1. Petitioner charged defendants with criminal contempt. This is a criminal trial and the mere fact that the case is tried before a single judge does not alter the fundamental principles that apply when the defendants are tried on an indictment found by a grand jury.
2. The defendants are presumed to be innocent and the burden of proof is on the prosecutor of showing the truth of every material allegation of the charge against them.
3. To be guilty of contempt of court, it is essential that the contemner be aware of the order that he is charged with violating. There has been no attempt to prove that any of the defendants had any knowledge of the order they are charged with violating.
4. The allowance of a counsel fee to a successful defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding is within the discretion of the court. The Chancery act of 1902, section 91, as amended P.L. 1910 p. 427; Comp. Stat. p. 445, providing that "in any cause, matter or proceeding in the court of chancery, the chancellor may make such allowance by way of counsel fee to the party or parties obtaining the order or decree as shall seem to him to be reasonable and proper, and shall direct which of the parties shall pay such allowances," is sufficiently broad to include the instant case where defendants were allowed a counsel fee to be paid by petitioner.
PER CURIAM.
The decree appealed from will be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinions filed by Vice-Chancellor Bigelow. For affirmance — THE CHIEF-JUSTICE, TRENCHARD, PARKER, CAMPBELL, LLOYD, CASE, BODINE, DALY, DONGES, VAN BUSKIRK, KAYS, HETFIELD, DEAR, WELLS, KERNEY, JJ. 15.
For reversal — None.