory remedy in some circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed section 3415's procedural scheme, noting that the statute:

Enumerates grounds for revocation, suspension, or annulment of medical licenses.
Requires that proceedings be begun by filing written charges and that the Board fix a time and place for hearing "as soon as convenient," with a copy of the charges and notice of the hearing served on the accused at least ten days before the hearing.
Affords the accused the right to cross-examine witnesses, produce witnesses in defense, and to appear personally or by counsel.
Permits suspension by a two-thirds vote upon satisfactory proof and provides for review by certiorari to the circuit court, a trial de novo in the circuit court, and appeals to the Supreme Court as in chancery appeals.

The Court acknowledged that, when the Board follows the statutory procedure, the statute provides a "complete and adequate remedy" other than mandamus. However, relying on Ex Parte Beattie, the Court stated that the statutory remedy is not necessarily the exclusive relief in all circumstances.

Applying these principles to the record, the Court found that, although charges and a hearing time/place were fixed, the Board did not comply with the statute's mandatory procedural protections: there is no showing that the charges or notice were served on the relator, and he was not afforded the rights to confront or cross-examine witnesses, to produce witnesses, or to appear personally or by counsel. Instead, the Board proceeded to remove his name from the roll without allowing him to defend himself. The Court characterized that action as a summary deprivation of rights ("they 'shot him on the ground' without giving him a chance for his defense") and concluded that, because of the lack of statutory proceedings, there was nothing for a circuit court to review.

On that basis the Court determined that, under the allegations of the petition for the alternative writ, the relator was entitled to restoration of his name to the roll, subject to subsequent proper proceedings under the statute.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court overruled the respondents' motion to quash the Alternative Writ of Mandamus and held that the relator is entitled to have his name restored to the roll of licensed practitioners, subject to proper proceedings under section 3415. The respondents were given ten days to answer.

Implications: The direct effect is that the relator's name is to be restored and the respondents must respond within ten days; any further revocation must proceed in compliance with the statutory procedures set forth in section 3415. The opinion applies existing principles (as reflected in Ex Parte Beattie) about the availability of non-statutory remedies when statutory procedures are not observed. The opinion does not articulate broader precedent beyond this application to the facts presented.

Opinion filed December 9, 1931. Per curiam. WHITFIELD, P.J., and DAVIS, J.J., concur. BUFORD, C.J., ELLIS, and BROWN, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.

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STATE OF FLORIDA, ex rel. EDWIN K. TULLIDGE, Relator, vs. S. G. HOLLINGSWORTH, J. D. RABORN, W. M. ROWLETT, N. A. BALTZELL, J. E. CRUMP, THOS.C. HUTSON, J. M. MANN, E. C. PEEK, T. D. VASSAR, CARL WILLIAMS, C. E. TUMLIN, as State Board of Medical Examiners of Florida, Respondents.

PER CURIAM. —

Alternative Writ of Mandamus was granted by this Court directed to the State Board of Medical Examiners commanding them to restore the name of relator, Edwin K. Tullidge to the roll as a legally licensed doctor, physician and surgeon in the State of Florida and to reinstate his license as such and set aside and vacate the order heretofore made by them revoking the license of said Edwin K. Tullidge. A motion to quash the alternative writ was seasonably entered.

The motion to quash invokes the provisions of section thirteen, chapter 12285 Acts of 1927, being section 3415 Compiled General Laws of Florida, 1927, as a bar to relief on behalf of relator, it being contended that said act provides a complete and adequate remedy peculiar to causes of this kind.

Section 3415 Compiled General Laws of Florida, 1927, provides for revoking, suspending or annulling the license of practitioners of medicine in this state. After enumerating the grounds for such revocation or suspension, the statute defines the procedure to be followed in these terms:

"Proceedings for revocation of a license or the annulment of registration shall be begun by filing written charge or charges against the accused. These charges may be preferred by any person or corporation or the board may, on its own motion, direct the executive officer of said board to prefer said charges. Said charges shall be filed with the secretary-treasurer of said board: upon the filing of said charges as herein provided, a time and place for the hearing of said charges shall be fixed by said board as soon as convenient, and a copy of the charges, together with a notice of the time and place when they will be heard and determined shall be served upon the accused at least ten days before the date actually fixed for said hearing. At said hearing, the accused shall have the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to produce witnesses in his defense, and to appear personally or by counsel. Said board may, upon satisfactory proof made that any licentiate has been guilty of any of the charges against him, suspend such licentiate from the practice of medicine, and call in the license of said licentiate, upon a two-thirds majority vote of the board: Provided however, that such suspended physician may have the proceedings of said board reviewed by certiorari to the circuit court of the circuit in which said license is recorded."

The statute further provides that the accused may have a trial de novo before the circuit court and his guilt or innocence determined there according to the evidence and law applicable to the facts produced before him. Appeals to the supreme court are also provided in the same manner as appeals in chancery are taken.

There can be no doubt that the statute as above quoted and referred to provides a complete and adequate remedy other than mandamus for one aggrieved who has had his license to practice medicine revoked or annulled when such a result has been reached by a compliance with the terms of the statute. We do not however, hold that the remedy provided in the statute brought in question would under the circumstances presented in this case, offer the sole and exclusive relief for the accused. Ex Parte Beattie, 98 Fla. 785 and 885, 124 So.2d 459.

In the case at bar, it appears that charges were preferred against the relator and the time and place for hearing them were fixed as the law directs but so far as the record discloses no other attempt whatever was made to comply with the statute. It is not shown that a copy of the charges or notice of the time and place of hearing them was ever served on the accused, he was not given the right to confront his accusers and cross-examine the witnesses against him, or to produce witnesses in his defense or to appear personally or by counsel as the law provides. These rights are fundamental to the accused and their observance on the part of respondents is made mandatory but so far as the record shows they were completely ignored. It appears that the respondents met at the time and place appointed and peremptorially struck the name of relator from the roll of those licensed to practice medicine in this state. In other words they "shot him on the ground" without giving him a chance for his defense. This procedure was contrary to the spirit of our institutions and directly opposed to the letter of the law governing such procedure.

Under the circumstances, there is nothing for the circuit court to review on which it could predicate its judgment. We think therefore that under the allegations of the petition for the alternative writ, the relator is entitled to have his name restored to the roll as prayed for in his petition subject to proper proceedings under the statute.

The motion to quash is accordingly overruled, and respondents given ten days to answer as they may be advised.

WHITFIELD, P.J., AND DAVIS, J.J., concur.

BUFORD, C.J., AND ELLIS AND BROWN, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.

STATE EX REL. TULLIDGE, v. HOLLINGSWORTH ET AL